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Chapter I: Introduction 
Motivation 
Science and ethics are two areas that within philosophy are often considered disjoint. 
A typical separation between the two delineates science as a description of the way things 
are, while philosophy, especially ethics, is concerned with an evaluation of human action 
and how we ought to be. One historical motivation for this split can be referenced to 
Hurne's mention of the naturalistic fallacy (sometimes called the "Is-Ought" or 
"FactNalue" problem) in his work, A Treatise of Human Nature (3.1.1.27). The 
naturalistic fallacy claims that a person cannot maintain logical validity and 
simultaneously draw a valued conclusion from a set of purely factual premises. For 
example, given that a soft drink contains poison, a person cannot logically conclude that 
the soft drink should not be ingested unless it is also the case that a person should not 
consume poisoned drinks. Simply put, the naturalistic fallacy concerns itself with 
surreptitiously placing value where none is conventionally found. Thus, fear of 
committing the naturalistic fallacy gives is a reason to be cautious about injecting moral 
value into science or deriving moral value from science. Nevertheless, people still 
combine scientific theory with ethical considerations, for example, in Social Darwinism. 
A question naturally occurs: What, if anything, is the underlying connection between 
science and ethics? Dr. Doren Recker's work with metaphor suggests a possible answer. 
Dr. Recker is investigating the cognitive functions of metaphors, especially 
metaphors used in science. It is my understanding that part of his research maintains that 
successful metaphors used in science are misused in pseudo-science, e.g., in the 
evolution-creationism debate. Recker's work brings out two ideas: (1) the idea that 
metaphor can play one of two basic roles-either as a cognitive tool for understanding or 
as a rhetorical tool for more colorful language-and (2) the idea that metaphor can be a 
bridge between two areas. 
This paper explores aspects of metaphor theory that lead to a possible application of 
metaphor as a cognitive connection between science and ethics. I suggest (although do 
not fully defend) that this is the first step in an exploration into the possibility that the 
success of the use of metaphor in science is "bleeding" over into the use of metaphor in 
ethics. Several case studies suggest this: understanding the world as "a machine" vs. the 
world "as an organism" as used in science and ethics, "survival of the fittest" in Darwin's 
evolutionary theory with "survival of the fittest" in Social-Darwinism's socio-economic- 
political theory. Although it would be an interesting empirical pursuit, this thesis is not 
concerned with proving that the successful use or misuse of metaphor in ethics is causally 
related to the successful use of metaphor in science. In other words, the thesis is not 
trylng to establish a causal relationship between metaphor in science and metaphor in 
ethics. Instead, this project sets out to investigate aspects of metaphor theory and 
metaphor as used in science and ethics. I hope to clarify the role of metaphor as a 
hypothetical foundation for a cognitive connection between science and ethics. I 
ultimately conclude that since metaphor structures thought by providing a mechanism for 
understanding one area in terms of another, it should be no surprise that when science and 
ethics use metaphor, then there will be a connection between the two. 
Outline 
This thesis is roughly divided into three parts: Theory, application, and 
miscellaneous information. Chapter two concentrates on the evolution of metaphor 
theory as seen through the path of three traditional theories of metaphor: Comparison, 
Interaction, and Speech-Act. This chapter is not attempting a complete analysis of those 
three theories, but trying to understand how to get to a cognitive view of metaphor. 
Chapter three continues this exploration by examining Donald Davidson's comments on 
metaphor. We further explore George Lakoff and Mark Johnson's account of metaphor. 
Ultimately, we see how a cognitive view of metaphor endorses understanding one area in 
terms of another. Chapter four begins the first of the application chapters. In this chapter 
we look at two foundational metaphors "The World is a Machine" and "The World is an 
Organism." We see how these metaphors structure science and ethics. This is the first 
major example of metaphor providing a link between science and ethics. Chapter five 
also is a major example of metaphor linking science and ethics. In this chapter, we look 
at evolutionary metaphor in Darwin's Theory of Evolution and how his metaphors are 
then used in ethics. Chapter six presents three short examples of metaphors in action. 
We see how the Nazis used metaphor to establish "Truth" (with a capital T) to justify 
genocide. Then we see how Garrett Hardin uses metaphor to arrive at "truth" (with a 
lower case t) to solve population problems. Finally, we get back into science by drawing 
out some implications of George Lakoff and Rafael E. Nuiiez's work with metaphor in 
mathematics. Chapter seven finishes the thesis by offering a summery and conclusion. 
Chapter 11: Traditional Theories: the Big ~ h r e e '  
The first part of this project involves exploring the nature of metaphor. This will 
involve trying to establish a basic idea of what metaphor is by looking at specific theories 
of metaphor: the comparison theory, the interaction theory, and the speech-act theory. 
This section concludes with elements extracted from these and other theories. 
Generally, it is understood that language can be separated into either literal or 
figurative objects. For example, the phrase "He was caught red-handed" originally could 
have referred to catching a murderer with bloodstained hands. Today this phrase can 
display other literal or figurative meanings. "He was caught red-handed" could still be 
literal (in the case that "he" had a painting accident that resulted in his hand being 
covered in red paint) or figurative (in the case that "he" had been caught committing a 
crime). Traditionally, a metaphor is a part of figurative speech in which one class of 
objects refers to another class of  object^.^ For example, "My work is a sea of troubles" 
associates the classes "things that are my work" with "a sea of troubles."' Before 
examining the different theories, it may be helpful to specify some of the terms employed 
to describe differing aspects of a metaphor. Consider the simple metaphor "Jean is a 
turtle." I define a simple metaphor as a metaphor that can be symbolized "S is P." "Jean 
is a turtle," for example, can be symbolized as "S is P" where S stands for "Jean" and P 
stands for "a turtle." We can look at "S is P" either as a whole, which is the fiame/focus, 
' This follows Martinich's outline from the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 
Although it is not always clear if this relationship is with underlying metaphysical reality or 
epistemological understanding. 
or at its parts, the target/descriptor. When viewed as a whole, in a literal sense, we are 
looking at the frame3; whereas the focus is the statement when considered non-literally, 
e.g., as a metaphor. "S" is the target, the object we are trylng to classify (it's the 
"unknown," what Black calls the focus), while "P" is the descriptor, an object that has 
been classified (it's the known). Another example, "The afternoon sun on a cloudy day is 
a diamond in the rough" can be rewritten as S is P. A literal interpretation would give the 
pame; a figurative interpretation would give the focus; the target is S (the afternoon sun 
on a cloudy day), while P (a diamond in the rough) is the descriptor. 
Reviewing some common theories of metaphor may aid understanding. According to 
Martinich, the three most influential theories of metaphor are The Comparison Theory of 
Metaphor (CTM), The Interaction Theory of Metaphor (ITM), and The Speech-Act 
Theory of Metaphor (STM). This review is not aimed as an analysis of all the strengths 
or weaknesses of these theories. Rather, the review is offered to suggest the path to a 
cognitive view of metaphor. 
I'm using Black's FramefFocus terms, but not necessarily with his meaning. 
4 Martinich A.P. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
Comparison Theory 
The Comparison Theory of Metaphor asserts that metaphors involve a comparison of 
similarity between two or more objects. Aristotle seems to hold this view in his Poetics, 
stating, "But the greatest thing by far is to be a master of metaphor. It is the one thing 
that cannot be learnt from others; and it is also a sign of genius, since a good metaphor 
implies an intuitive perception of the similarity in  dissimilar^.^" Thus, "Jean is a turtle" 
involves noting a similarity between "Jean" and "a turtle." Searle's essay, ~ e t a ~ h o r , ~  
implies that CTM involves one or more of the following two claims. First, CTM is a 
metaphysically based theory, i.e., the two objects of comparison--what I have called the 
target and descriptor-have to exist, this existence is independent of humans, and the 
common similarity must also exist. Second, metaphors are literally similes with the 
"like" or "as" deleted and the respect of the similarity left unspecified. In his essay, 
Searle attacks each of these claims of CTM. 
Searle gives two examples of how it is possible to have a metaphor in which one part 
does not really exist, attacking the claim that CTM is metaphysically based. The first 
example is "Sally is a block of ice." Searle points out that this does not mean literally 
that (3x) (x is a block of ice, such that x is comparable to Sally). Instead, "Sally is a 
block of ice," under CTM, compares properties shared by Sally and a block of ice. 
Searle, however, objects that it is not always possible to find a literal similarity between 
the objects of comparison. In the example, "Sally is a block of ice" we interpret that 
Sally is cold and hard.7 Yet, "Cold" and "Hard" are not predicates that "Sally" and "a 
* Aristotle. Poetics. 1459" 
6 Reprinted in: Martinich, A.P. The Philosovhv of Lanmage. 408-429 
7 Searle uses a paraphrase, Sally is an extremely unemotional and unresponsive person. However, this does 
not seem to capture the metaphorical meaning. A problem that Searle mentions later in his essay. 
block of ice" literally share.* If we literally meant Sally is cold and hard, then we could 
just as easily say, "Sally is a block of granite in the dead of winter." Yet most people 
understand that comparing Sally to a block of ice or a block of granite does not 
necessarily give the same meaning. For example, in certain contexts, comparing Sally to 
either a block of ice or a block of granite would depend on a person's perception of Sally 
as a either a romantic object or a casual acquaintance. Suppose Sally acted unmoved by 
compassion or unyielding in certain situations. In such a case, we might say that Sally is 
cold and hard. If a person, however, were inclined to pursue Sally romantically, while 
Sally acted cold and hard toward that person, then the person-when searching for an 
expression to capture his ideal of Sally-would call her a block of ice. If the same 
person, however, were inclined to treat Sally as just another person and Sally acted cold 
and hard toward life, then she would be more properly classified as a block of granite. 
However, context can change this analysis. Dr. Taylor, one of my advisors, pointed 
out "If I were to describe Sally's demeanor toward others, then a 'block of ice' might be 
more appropriate. Suppose S. is alienated from her family-her children, say. Then, if 
she remained unmoved and impervious by attempts to restore relations, we would likely 
use the 'block of ice'. . ." I think that this brings up the interesting notion of how physical 
experiences influence the metaphors we use. Heat or coldness often characterizes 
emotional states. For example, we often hear of "The flaming passion of love," "The 
fi-osty glare," "The fight was a heated exchange," "You're as cold as ice," etc. Lakoff 
and Johnson claim that these metaphors, like many metaphors, have a physical basis 
characteristic of experience.9 Physically, like many animals, we humans heat up when 
Assuming that Sally has not been dead for a while. 
9 Lakoff and Johnson. Metaphors We Live By. E.g., chapter four 
excited, e.g., while experiencing love or fighting; we cool down when distancing 
ourselves, e.g., shock; and in extreme cases, our manner is such that people feel like we 
are drawing heat out of the surroundings (or even them!), e.g., we are "cold as ice. 109, I 
think that the case of Sally and her estranged family properly falls within this latter 
category, i.e., Sally has gone beyond just distancing herself like a true stoic. Sally 
presents an image that people "feel" to be cold; she is sucking the life out of them or the 
heat from the surroundings. This is an example of the experiential aspect of metaphor 
covered in chapter 3. I hlly agree with Dr. Taylor that his case of "Sally and the 
Estranged Family" would be one in which it was not appropriate to say that she is a block 
of granite. However, I submit that there are cases, e.g., Sally the Stoic, in which a block 
of granite is more appropriate as a metaphor, and there are cases where the block of ice is 
more appropriate. 
Searle's next counter-example aims at demonstrating that CTM is not metaphysically 
based. Searle uses the following example: A person says, "Richard is a goril!a9' with the 
meaning that "Richard is fierce, nasty, prone to violence, and so forth." The inference 
assumes that "Gorillas are fierce, nasty, prone to violence, and so forth." The comparison 
works only if we feel justified that "Richard and gorillas are similar in several respects; 
viz., they are fierce, nasty, prone to violence, and so forth." What makes metaphors not 
metaphysically based is that fact that gorillas "are in fact shy, sensitive creatures, given to 
bouts of sentimentality." In other words, the comparisons, according to Searle, are false. 
This means that within metaphorical context the statement "Richard is a gorilla" with the 
meaning "Richard is fierce, nasty, prone to violence, and so forth" is "true." While the 
10 The physiological bases could be tested in the lab. For example, showing various pictures of situations 
and having the subject rate the "warmth" of the person shown. This could be correlated with physiological 
readings of the subject's body. 
literal statements, "Gorillas are fierce, nasty, prone to violence, and so forth" and 
"Richard and gorillas are similar in several respects; viz., they are fierce, nasty, prone to 
violence, and so forth" are "false." From here Searle concludes "In many cases the 
metaphorical statement and the corresponding similarity statement cannot be equivalent 
in meaning because they have different truth conditions."" Because there are different 
truth conditions between the statements, the metaphor provides a function of 
understanding one subject in terms of another; it fbrther shows that metaphors need not 
be based on a particular metaphysical reality. 
It seems that the "truth-condition" can be either a metaphysical judgment about the 
way the world really is or that it can be an epistemological judgment about how a person 
understands a particular aspect of the world. Within the discussion of metaphor, 
arguments such as Searle's, which rely on differing b'truth-conditions," rarely make this 
distinction. (Oddly enough, when Searle implies that CTM compares objects that exist, 
his example of the gorilla-by his own rule-does not apply to CTM.) Thus, the arguments 
against CTM appear to rest on the ideas that (a) CTM is a metaphysical claim between 
two objects and (b) we have access to what is really real. This rejection of CTM is 
unfortunate because it ignores that CTM can reflect an epistemological theory about how 
we categorize and understand differing objects. Epistemologically speaking, the 
comparison is only contingent to our perceptions, not to the underlying metaphysical 
reality. Therefore, if our understanding of gorillas, even if a misunderstanding, 
corresponds to "Gorillas are fierce, nasty, prone to violence, and so forth," then 
essentially we are making a relevant comparison. Thus, for epistemological reasons, it 
appears that a CTM is partially salvageable if we relax the requirement of being 
" Searle, John. Metaphor. 41 5 
metaphysicaVexistential in nature. One interesting attempt to reconceptualize CTM and 
possibly making it a valid theory is by incorporating a simile theory of metaphor. 
Comparison Theory: Simile theory 
The Simile theory appears to have its roots in Aristotle's Rhetoric: "The simile also is 
a metaphor; the difference is but slight.. .All these comparisons [examples in Aristotle's 
text] may be expressed either as similes or as metaphors; those that do well as metaphors 
can obviously be turned into good similes; and you can turn the similes into metaphors by 
omitting the words of comparison.12"Some people take this to mean that Aristotle holds 
a particular view of CTM in which metaphor is a simile.13 ~ar t in ich  claims that the 
merit of this simile theory is in a "double simplicity.14" First, we will not have to deal 
with both similes and metaphors because they are one in the same; that is, we can treat 
them similarly. Second, analyzing similes is relatively easy; each object just needs one 
similar feature, so, by extension, the examination of metaphor should also be relatively 
easy by just turning it into its corresponding simile. There are several objections 
indicating that a simile theory of metaphor does not adequately explain some aspects of 
metaphor, i.e., the objections indicate that metaphor must be more than just simile. 
Let us start with Searle's attack on simile theory. Searle's strongest complaint is that 
simile theory does nothing to account for computing the meaning of a metaphor, stating 
that explanations as to how "the speaker and hearer are able to go from 'S is P' to 'S is 
R"' do not exist.15 (However, Searle's speech-act theory of metaphor used CTM as a 
starting place to derive meaning.) Whether this complaint necessarily invalidates CTM 
(or Simile Theory) or merely argues for expanding the CTM depends, more or less, on 
Searle's next objection to simile theory. This objection is a more interesting attack on the 
12 Cooper, Lane. The Rhetoric of Aristotle: An exvanded translation with suvvlemental examples for 
students of composition and public sveaking. (1406~ - 1407") 
13 Martinich claims this, but an alternate conclusion is that Anstotle holds that simile is a type of metaphor. 
l4 Martinich. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
l5 Searle, John R. Metaphor. 41 7 
(read "point nine nine nine repeating is equal to one).I7 I dare say that to most people 
there are two reactions: (1) that is a false claim (we can keep adding nines as long as we 
want, but we will never really get to one), although (2) ". 999.. ." is close enough for 
government work to equal "1." In other words, they can read it as either .999.. . is 1, or 
.999.. . is like one; we could read ". 999.. . = 1" as literally false, but figuratively true. 
Yet, these reactions are wrong. ". 999.. . = 1" is literally true whenever a person 
understands the correct "context" of mat he ma tic^.'^ A simple proof fiom "Dr. ~ a t h ' ~ "  is 
that given "113 = .333.. ." multiply both sides by 3 to get "I=. 999.. ." see appendix 1 for 
the more rigorous proof from Dr. Math. This example shows that within a statement, 
whether it be ". 999.. .=I" or "Time is a Frisbee," there are contextual clues outside of the 
statement itself that may alert us to an interpretation of what is being displayed. In the 
former case, we have to realize that .999.. .=l is shorthand for a limit operation. This 
shows that leaving out signs or symbols in math does not necessarily change the 
underlying truth-value because of the context. Thus, analogously, it is not necessarily the 
case that leaving out signs or symbols in the English language will alter the truth-value. 
In this analogy, we might say that ". 999 ...= 1" is the "metaphor" for "limit." This 
suggests that the concepts of "literal" and "figurative" are not as clearly designated as 
people typically use them. Let us look at how this can work in language. 
Consider "Time is a Frisbee" versus "Time is like a Frisbee." The literal truth-values 
of these two sentences are "False" and "True" respectively, according to Searle's 
17 Lakoff and Nunez use this example in Where Metwhors Come ffom: How the Embodied Mind Brings 
Mathematics into Being to discuss how metaphors are necessary to understand math. 
l 8  Its actually more complicated than this. It is true, under certain circumstances, for real numbers. It is 
false, under certain circumstances, e.g., hyperreal numbers or computers that have not been programmed to 
lie. 
l9 h~:/mam2000.mathfomorg/dr.mth~abt.drmath.html 
objections to CTM being a Simile. Yet it is possible for a person to conclude that "Time 
is a Frisbee" is literally true by restricting the universe of discourse. Restrict knowledge 
to just the understanding that the objects "time" and "Frisbee" share some common 
element, e.g., movement. This conclusion would require that the movement is 
understood to be the same, which could require a foundation of further metaphors used to 
understand time, space, and movement. One conception of time is that it is flowing; 
"Time is a river." A river has a beginning, can flow fast or slow, can stop for a while at a 
particular place, etc. Likewise when one throws a frisbee, there is a beginning; it can fly 
fast or slow; it can stop in a place for a while, etc. This could be the wrong foundational 
metaphor. As one of my advisers pointed out, "the frisbee's movement is spatial - so 
won't the movement of time have to be like movement of space? ... Does space move? 
Or do things in space move (is the idea of movement applicable to space, or only to 
things in space?)? If time is like space with regard to movement, will time move or only 
things 'in' time?" To answer this we may assume that space and time are identical in that 
objects move through them (two metaphors?). This relies on the metaphors that space 
and time are containers. In this case, "time is a frisbee" can still be literally true if a 
frisbee is also a container. If players of Ultimate Frisbee can be trusted, a regulation 
frisbee can hold an entire pitcher of beer.20 Thus, a frisbee is a container. Now, granted, 
these examples could be totally without any practical value. Nevertheless, the point is 
that the idea of literalness and truth-value depend on context. 
People often interpret "Time is a Frisbee" as literally false because of their 
background assumptions of context. A person understands that there are overriding 
20 Because I am on a Graduate Student's salary, I have not bought a frisbee and a pitcher of beer to 
empirically verify this claim. However, I'm sure that we can carry on some scientific research after (or 
during) the thesis defense. 
relevant differences between the two objects of comparison. In one case (literally true) 
the comparison relation focuses on the sameness between the objects, in the other case 
(literally false) the focus is on the differences. Now consider using the term "like." 
"Time is like a Frisbee" invites (or allows) the reader to ignore the differences by 
restricting the universe of discourse to similarity, while stating "Time is a Frisbee" forces 
the reader to search a bit on her own to decide whether to consider similarity or 
difference and the proper degree of relevance. The relevant difference involves an 
understanding of the context of the statement and the readers own understanding of the 
situation. The context is partially defined by whether or not the term "like" or "as" is 
used in the statement. Thus, if metaphor is a substitution of a simile, then there is really 
no necessary change in the truth-value between a metaphor and its corresponding simile. 
For other discussions about the differing truth values, or interpretations of similes and 
metaphors see Davidson's "What Metaphors Mean" and Kittay's "Metaphor: Its 
Cognitive Force and Linguistic Structure." 
Let us summarize the idea with another math example. If a teacher asks her college 
2 - 23, class about the truth-value of "a2+b - c then the students typically will respond by 
indicating that the statement is "true" in a literal sense. Yet the statement is only true 
within certain situationefor instance, when using a right triangle in Euclidean geometry 
where "a" and "b" are the legs with "c" representing the hypotenuse of the triangle. In 
the Euclidean case, a person can find any one value when given the other two, e.g., given 
a=3, b 4 ,  then a person can calculate that c = + (a2+b2) = + (32+42) = + (25) = 5. 
However, in another situation, the equation is not necessarily true. Obviously, using 
shorthand does not necessarily change the understood truth-value. Thus, claims that 
metaphors and their corresponding similes have differing truth-values do not necessarily 
establish that metaphors and similes are substantially different. They may be different in 
degree, not kind. 
Nevertheless, I suggest that the idea of metaphor as a substitution of a simile is 
conceptually flawed. Conceptually speaking, a metaphor is much broader than its 
corresponding simile (if it has one). As has been shown, similes, by using "like" or "as," 
restrict the universe of discourse to only similarities; whereas metaphors do not. This 
shows how, contrary to some interpretations, Aristotle might have viewed similes as 
metaphors, not metaphors as abbreviated similes. This classification also better fits with 
the classification system of going from general to specific (or broad to narrow) 
categories. For example, we would typically classic "a Hyundai is (necessarily) a car" 
not that "a car is (necessarily) a Hyundai." It seems that the proper understanding of the 
relationship between a metaphor and a simile is that a simile-despite looking longer, 
syntactically-is an explicitly restricted metaphor. Furthermore, this restriction (or lack 
of) gives the appearance of a change in truth-values, where the "truth-value" merely 
identifies an underlying change in scope. Therefore, metaphors are not just similes, 
although as we have seen, Aristotle held "the simile also is a metaphor.21" 
A summary of CTM: "Comparison views probably derive from Aristotle's brief 
statement in the Poetics: 'Metaphor consists in giving the thing a name that belongs to 
something else; the transference being either fkom genus to species, or from species to 
b 22 ,~  genus, or from species to species, or on grounds of analogy (1457 ). Based on my 
readings, I believe that the rejections of CTM occur because CTM is too restrictive or 
2 1 Aristotle. Rhetoric 1406~ - 1407a 
22 Black, Max. Models and Metaphors. 36 
weak. As we have seen, CTM is often presented as a metaphysically based theory. Yet, 
as Searle has shown with "Sally is a block of ice," there does not actually exist properties 
that both literally share. Searle also showed, with "Richard is a gorilla," many metaphors 
rely on mistaken assumptions, like the nature of gorillas. One weakness of viewing a 
metaphor theory as a metaphysical claim is that there may be a danger that instead of 
focusing on what the metaphors are doing, people argue about whether or not something 
really is something else (a theme taken up in the next few chapters). More importantly, 
CTM is weak because it does not give a method to interpret metaphor beyond simple 
literal comparison. This becomes a problem, for example, because it is not always 
possible to articulate what is being compared, e.g., "Gravity is super-percolating coffee 
grinds." This is a fiuther problem, as we will see, because the notion of "literal" is 
problematic.23 However, the CTM does bring up two interesting issues when considering 
the simile view: (1) Arguments about truth-conditions raise issues of context, and (2) 
similes are restricted metaphors. The interaction theory builds on CTM. 
23 Nothing is context independent, e.g., "You're warm." 
Interaction Theory 
A recurring theme in the previous analysis of metaphor as a comparison is that there 
is a difference between viewing metaphor as a metaphysical theory or as an 
epistemological theory. As a metaphysical theory, metaphor seems on shaky ground, i.e., 
it seems rather limited and presents problems, especially when trying to determine a 
truth-value for a claim. With the interaction theory of metaphor, we shift from a 
metaphysical theory to an epistemological theory of metaphor. This shift will draw out 
the notions of irreducibility (discussed later), focusing power, similarity creation, and 
demonstrate a cognitive force associated with metaphor." At the heart of ITM is the idea 
that a metaphor has both a literal element and a metaphorical element, thus giving two 
parts to the metaphor. This gives the basis of the interaction theory of metaphor "an 
interaction between a literal element in a sentence and a metaphorical element.25" 
The development of ITM we consider primarily come from work by Max Black and 
Eva Feder Gttay. We look mostly at Max Black's development of ITM in Models and 
Metaphors: Studies in L a n w a ~ e  and Philosophy. 
According to Black, one word or phrase of a metaphor becomes the focus because it 
does not make sense in a literal way; e.g., "The chairman plowed through the discussion." 
Here, "plowed" does not make literal sense.26 Because of this discontinuity, we can 
identify parts of the metaphor. For Black, the focus is the metaphorical element in the 
sentence -"plowed"- while the rest of the sentence is the fkarne. Rather than focusing 
on identifying metaphors, Black focuses on the possible uses of metaphors. Black claims 
24 Kittay, Eva Feder. Metaphor Its Cognitive Force and Linguistic Structure. 13 
25 Martinich A.P. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
26 That is, in the literal sense of plowing on a farm or a ship plowing through the sea. It is not until the 
metaphor gets established that people think that plowed can refer to a discussion. 
that metaphor usually serves one of two functionmamely, as a type of substitution of 
meaning (as in CTM) or (more importantly) by giving new meaning. He further claims 
that if metaphor is used as substitution, then it is merely spicing up language and not very 
significant (unless one is a poet). As giving new meaning, Black argues, metaphor is 
crucial to understanding. 
To get new meaning, Black claims, "Understanding a metaphor is like deciphering a 
code or unraveling a riddle ... Metaphor plugs the gaps in the literal vocabulary. 279, 
other words, sometimes a language does not have a term for an object. Rather than 
adding new terms to a language, metaphors are used. As examples, Black gives "cherry 
lips," "the leg of a triangle," "Osculating curves that kiss," and the color "orange" 
coming from the h i t .  These all are examples of Catachresis - the use of a word in some 
new sense in order to remedy a gap in the vocabulary; catachresis gives new senses to old 
words.28 
Because of the use of metaphor in giving meaning, Black claims that CTM does not 
accurately describe how metaphor works. Black uses the example "Richard is a lion" to 
demonstrate this. The metaphor is about both parts of the sentence; i.e., it is about 
Richard and lions. It is about our understanding of lions and how we forge a connection 
between Richard and lions. Whereas with simple substitution, Richard is a lion - is about 
Richard because the word "lion" is a substitution for a list of characteristics understood to 
be about hypothetical lions. In addition, if these characteristics accurately described how 
we wanted to understand Richard, we would have used the list to begin with. 
27 Black, Max. Models and Metaphors. 32 
28 D. Fraser Harris gives many examples of Catachresis with science in his article The Metaphor in Science. 
Oxygen, Phlogiston, Andrenalin, Nerve Reflex, and Malaria are some of the examples he discusses. 
Black W h e r  objects to CTM because it assumes that the meaning is already 
contained within the terms. Yet 
We need the metaphors in just the cases when there can be no question as yet 
of the precision of scientific statement. Metaphorical statement is not a 
substitute for a formal comparison or any other kind of literal statement, but 
has its own distinctive capacities and achievements. Often we say, "X is M," 
evoking some imputed connection between M and an imputed L (or, rather, to 
an indefinite system, L1, L2, L3, . . .) in cases where, prior to the construction 
of the metaphor, we would have been hard put to it to find any literal 
resemblance between M and L. It would be more illuminating in some of 
these cases to say that the metaphor creates the similarity than to say that it 
formulates some similarity antecedently existing.29 
Now we see the creative nature of metaphors. Metaphor can create the similarity, for 
example, "Gravity is super-percolated coffee grounds." In what way was there already a 
similarity between gravity and coffee grounds until I made up the metaphor? The 
similarities only exist when consciously considered. 
Meaning, in an interaction view of metaphor, derives from an interaction of the 
elements of the metaphor; i.e., meaning develops from the discontinuity in meaning 
between the elements in the metaphor. For example, there is a discontinuity in the 
elements of Ben Johnson's metaphor regarding time, "That old bald cheater, ~ ime.~ ' "  
The meaning of the metaphor directly depends on the interaction that happens between 
the elements of the metaphor (maybe reaction would be a better term, in the sense that 
one typical reaction when confronted with a metaphor seems to be "What the. ..?"). 
(Searle's essay, "Metaphor," draws out a methodology for metaphoric interpretation that 
seems close to this idea.) Black further suggests that metaphors may act as a filter, a 
- -  
29 Black, Max. Models and Metaphors. 37 
30 Bartlett, John, comp. Familiar Quotations 
filter that relies on a shared world-belief concerning what the individual elements usually 
mean. For example in the statement 
'Man is a wolf .. .the metaphorical sentence in question will not convey its 
intended meaning to a reader sufficiently ignorant about wolves. What is 
needed is not so much that the reader shall know the standard dictionary 
meaning of 'wolf - or be able to use that word in literal senses - as that he 
shall know what I will call the system of associated 
These cornrnonplaces are merely what people typically interpret the terms to mean. They 
need not be true but "they should be readily and freely evoked."" Filtering gives 
metaphors the potential for insight: "The wolf-metaphor suppresses some details, 
emphasizes others - in short, organizes our view of man."" The insight that metaphor 
offers is a result of the filtering and transforming aspect of metaphor. Another example 
from Black is in describing a war by using a chess vocabulary; "The chess vocabulary 
filters and transforms: it not only selects, it brings forward aspects of the battle that might 
not be seen at all through another medium. (Stars that cannot be seen at all, except 
through teles~o~es.)~'" This bbwar" vocabulary would also filter and transform with, e.g., 
regard to drugs and terrorism. It is interesting to note that Nancy Reagan campaigned for 
"The War on Drugs" not "The Treatment Program for Drug Illness." Further, we do not 
"Negotiate with terrorists" we are (currently) "At war with terrorism.35" 
Kittay has expanded and commented on ITM. She has also identified six salient 
features of ITM, some of which we have already seen3! (1) Metaphors are not just one 
element in a statement; metaphors are entire sentences, not isolated words. Only by 
-- - 
31 Black, Max. Models and Metaphors. 39-40 
32 Black, Max. Models and Metaphors. 40 
33 Black, Max. Models and Metaphors. 41 
34 Black, Max. Models and Metaphors. 42 
3s For an interesting analysis of metaphors in politics, see Metaphor in Politics: An Open Letter to the 
Internet fiom George Lakof(l99 I )  
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examining the sentence, as a whole, can it be decided whether a literal or metaphorical 
interpretation is preferable. This helps to establish the context of the sentence to 
determine the interpretation of the sentence. For example, the sentence "Jean is a turtle," 
relies on contextual clues to decide if there is a turtle named Jean or the meaning is closer 
to Jean being slow. (2) As I have previously pointed out, a metaphor consists of two 
components: the target and descriptor. In the metaphor "Jean is a turtle," Jean is the 
target, while turtle is the descriptor. The target is, roughly speaking, that aspect of a 
metaphor that we try to understand, while the descriptor is the aspect of a metaphor that 
we (presumably) understand. (Black calls the target the focus or metaphorical element in 
a statement; while the frame is the rest of the statement. However, it does not seem as if 
the statement contains the metaphorical element, but the statement as a whole must be the 
metaphorical element.) (3) There is a tension between these two components. The 
identification, or relationships, between the components of the metaphor are not normally 
made (until the metaphor is dead), tension first hinting at a metaphor being used. The 
tension also helps one part of the metaphor organize or conceptualize the other. Much 
like in the example of the evening star or the morning star, these are two ways of 
presenting the same object. (4) As we have seen, the components are understood as 
systems; each part has with it an associated background of meanings. For example, in the 
previous example from CTM- "Richard is a Gorilla9'--there has to be a shared belief 
concerning Gorillas. (5) The interpretation or meaning of a metaphor arises from 
interplay of these components. (6) The meaning of a metaphor is irreducible and 
cognitive: "The cognitive significance of metaphor arises from its capacity to restructure 
or to induce a structure on a given content domain.. .The irreducibility of metaphor is 
importantly tied to the incongruity between the domains of the topic and vehicle.37" 
Kittay also has more on cognition: 
The cognitive force of metaphor comes, not from providing new information 
about the world, rather from a (re)conceptualization of information that is 
already available to us. Information which is not articulated and 
conceptualized is of little cognitive importance. Metaphor is a primary way in 
which we accommodate and assimilate information and experience to our 
conceptual organization of the world. In particular, it is the primary way we 
accommodate new experience. Hence it is at the source of our capacity to 
learn and at the center of our creative thought. In the process of 
accommodation and assimilation through metaphor, we gain a needed 
epistemic access to the metaphorical referent.38 
I think that this last point of Kittay's is a bit misleading. As we will see in later chapters, 
the cognitive force of metaphor does two things: (1) restructures current information, and 
(2) provides new ways of understanding that do lead to new information about the world. 
I also think that in the sense that metaphors are made, not found, they are capable of 
being new and of providing new information about the world. 
There are several objections to ITM. We will look, first, at some of Searle's 
objections to this theory. 
According to the interaction theory, a change exists in the meaning in the terms of the 
metaphor. This occurs when the object in the metaphorical sentence does not make sense 
with the rest of the sentence; e.g., "The chairman plowed through the discussion." Searle 
denies that there is any change in meaning of any term in a metaphor; there is simply a 
change in the semantics. This seems to argue against the idea that within a statement 
there is a "metaphorical element." Searle expands the metaphor to include the whole 
statement. To do this, Searle claims that people confuse what he calls speaker's 
37 Kittay, Eva Feder. Metaphor Its Cognitive Force and Linguistic Structure. 37 
38 Kittay, Eva Feder. Metaphor Its Cognitive Force and Linguistic Structure. 39 
utterance meaning (what the speaker means by uttering words, sentences, and 
expressions) with word or sentence meaning (what the words, sentences, and expressions 
mean). The utterance (in metaphors) means something different fiom the sentence, but, 
Searle maintains, the expressions still mean the same thing. 
Searle also objects that under ITM the metaphor relies on the literalness of the 
sentence. What Searle might mean is that in a given statement, like "Life is a box of 
chocolates," the interpretation relies on first understanding the literal meaning of the parts 
of the statement. Then, after noticing that there is something wrong with the fit of the 
parts, we should know to interpret the statement as a metaphor. Yet, Searle notes, "It is 
not logical necessity that every metaphorical use of an expression occurs surrounded by 
literal occurrences of other expressions.39" As a counter-example, Searle cites "Russell's 
example of a completely nonsensical sentence, 'Quadrilaterality drinks procrastination,' 
is often given a metaphorical interpretation as a description of any postwar four-power 
disarmament ~onference.~'" This objection emphasizes that it can be difficult, if not 
impossible, to identify a "metaphorical element" that is distinct from a "literal element" 
in a metaphorical statement; it does not appear that any part of the statement serves as the 
fiarne of the metaphor (as Black classifies metaphors or what I am calling the descriptor). 
Finally, Searle objects that in the ITM the meaning of "interaction" is not clear. For 
example, in "Sally is a block of ice," it is not clear just what the interaction is or where it 
occurs. To answer this, perhaps it would be best if interaction were understood as either 
part of the tension between the parts of the statement, resolving the tension between the 
various components of the metaphor, or resolving the tension between a literal and 
39 Searle, John R. Metaphor. 4 16 
40 Searle, John R. Metaphor. 4 16 
figurative interpretation of the metaphor. For example, we know that Sally is not really a 
block of ice; we know that there is a problem with a literal interpretation of the statement. 
The interaction occurs by trying to reconcile the parts of the statement. Perhaps the 
people who use ITM intend "Interaction" to be a metaphor to describe the metaphor 
theory. 
Ultimately, ITM shows that metaphor is much more than simple comparison between 
two objects. Metaphor has a cognitive component that brings together (forges meaning). 
This is partially accomplished by the focusing aspect of metaphor. We will see more 
examples of this in following chapters. Now we turn to the speech act theory of 
metaphor. 
Speech Act Theory 
As the primary example of a speech act theory of metaphor, we will look at the theory 
as given by Searle in his essay ~ e t a p h o r . ~ '  We all have experiences where a person says 
one thing yet intentionally means another; for example with irony, joking, sarcasm, or 
some type of indirect speech act. In his essay Searle desires a theory of metaphor that 
explains how a speaker can say one thing, "Sam is a pig" and mean a different thing, 
"Sam is a fat filthy slob." Searle observes that there are often two possible interpretations 
of sentences. One interpretation bases itself upon what the speaker intends to 
communicate, previously identified as "speaker's utterance meaning." The other aspect's 
basis is the literal meaning of the words, previously identified as "word or sentence 
meaning." Searle identifies metaphor with the speaker's utterance meaning. (I take this 
as showing that people often say one thing to mean another may indicate that sometimes 
we do not have the language or capability to explain what something is; thus, we have to 
come up with metaphors.) 
Next, Searle discusses the differences between the literal meaning of an utterance 
versus the metaphorical meaning of an utterance. Using examples of "Sally is tall," "The 
cat is on the mat," and "It's getting hot in here," Searle establishes that literal meaning 
determines truth conditions relative to a particular context. "Sally is tall" only in 
relationship to other people or objects of comparison. If Sally is 5'1 I", then she may be 
"tall" when walking in the mall, but "short" when on a basketball team. To understand 
"The cat is on the mat" requires knowing the particular special orientation of the cat and 
the mat (Compare a cat on a mat in the space station versus a cat on a mat in a downtown 
41 Reprinted in: Martinich, A.P. The Philosophv of Language. 408-429 
26 
house). "It's getting hot in here" could refer to actual air temperature change or 
emotional responses, possibly embarrassment or excitement. 
Searle identifies three key features of literal statements: First, "The speaker means 
what he says42" meaning that the speakers meaning is the same as the literal meaning of 
the statement; second, "The literal meaning of a sentence only determines a set of truth 
conditions relative to a set of background assumptions that are not part of the semantic 
content of the sentence43" context and understanding are part of the evaluation; third, 
"The notion of similarity plays an essential role in any account of literal predication.44" 
because it helps in interpreting the metaphor. Identifiable aspects of metaphor are 
opposed to these three conditions. In a metaphor the speakers meaning is different from 
the sentence meaning, this causes differing truth conditions, and allows for interpretation. 
Searle points out that metaphors often have a related paraphrased sentence. We have 
already seen the metaphor "Richard is a Gorilla" with its paraphrase "Richard is fierce, 
nasty, prone to violence, and so forth." Yet, when we make this paraphrase, some people 
feel a sense of loss, a psychological difference between uttering one or the other phrase. 
At the very least, this suggests an emotive force behind metaphor; a sense of "ah yes!" It 
is not always an easy task to paraphrase a metaphor, such as (from Searle) "The ship 
ploughed the sea" or "Juliet is the sun." The exercise in paraphrasing is supposed to 
demonstrate two things. First, to get any kind of truth-value of a metaphor we have to 
understand some of the background context of the statement (this is the same with so 
called literal statements). Second, paraphrasing can help us understand part of the 
meaning of a metaphor. 
42 Searle, John R. Metaphor. 4 1 1 
43 Searle, John R. Metaphor. 41 1 
44 Searle, John R. Metaphor. 41 1 
We have already seen Searle's objections to CTM and ITM. It is not clear, however, 
that STM radically differs from the previous theories. STM gives metaphor theory a 
more precise method of identifying and working with metaphoric interpretation. Searle 
extracts nine principles for identifying and working with metaphoric interpretation. 
These principles rely on Searle's claim that metaphors are hdamentally restricted and 
systematic. Metaphors are restrictive in the sense that not all of the properties of the 
target and descriptor are shared. (Black identified this as the focusing aspect of 
metaphor.) Metaphors are systematic in the sense that the hearer and speaker must share 
a system of principles that make it possible to identi@ the meaning. (Black called this 
the system of associated commonplaces.) The three most basic principles are: (1) Decide 
if we need to look for metaphorical meaning, "Where the utterance is defective if taken 
literally, look for an utterance meaning that differs from sentence meaning.45" (2) Use a 
set of strategies for finding meaning, "Wlen you hear 'S is P,' to find possible values of 
R look for ways in which S might be like P, and to fill in the respect in which S might be 
like P, look for salient, well-known, and distinctive features of P things."" And (3) use 
strategies for restricting the range of meaning, "Go back to the S term and see which of 
the many candidates for the values of R are likely or even possible for properties of s . ~ ~ "  
For now we will not look at specific objections to STM except to note that (1) it relies 
on basic comparison theory to achieve meaning of metaphorical statements, (2) it does 
not seem to reject CTM and ITM so much as supplement them. 
Before moving on to the next chapter, let us review the key progression of metaphor 
fiom CTM, ITM, and STM. At its heart, many metaphors are comparisons. This 
45 Searle, John R. Metaphor. 422 
46 Searle, John R. Metaphor. 423 
47 Searle, John R. Metaphor. 423 
comparison is flawed in two fundamental ways: (1) metaphor is possibly meaningless 
when one takes metaphor to be a metaphysical theory comparing real objects, and (2) it 
does not offer a method of identification or interpretation of metaphors. Interaction 
theory solves the first problem by breaking up the sentence into both a literal and a 
figurative interpretation. This distinction creates a better method of identifying a "truth- 
condition" when considered metaphysically. Furthermore, the interaction theory 
identifies the focusing and cognitive nature of metaphors as an epistemological theory of 
understanding. STM addresses CTM's second problem by creating tools to identify and 
interpret metaphor. STM further draws out the importance of context. 
Thus, we may extract the following information from these views: (1) Metaphor may 
be viewed as either a metaphysical or an epistemological theory. (2) Metaphors are often 
identified based on an incongruity between two or more elements in a statement. (3) 
Metaphors may involve creating new meaning and focusing attention onto particular 
meaning. (4) It may now be easier to interpret metaphors. (5) Context matters. It seems 
each theory helps us understand metaphor. We now turn to two competing contemporary 
metaphor theories. 
Chapter 111: Colorful Linguistic Expression vs. Cognitive Role 
Metaphor is for most people a device of the poetic imagination and the 
rhetorical flourish - a matter of extraordinary rather than ordinary language. 
Moreover, metaphor is typically viewed as characteristic of language alone, a 
matter of words rather than thought or action. For this reason, most people 
think they can get along perfectly well without metaphor. We have found, on 
the contrary, that metaphor is pervasive in everyday life, not just in language, 
but in thought and action. Our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which 
we both think and act is fundamentally metaphorical in nature.48 
This opening paragraph proposes two differing views of metaphor. In one view, 
metaphor is no more than a colorful linguistic expression. Metaphor means no more or 
less than what the words mean in a literal "traditional" (or objective) interpretation. In 
the other view, metaphor plays a cognitive role, affecting or even producing 
understanding. Metaphor, in part, creates and shapes our understanding of the world in 
which we live. In this chapter, we explore these views. 
Numerous books and articles have already attempted to develop a completely robust 
theory of metaphor. Likewise, many authors have attempted to bolster or discredit these 
theories. That is the nature of the game. In light of this, this chapter is not attempting to 
fully develop, nor defend, a completely robust theory of metaphor. On the contrary, it 
will focus on the two areas relating to a literal versus a cognitive view of metaphor. In 
order to do this we first examine Donald Davidson's position that metaphors do not have 
a cognitive content but are merely literally interpreted phrases. Then, using Lakoff, 
-- 
48 Lakoff and Johnson. Conceptual Metaphor in Everyday Language. 453 
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Johnson, and Recker's works, we will extract some of the more interesting features of a 
cognitive approach to metaphor. 
Davidson 
One of the more thought-provoking individuals to work on metaphor is Donald 
Davidson. What concerns us, in this chapter, is part of Davidson's analysis of metaphor 
in his work, What Metaphors ~ e a n . ~ ~  In this work, Davidson's thesis is that, "Metaphors 
mean what the words, in their most literal interpretation, mean, and nothing more. 507, HiS 
thesis involves three related claims: (1) "[metaphor] conveys truths or falsehoods about 
the world much as plainer language does, though the message may be more exotic, 
profound, or cunningly garbled.51" (2) "Literal meaning and literal truth-conditions can 
be assigned to words and sentences apart from particular contexts of use.52" (3) Metaphor 
does not have cognitive content. To support his claims, Davidson reviews various 
interpretations of metaphors: metaphor as simile, the truth-conditions of metaphor, and 
the interaction theory of metaphor. 
The second claiwb'Literal meaning and literal truth-conditions can be assigned to 
words and sentences apart from particular contexts of use" sounds straightfornard. 
Unfortunately, Davidson neither offers examples of what he means by this claim nor any 
reasons why this would be desirable.53 Davidson might be dealing with the idea that 
metaphors can have truth-conditions (or values under a logical positivism's notion of 
objective absolute truth). A basic argument could thus follow: If metaphors have truth- 
conditions, then we should be able to get at the "truth" of a metaphor. If we can get at the 
"truth" of a metaphor, then it makes sense to talk about metaphors being true or false. 
Under Davidson's view, the truth-conditions will be found by appealing to a metaphor's 
49 Reprinted in: Martinich, A.P. The Philosophy of Lanwa~e. 430-441 
50 Davidson, Donald. What Metaphors Mean. 430 
5 1 Davidson, Donald. What Metaphors Mean. 430 
s2 Davidson, Donald. What Metaphors Mean. 43 1 
53 Although it is possible that in other of his works he does this. 
potential literal interpretation. There are however a few problems with the idea that 
metaphors have a "truth" because of literal truth-conditions. 
The first problem stems from Davidson's claim that literal meaning and truth can be 
assigned to a metaphor independent of the metaphor's context. Although it is certainly 
true that we can assign truth conditions unrelated to contextual usage, this seems to apply 
to limited cases. In fact, beyond simple definitions or categorical claims (which rely on 
oft times arbitrary definitions) it does not seem possible to get away fiom contextual 
usage.54 If we do not look at context to help assign a truth-value, then the assignment of 
a truth-value seems arbitrary. For example, within mathematics we can give the 
following statements, "12+1 = 13 is true," and "12+1 = 1 is true." It would seem 
appropriate to say that the first statement is true while the second statement is false. 
Nevertheless, why should we claim this? Without context there is no reason to accept the 
given truth-values. If we are dealing with base-10 arithmetic (with all the "typical" 
assumptions), then the first statement is true and the second statement is false. Yet, if 
dealing with "clock" math, the first statement is true for military time, and the second 
statement is true for civilian time. (The time starts at 12-noon and in each case an hour is 
added.) If context is crucial to understanding mathematical claims, then it seems as if 
context would be crucial when dealing with natural language. In fact, when interpreting 
or analyzing metaphor, context is crucial! For example, consider the metaphor "Humans 
are Machines." This simple metaphor will change interpretation based on whether using 
(a) a rationalist or empiricist approach or (b) the technological state of machines. For 
rationalists there does not seem to be any a priori reason to suspect that humans are 
54 See Kittay, Eva Feder. Metavhor Its Comitive Force and Linguistic Structure. (97-139) for more 
analysis of Davidson and context issues. 
machines. While for the empiricists the current level of technology can influence the 
belief in humans being machines. For example, if a person had the limited technology of 
the ancient Greeks, then humans would probably not be thought of as  machine^.^' Yet, a 
person with a 21'' century computer might be more inclined to believe that humans are 
machines. As Artificial Intelligence, Artificial Behavior, and Artificial Life become 
closer to approximating "Human," we may see this more clearly. Hence, if it is necessary 
to assign a truth-value to metaphor, then it is necessary to account for the particular 
context. In what sense, however, is it deemed "necessary" or desirable for a metaphor to 
have a truth-value? 
A possible motivation for Davidson's view is that it arises from a logical positivist 
tradition in the philosophy of language. Part of this tradition concerns itself with 
understanding how language "hooks" up with the world or "reflects" reality. Under this 
view meaningful language is restricted to empirical sentences that are either true or false 
for given verifiable conditions that are directly related to the world. Thus, for metaphors 
to have meaning, they must have truth-conditions. There is, however, an opposing 
viewpoint concerning the necessity (or desirability) of assigning truth-value to 
metaphors. 
Perhaps it would be more desirable (fruitful) to distance ourselves from a strict notion 
of truth-value when dealing with metaphors. This deals with a second problem with 
insisting that metaphors have truth-values. The problem arises when considering the 
consequences of accepting a truth-value view of metaphor. For example, take a popular 
metaphor in science (which is also used in some ethical discourse), "Animals are 
55 In the next chapter, we will examine what kind of belief structure one may have that would lead to the 
conclusion that animals andlor humans are machines. 
Machines." The way the metaphor is used involves (1) translation by taking the literal 
meaning of "animals" and the literal meaning of "machines" (whatever they are), (2) 
creating an appropriate relationship between the two terms (whatever that means), and (3) 
agreeing or disagreeing with the relationship. If there is agreement with the metaphor, 
then it is labeled as true. If there is not agreement with the metaphor, then it is called 
false. What are the consequences of demanding a literal truth-value of true or false with 
this metaphor? If people are allowed to hold with either truth-value, then within science 
people who agree with the metaphor proceed to conduct research and generate scientific 
knowledge related to animals, e.g., in the lab. Yet, at the same time, scientists who 
disagree with the metaphor proceed to conduct research and generate scientific 
knowledge related to animals, e.g., in the wild. In either case, we gain information 
because the metaphor structures the way in which we research a problem. Consider, 
however, the information that would be lost if we were not allowed to conduct research 
on so-called "false metaphors." If it is false that animals are machines, then we lose the 
information gained in lab experiments. Likewise, if we interpret the metaphor as strictly 
true, then research would be hindered in field studies. Therefore, even if we could assign 
truth-values to metaphor, we may not want to. Thinking of metaphors as "good" or "bad" 
would be more appropriate-"good" when they promote scientific research, "bad" when 
they hinder it. 
Be that as it may, Davidson insists on using a literal interpretation of metaphors. 
Davidson uses this idea of literalness in a complaint that the creative aspect of metaphor 
(that aspect that links the unconnected concepts together into a newlunique relationship) 
leads to conclusions about the meaning of metaphor. Davidson's objection is that we 
naturally categorize similar objects, thus there is no need to posit a non-literal meaning to 
metaphor. For example, flowers with characteristics x, y, z.. . are similar enough to 
classify them under one family as roses. Under this view ordinary similarity (like in the 
roses), not some sort of extraordinary similarity is used. Thus, if one were to say, "My 
lover is a red, red rose," then the similarities are literal and natural with no extra meaning 
given by a metaphor. Again, there are two problems with this view.56 First, it is still not 
clear how we can get literal truth or falsehood on context-free bases. The phrase, "My 
lover is a red, red rose" could have any of the following meanings: 
1. My lover is beautiful, much as a freshly blooming very red rose is beautiful. 
2. My lover has sharp wit, inuch like the sharp thorns on a red rose. 
3. My lover is dangerous, like an extremely red rose; she draws you in with her 
beauty.. .but if you are not careful, her sharp thorns will leave you bleeding. 
4. My lover is like a rose. She attracts annoying little insects. (This is still context 
dependent.. .try to decide if the little insects are literally those annoying insects 
that must be dealt with, or if the insects are those annoying people that tend to be 
drawn to beauty.) 
We should see that given, "My lover is a red, red rose" there is no way to literally 
interpret the appropriate meaning without either the speaker directly elucidating the 
meaning or for the listener to have the appropriate contextual background. There is no 
doubt that there is some element of literalness necessary to understand metaphor; this is 
what helps us in deciphering the metaphor. It however does seem (as Searle maintained) 
that something is lost in translation, much like a literal translation of "Ich bin kalt" from 
German into the English; "I am cold" loses meaning in tran~lation.~~ 
56 There are actually more problems with this, e.g., people tend to actually classify based on prototypes not 
categories-however I will not address this. 
57 The German is a statement of sexual frigidity; the English is a statement of subjective comfort. 
The second problem with the view of "ordinary similarity" is that it seems to imply 
that the connection, or similarity, between two objects is already there. By what 
objective standards, however, do we judge a connection or similarity? Michel Foucault 
asks 
When we establish a considered classification, when we say that a cat and a dog 
resemble each other less than two greyhounds do, even if both have just broken 
the water pitcher, what is the ground on which we are able to establish the validity 
of this classification with complete certainty? On what 'table,' according to what 
grid of identities, similitudes, analogies, have we become accustomed to sort out 
so many different and similar things?'* 
Consider the simile, "There are some days that the happy ocean lies like an unfingered 
harp below the hand.59" The question, relating to the problem of similarity, is "In what 
way is there already a similarity between the ocean and a harp?" The similarity is created 
in the mind of a poet and passed on to her audience. Now, within a metaphor, is the 
connection already there, waiting to be discovered, or is it created? It seems plausible 
that, like similes, there are cases in metaphor in which there is already a connection. 
Perhaps this follows Davidson's notion of "ordinary similarity." For example, upon 
watching a ship at full steam at sea, a person who is familiar with plowing a field could 
naturally associate the two events together to conclude, "The ship is plowing through the 
sea." However, it also seems the case that not every metaphor is discovered, but that 
some are created-the sun is the heart of the universe; the heart is an engine; the heart is a 
pump; darkness is ignorance; light is truth; the mind is a computer; DNA is a code; the 
earth is a spaceship; the earth is a lifeboat, etc. The metaphors do not display a special 
"truth" about the world. They structure our understanding and analysis of the world. In 
58 Foucault, Michel. The Order of Things: An Archaeolopv of the Human Sciences. 
59 My thanks to Dr. Recker for pointing out this example from Eavan Boland's Poem, "White Hawthorne in 
the West of Ireland." And suggesting the following question. 
the next section the cognitive view of metaphor will further develop this idea. For now, 
we turn to Davidson's treatment of metaphor as simile. 
Davidson objects to the view that metaphors are similes in which "the figurative 
meaning of a metaphor is the literal meaning of the corresponding simile.60" To use 
Davidson's example, the figurative meaning of "he was burned up" is the literal meaning 
of "he was like someone who was burning up." Although Davidson talks about the 
differing truth-values between a metaphor and its associated simile, he does not appear to 
rely exclusively on Searle's objection relating to differing truth-values. However, he 
does have two interesting objections. Davidson first objects that it can be very difficult to 
identify a simile with its corresponding metaphor. Davidson's example is "Virginia Wolf 
said that a highbrow is 'a man or woman of thoroughbred intelligence who rides his mind 
at a gallop across country in pursuit of an idea.'6"' With this metaphor it is rather hard to 
imagine or create a comparable simile. Nevertheless, I question the effectiveness of this 
objection. It certainly implies that we may have limits to overcome when interpreting 
metaphor as simile. It could also imply that there needs to be some addition to the simile 
theory of metaphor. However, it is a long step to saying that a simile theory is false. I 
suggest that if the mere difficulty in finding a solution is enough to rule out a theory, then 
this would rule out most, if not all, struggles in math and science, e.g., Fermat's Last 
Theorem, GUT, Kepler working twenty years for his 3rd law of planetary motion, etc. I 
think that this objection of Davidson's merely demonstrates the need that if someone 
claims that all metaphors are similes, then that person also has the task of making STM 
more robust. 
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Another objection from Davidson, which he considers a "fatal defect" of the 
metaphor as simile view, is that metaphors "make the hidden meaning of the metaphor all 
too obvious and accessible. In each case the hidden meaning is to be found simply by 
looking at the literal meaning of what is usually a painfully trivial simile.62" Surely only 
a philosopher can complain about and take objection to a theory that it is too simple. 
Well, this is not fair to Davidson; scientists will do the same, e.g., trying to determine if 
the genetic material is a protein or acid. In fact, I imagine (despite Occam's Razor) that 
many of us have rejected a hypothesis because it is seen as too simple. Arguing against 
the metaphor as simile view, Davidson writes that, "It is trivial because everything is like 
everything, and in endless ways." This is rather strange considering that previously 
Davidson was arguing for "ordinary similarity" in categorizing objects. It would seem 
that if Davidson insists on literal interpretation using literal language translations then he 
would favor a simile view of metaphor. It further seems that, under this view of the 
trivialness of simile, Davidson presupposes that metaphors cannot be evaluated as "good" 
or "bad" based on the cognitive ability to combine or amalgamate relevant relationships 
in a new or productive way. Since this is a basic position of ITM, let us see how 
Davidson analyzes that theory. 
Davidson criticizes the aspect of the interaction theory that claims there is some 
meaning beyond that given by a literal interpretati~n.~~ Davidson7s main point of 
contention is in Black's claim that metaphor 
selects, emphasizes, suppresses, and organizes features of the principal subject by 
implying statements about it that normally apply to the subsidiary 
subject.. .[paraphrases] will not have the same power to inform and enlighten as 
the original. :. . One of the points I most wish to stress is that the loss in such cases 
62 Davidson, Donald. What Metaphors Mean. 435 
63 From The Philosovhv of Lancrua~e, A.P. Martinich, ed. 
is a loss in cognitive content.. .[the paraphrase] fails to give the insight that the 
metaphor didM 
Davidson argues 
There is, then, a tension in the usual view of metaphor. For on the one hand, 
the usual view wants to hold that a metaphor does something no plain prose 
can possibly do and, on the other hand, it wants to explain what a metaphor 
does by appealing to a cognitive content -just the sort of thing plain prose is 
designed to express.6s 
This strikes to the heart of Davidson's rejection of cognition in metaphor. To reach this 
conclusion Davidson poses three questions: (1) dealing with the difficulty of setting out 
the cognitive content of a metaphor "If a metaphor has a special cognitive content, why 
should it be so difficult or impossible to set it (2) dealing with special meaning 
with simile "How is it that simile gets along without a special intermediate meaning?67" 
(3) dealing with dead metaphors "If words in metaphor bear a coded meaning, how can 
this meaning differ from the meaning those same words bear in the case where the 
metaphor dies - that is, when it comes to be part of the language?68" 
In response to the first question, the difficulty or impossibility of setting out the 
special cognitive content, there are several responses. First, there are numerous cases 
where it is difficult or impossible to set out the meaning of a concept. Some cases would 
involve cases where a person lacks a faculty; for example, trying to explain color to the 
blind, or sound to the deaf. Other cases might involve concepts in science or 
mathematics. Imagine dropping chalk in the classroom or balls off a tower to 
demonstrate "gravity" to Aristotelians who persist in seeing "natural motion." Or 
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working through a complex proof to show that "A map into a product space is 
continuous iff its composite with each projection is contin~ous.~~" In the case of gravity 
there is certainly some kind of understanding (or cognitive content) associated with that 
term. Yet, many people who use the term are challenged to simply explain its literal 
identity without using the metaphor "an attractive force." In the case of mapping product 
spaces, a person could review informal proofs or formal proofs, yet still not know what is 
being said (as many graduate students unfortunately experience at one time or another). 
In both cases there is usually a moment of "Ah ha! I understand it!". Yet, the 
understanding is difficult to express beyond this knowing or as a phrase beyond the 
original ~tterance.~' It is suddenly as obvious as 1+1 = 2 (without Russell's two page 
proof). A person sees it or does not. This is also similar to gestalt optical illusions 
involving a figure / ground distinction, e.g., old woman / young maid. We can help 
people see them, but they must see it themselves to reach understanding. Alternatively, it 
is like "dot" posters that some people claim have pictures in them. People can guide us to 
seeing it, saying "Focus far away." Yet, we have to see it for ourselves. Nevertheless, in 
all these cases, after we see it, or experience it, that becomes the cognitive concept, or the 
way we understand it. Difficulty in expressing the cognitive content is not a valid 
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70 This brings up the trick notion of what is meant by "Understanding." Some people will claim that a 
person does not really understand somethmg until she can explain it to others. I myself do not take the 
ability to explain as a necessary or sufficient condition for understanding. For example, I may have a 
Cartesian moment where I am going through a math proof and can hold with my minds eye all the lines so 
that the whole forms a 'clear and distinct' image to me so that I 'Understand' it. However, once I am 
distracted by the evil deceiver, I no longer understand it with a sufficiency to explain it to others. This 
implies that understanding as an ability to explain ignores potential problems with memory. I can also 
imagine a case where a lecturer reads a speech, the audience understands the speech, yet the lecturer was 
merely parroting what was printed before her. Understanding seems to come in degrees, not some kind of 
absolute vs. complete lack of (like Meno's Paradox). Also, a common background or language may be 
missing, in which case, metaphor may be the only way to communicate. I also think that understanding can 
be a function of language, e.g., having a coming vocabulary.. .metaphor seerns to be a bridge here. 
complaint against a cognitive view. There could be other reasons that it is difficult to 
express or impossible to set out the special cognitive content of metaphor. 
Perhaps it is difficult to set out a particular cognitive context because metaphors are 
working on many levels or dealing with many concepts. A cognitive notion of metaphor 
involves, "understanding and experiencing one kind of thing or experience in terms of 
an~ther.~'" This is why we claim that metaphor has a cognitive role. For example, Lakoff 
and Johnson compare the metaphors "Argument is war" and "Argument is dance." They 
claim that the "special cognitive content" arises because "metaphors have entailrnent~.~~" 
For example, "Argument is war" entails: An argument is defensible; an argument can be 
attacked; objections to an argument can be right on target; an argument can be 
demolished; people win (or lose) arguments, etc. Thus, the "Special Cognitive Content" 
is the belief or experiential system created by metaphors and their entailments. 
Moreover, because metaphors have many entailments and other entailments yet to be 
created, it is a distinctive feature of many metaphors that the "meaning" is hard to 
unpack. 
The second question of Davidson's, regarding similes and their lack of "special 
intermediate meaning," poses less of a problem. Davidson points out that not many 
critics suggest that simile also has a special cognitive content. If, as my previous analysis 
of simile and metaphor suggests, metaphor and simile may not be so different, then simile 
might also have a cognitive content. However, in this case, and in the case that simile 
and metaphor are substantially different, maybe similes are just boring. As many people 
point out, including Davidson, everything is "like" everything (or "as" everything) in 
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many trivial (and not so trivial) ways. However, metaphor can be a much more powerhl 
claim; one thing "is" another thing. There is a different feeling towards metaphor. Even 
if this feeling were only emotive, instead of having cognitive significance, it would 
explain why more attention is given to metaphor than simile. 
Davidson's third question, "If words in metaphor bear a coded meaning, how can this 
meaning differ from the meaning those same words bear in the case where the metaphor 
dies - that is, when it comes to be part of the language?" is much more difficult to 
grapple with. Davidson elaborates with the following: "Why doesn't 'He was burned up' 
as now used and meant mean exactly what the fresh metaphor once meant? Yet all that 
the dead metaphor once means is that he was very angry - a notion not very difficult to 
make explicit.73" We deal with dead metaphors in the next section. 
Recall Davidson's goal with these questions. He claims that there is a tension in the 
interaction theory because, on one hand, metaphor does what plain prose cannot do, and 
on the other hand, metaphor has a special cognitive content (the sort of thng plain prose 
is supposed to have). Davidson then claims that to get out of this tension we must 
abandon the notion that metaphor carries meaning, i.e., abandon a cognitive view of 
metaphor. This is a mistake. In the next section, we will examine what is really meant 
by a cognitive view of metaphor. In it we find that Davidson's tension is a 
misunderstanding of the fact that metaphors do what plain prose cannot do because of the 
way they structure cognitive content in a manner plain prose does not. Under a cognitive 
view, there is not the idea of a "hidden cognitive content" or "hidden meaning." 
Davidson concludes his critiques by reasserting that "As much of metaphor as can be 
explained in terms of meaning may, and indeed must, be explained by appeal to the literal 
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meanings of words." Where does this leave us? Davidson's view that metaphor must 
take meaning from what the literalness of the components of the metaphor seems correct 
as far as trying to explain or interpret meaning behind a metaphor. However, as we have 
seen, two problems present themselves. First, there is a problem of establishing what 
"literalness" means without an account of the context of a statement. Second, his case for 
the non-cognitive nature of metaphor seems weak. He tries to tie together the claims (a) 
that metaphor conveys truth much like plainer prose, and (b) literal meaning and truth- 
conditions can be independent from context. From here he jumps to the conclusion that 
there is no cognitive content in metaphors. This jump is based on a misunderstanding 
that a cognitive view of metaphor demands a "hidden meaning" of metaphor. The rest of 
this chapter will draw out (or explore, depending upon your metaphor of choice) the 
cognitive view of metaphor. 
Lakoff and Johnson 
In the first chapter of this paper, we briefly examined three influential views on how 
metaphors work. In this chapter, we extend how metaphor works to the role of 
metaphors as understood by two opposing views. One view, in this paper represented by 
Davidson, holds that although metaphor is useful, it does not serve a cognitive function of 
understanding; metaphor merely substitutes words or phrases in colorful manners to 
mean what plainer prose is designed to mean. This suggests that under Davidson's view 
the role of metaphor is an extension of either the comparison view of metaphor or the 
speech-act theory of metaphor. The other view, here represented primarily by George 
Lakoff and Mark Johnson, appear to represent the role of metaphor as an extension of the 
interaction theory. However, Lakoff and Johnson propose an experiential view of 
metaphor in which metaphor is the primary way we structure our understanding of our 
world and our relationship in it. This is the claim that metaphor serves a cognitive 
function in understanding. This is not a view of secret or hdden meaning. Rather, it is a 
claim that metaphors are an integral part of our conceptual system (web of belief). It is 
because of this metaphorical structuring that I claim it is plausible that metaphors provide 
a conceptual link between ideas in science and ideas in ethics. Three areas influenced by 
Lakoff and Johnson's will be reviewed to show the cognitive view of metaphor: (1) Four 
aspects of metaphor; (2) metaphors as dead or alive; and (3) implications for meaning and 
truth. 
Four Aspects of Metaphor: Irreducibility, Focusing, Creative, and Experiential. 
As previously mentioned, one of Doren Recker's interest is the use of metaphor in 
science. He maintains, as others do, that metaphors help shape what scientists are doing 
in science. This is accomplished because metaphors influence the organization of data, 
the understanding of data, what counts as data, what kinds of experiments are performed, 
etc. In short, metaphors influence the whole field of scientific thought. There are at least 
four aspects of metaphor that contribute to the influencing power within science: 
Irreducibility, Focusing, Creative, and Experiential 
The Irreducibility aspect of metaphor refers to the fact that metaphor does not play a 
"truth-functional" role. By this, I mean that metaphor usage has abandoned logical 
positivism or the idea of the correspondence theory of truth. We are now looking at 
metaphors as they contain epistemic significance, not as they bear relation to a 
metaphysical existence or claims about an objective reality. We have already seen the 
consequences, within science, of assuming metaphors have truth-value. If metaphor had 
a truth-value, then research is necessarily limited to "true" metaphors, e.g., "Animals are 
Machines." We would also encounter strange arguments like the following: The sun is 
the heart of the universe74; the heart is a pump75; therefore, the sun is a pump. 
Alternatively: the sun is the heart of the universe76; the heart is a furnace77; therefore, the 
sun is a furnace. Even with truth-values and formal logic, how do we evaluate the 
arguments? Do they give truth with respect to an underlying reality, or just a truth of 
how we understand reality? We have to consider truth relative to context. The bottom 
74 Copernicus, Fludd 
75 Harvey 
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line is that a metaphor does not necessarily have a truth-value in an objective logical 
positivist sense. Thus, metaphor is better described as being useful or not useful. This 
would nicely fit in with a more modem notion of scientific "truth" versus a past notion of 
"TRUTH. " 
Examining the metaphor "Time is Money" W h e r  shows the irreducible nature of 
metaphor. Recker asks the question, "Is time money?" From here he points out that 
there are aspects in which time is like money; for example we trade our time for money; 
yet there are important ways in which time is not money; you cannot put time in a bank to 
spend later; you cannot carry time around in your wallet, etc. In this circumstance it 
seems more useful to view the metaphor as useful (or not) rather than true (or false). 
The next aspect of metaphor is its focusing nature. Focusing is simply the realization 
that in a metaphor the interaction of the elements in the metaphor "focuses" on some 
properties while drawing attention away from other properties. This follows directly 
from the fact that metaphors are not, strictly speaking, identity statements, i.e., metaphors 
are not metaphysical claims but epistemic in nature. As we have seen, it is not the case 
that "time=rnoney", but we can understand time in a relation to money. This relation is 
focusing because it highlights some aspects of the relationship and simultaneously 
downplays other aspects. For exampl-nce again using "Time is Money9'-with either 
time or money it is possible to spend wisely, waste, rob, or otherwise use both in a 
conceptually similar manner. Yet while it makes sense to utter something to the effect 
that "Time seemed to drag on forever as I waited in the dentist's chair" it makes less 
sense to talk about "Money seemed to drag on forever." Notice that while "Time is 
money" focuses on spending wisely, "Time is a River" focuses on different aspects. The 
river can invoke the ideas that: time flows on from the past to the future; time has a 
direction; we can get stuck in time (like being stuck on a some rocks in a river); we can 
he pushed along against our will; we can go fast or slow; we can be caught in the eddies, 
etc. Different metaphors capture differing aspects of the relationship. 
An interesting claim relating to the focusing aspect of metaphors, from Lakoff and 
Johnson, states that to hlly understand a concept it is necessary that we have various 
metaphors to focus on differing aspects of the concept. Lakoff and Johnson argue 
There is good reason why our conceptual systems have inconsistent metaphors 
for a single concept. The reason is that there is no one metaphor that will do. 
Each one gives a certain comprehension of one aspect of the concept and 
hides others.. .The use of many metaphors that are inconsistent with one 
another seems necessary for us if we are to comprehend the details of our 
daily existence.78 
Thus, for example, to understand "Love" we may use one or more of the following 
metaphors: "Love is a Journey," "Love is War," "Love is an Adventure." Towards the 
end of their book (page 236), Lakoff and Johnson give an example of the danger of 
utilizing just one metaphor, e.g., "Labor is a Resource." This focuses the following 
relations: labor is equivalent to raw materials; cheap labor is good just like cheap 
resources are good. This metaphor hides the fact that cheap labor is often dehumanizing 
labor; that is, poor wages and working conditions resulting in slave-like conditions of 
oppression. 
The third aspect of metaphors is their creative nature. The Creative nature of 
metaphors refers to the fact that metaphors can create new similarities and that metaphors 
do more than point out existing connections between objects. They bring about new 
~onnections. This creative nature restructures how we conceive of things; for example, 
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"Love is a collaborative work of art.79" This metaphor entails, "Love is work. ..Love 
requires compromise.. .Love demands sacrifice.. .love is aesthetic experience.. .Love 
involves creativity.. .Love reflects how you see the world.80" Another example of 
restructuring views would be the idea that "The world is a machine" as opposed to "The 
world is an organism." Once people start thinking about the world as a machine, then it 
makes sense to talk about "Who built the world?" "Can we modify the world?" "Can we 
build one?" 
Lako ff and Johnson's book consistently reiterates how metaphors change our 
conceptions of reality. They point out that part of the Westernization of other cultures is 
introducing new concepts through metaphors, for example "Time is   one^.^"' We also 
see that part of Westernizing a culture involves introducing them to the concept that "The 
World is a Machine." The creation and introduction of new metaphors also affect our 
experiences of the world. This is the final aspect of metaphor that we consider. 
Metaphors change our Experience of the world. If all they did was point out trivially 
obvious connections, then it seems hard to account for the "ah ha!" felt whenever we 
encounter a particularly strong metaphor. For example, many students remember an 
English or Theater class where they first experienced Shakespeare's famous line "The 
world is a stage." That metaphor, potentially, changed the way many of people viewed 
the world. We certainly experience the world differently when we feel that "Time is 
money." As Recker points out, I get mad when you waste my time! 
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This experience underlies the cognitive view idea that "The essence of metaphor is 
understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another.**" For example, 
we can consider various cases relating to the idea that "Higher status is up, lower status is 
down." The physical arrangements of meetings can signal the power structure felt by 
those participating. Traditionally, a King would sit on a throne while his subjects always 
had to remain physically below their liege's head and shoulders. Legend has it that King 
Arthur and his knights sat around a round table to show that Arthur was merely "first 
among equals." (Given the disastrous ending, was this tale a metaphor against the idea of 
democracy?) A modern CEO from a Fortune 500 company may show status by using a 
rectangular table with him (or her) at the head of the table, while the power structure 
diminishes the farther down the table one sits, much like with the Kings of old. The same 
CEO can create a more relaxed atmosphere with his employees by having a "round table 
discussion," thus signaling the workers are more equal with the head of the company. 
This experiential nature is also seen in our actions. For example, say that a person 
accepts the metaphor "Animals are Machines." Further, suppose this person lives in a 
throwaway society where products, especially machines, are used, abused, and thrown 
away to get a new one. Such a person might not take care of his equipment because he 
can always get a new one. It seems reasonable to suppose that his treatment of animals 
will be similar. We can see this with animal experiments. In a lab a scientist is not 
concerned with causing pain to his microscope or the table or the computer because they 
are all tools or machines. Thus, if animals are machines, then they can be treated 
similarly. 
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Before moving onto the next topic, I would like to give a quick example of these four 
aspects as seen through the metaphor "A Thesis Defense." It may not be obvious that 
this is a metaphor; after all, it is supposed to be a rational argument in support of a 
particular position. However, rational argument itself falls within what Lakoff and 
Johnson call the conceptual metaphor "Argument is War." The irreducibility of "a thesis 
defense" refers to the non-literal nature of it being a defense. By this, I mean that a 
student cannot carry around her thesis defense for protection against a mugging. For this 
metaphor to be taken literally would require W h e r  metaphors. War is usually in the 
context of acquiring material objects like land, water, or other resources. Thus, there can 
be a defense against possession. What is the material object of a thesis? It has to be 
more than the laser ink and special watermarked OSU paper; it is the ideas expressed 
either verbally or written down on the paper. Thus, with a new metaphor, the ideas 
become objects; the thesis becomes a container for the objects. The "Thesis Defense" 
metaphor is focusing certain aspects of a presentation into war-like concepts. The thesis 
defense will involve claims that are defended; some of the faculty will attack weak 
points; some of the faculty will help come to the rescue of contested points; arguments 
will be demolished; arguments will be bolstered; skirmishes will be won or lost; strategy 
will be planned; there will be attacks and counterattacks, etc. The metaphor is creative 
because it is not necessary that a thesis be presented in an adversarial climate. It could be 
any of the following: "A thesis presentation," "A thesis building," or "A thesis project." 
The second one sounds particularly pleasing. Instead of focusing on war, we could focus 
more on building knowledge and understanding about a particular topic. It would be an 
interesting project to compare a student's thesis defense with a faculty's colloquium 
presentation. Finally, for anyone who has gone through a thesis defense it should be 
obvious that the metaphor is experiential. Months planning and preparing for an 
onslaught fiom a group who has years of experience beyond the few months spent on 
working on the thesis. Thus, we see how "A Thesis Defense" fits into a cognitive view 
of metaphor. The structure and format of the whole defense is in terms of war. It is 
irreducible, focusing, creative, and experiential. 
Yet, it almost seems preposterous to claim that an argument can be anything but a 
kind of war. This brings to light two issues that Lakoff and Johnson discuss. The first 
issue is a reiteration that metaphorical concepts structure our lives. They mention that it 
is conceivable that a culture could view argument as a dance: "the participants are seen as 
performers, and the goal is to perform in a balanced and aesthetically pleasing way.83" 
Under this v2iew the argument could focus more on working together for harmony, 
covering your partner's weaknesses, and helping your partner achieve her goals. 
However, for us, understanding meaning under the western tradition, it is hard to see 
argument as dance. "Argument is War" is a dead metaphor, which takes us to the next 
issue. In what ways are metaphors dead and alive? 
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Dead or Alive 
When examining Davidson's three questions that challenge an interactive view of 
metaphor, his third question was "If words in metaphor bear a coded meaning, how can 
this meaning differ from the meaning those same words bear in the case where the 
metaphor dies - that is, when it comes to be part of the language?" Because we have 
already discussed how metaphor does not have a coded message, we will dismiss the first 
part of the question to focus on the latter part claiming that when a metaphor dies it has 
become part of the language. The standard view, which sounds like Davidson's position, 
is summarized by George Orwell, "A newly invented metaphor assists thought by 
evolung a visual image, while on the other hand a metaphor which is technically 'dead' 
(e.g. iron resolution ) has in effect reverted to being an ordinary Hence, it 
appears that the standard view of dead and alive metaphors goes something like this: 
Metaphors are alive as long as they are seen as metaphors; we do not view them as literal 
language. Metaphors die when they become so inculcated into our language that they no 
longer seem figurative. (Reminiscent of Hume's theory that impressions fade into ideas 
as they become less vivid.) Thus, "Richard is a Gorilla," "Socrates is a Midwife," and 
"Time is a Frisbee" are all alive, while, "Time is Money," "The World is a Machine," and 
"I'm feeling blue today" are all dead. Oddly enough, a continuation of Orwell's 
comment responds to Davidson's question about the change in meaning, "But in between 
these two classes [alive and dead] there is a huge dump of worn-out metaphors which 
have lost all evocative power and are merely used because they save people the trouble of 
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inventing phrases for them~elves.~~" Thus, one response to Davidson is that it is not the 
case of a meaning change, just a general non-attention by people who use the metaphors. 
Lakoff and Johnson suggest another response to Davidson when they simply deny the 
idea that this is the proper way to classify metaphor as being dead or alive. In chapter 10 
of their book, Metaphors We Live By, they g v e  a list of examples where metaphors help 
structure our conceptual schemes: Theories are buildings; ideas are food; ideas are 
people; ideas are plants; ideas are products; ideas are commodities; ideas are resources; 
ideas are money; ideas are cutting instruments; ideas are fashions; understanding is 
seeing; ideas are light-source; discourse is a light-medium; love is a physical force; love 
is patient; love is madness; love is magic; love is war; wealth is a hidden object; 
significant is big; seeing is touching; eyes are limbs; the eyes are containers for the 
emotions; emotional effect is physical contact; physical and emotional states are entities 
within a person; vitality is a substance; life is a container; life is a gambling game. 
Lakoff and Johnson will say that these metaphors are alive because, "they are metaphors 
that we live by. The fact that they are conventionally fixed within the lexicon of English 
makes them no less alive.86" 
Dead metaphors, on the contrary, are simply metaphors that "are understood partly in 
terms of marginal metaphorical concepts like A MOUNTAIN IS A  PERSON.^^" There 
are several things going on here. First, we have the metaphorical concept of a mountain 
is a person because within our culture we speak of the "foot of the mountain." However, 
the metaphor is marginal because it is only within subcultures that we extend the 
metaphor to, e.g., the shoulder of the mountain, conquering, fighting, or being killed by a 
-- 
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m~untain.'~ Thus, within Lakoff and Johnson's theory, alive metaphors are those that 
have been assimilated within the culture and are the ones we "live by." Dead metaphors, 
have not been taken up by the culture, or are so limited that they do not produce many 
entailments. 
Another response to Davidson, in how meaning changes f?om alive to dead, relies on 
the changing nature of language. With few exceptions, language is itself dynamic and 
alive, not static and dead. Words and phrases change meaning over the years. There is 
no reason that metaphors should be an exception to this. 
The final aspect of the cognitive view of metaphor we will review is the problem of 
truth and objectivity. 
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Problems with Truth and Objectivity? 
If a person were to study a brief history of science, she might develop the following 
story of scientific development: There is a dividing line in scientific methodology that 
could be made with the introduction of the mathematization or mechanization of science, 
e.g., Descartes' works. In a pre-Descartes world, natural philosophy (science) followed 
many systems of thought. People were trying magic, mysticism, and prayer, thought 
experiments, and any other type of activity claiming knowledge about the world and how 
we shodld interact with it for results. Language was poetical and metaphorical. 
Although Descartes himself uses many metaphors in his treatise, he also proposes a 
mathematical-mechanical approach to scientific enquiry. Natural philosophers who 
focused on this mathematical-mechanical approach tended to get results more often than 
their competitors did. Thus, there is almost a Darwinian elimination of science lacking 
mathematical language; slowly, mathematics becomes a critical part of science. Unlike 
the previous language used in science, mathematics appears objectively true, real, and 
unambiguous. The language of mathematics became the primary model of science. 
Thus, within science we might find a push for changing the language to be more precise 
and mathematical. With the obvious success of mathematics in science, science begins to 
have more status and becomes almost a standard of academic thought. Thus, within other 
disciplines, to regain status there will need to be some sense of rigor within the language. 
Now, for example, philosophers would be motivated to utilize language that is 
objectively true, real, and unambiguous. Since it is difficult to see metaphor as any of 
these things, metaphor is seen as not being important within a project of objective truth. 
I do not suggest that this is the actual stage of events that led to the rejection of 
metaphor within science or the humanities as a part of our quest for Truth and 
Understanding. However, I submit that it is plausible that a motivation for ridding 
metaphor as serious discourse within science or science-like inquiry is because of a desire 
to make language more like what mathematics appears to be. (I later look more at 
metaphor and mathematics in chapter six.) However, this story does bring up an 
important problem when first exposed with a cognitive view of metaphor: What about 
truth and objectivity? 
In the latter part of Metaphors We Live By, Lakoff and Johnson neatly lay out the 
importance of a truth theory, and the dangers of buying into the objectivism or 
subjectivism theories of truth. Truth is important because of the survival value that we 
derive from thinking things are true.89 For example, most people are not killed by 
stepping out in front of a fast moving truck because they act on a belief that "If you want 
to stay alive, then do not step in front of a fast moving truck." Likewise, there are 
"truths" about social interactions, which foods are eatable, and what are friends are like.90 
The dangers arise because, "truth is always relative to a conceptual system that is defined 
in large part by metaphor.91" For example, the truth of the claim "The fog is in front of 
the mountain" depends upon our cultural understanding of an orientation metaphor that 
gives mountains a fronthack. The danger of buying into the objectivism account is 
because " Most of our metaphors have evolved in our culture over a long period, but 
many are imposed upon us by people in power ... the people who get to impose their 
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metaphors on the culture get to define what we consider to be true.92" For example, the 
"War on Drugs" or "Special Treatment." 
Lakoff and Johnson note, it is rather difficult for people in the western tradition of 
philosophy to accept this cognitive view of metaphor. The primary reason for this is that 
a cognitive view of metaphor denies the traditional "objectivism" worldview that western 
philosophy has primarily adopted. For example, this cognitive view denies: We can have 
knowledge of a world independent of experience; We understand the objects of the world 
in terms of categories and concepts that objects have independent of our experience; 
Words have fixed meanings; Objectivity is good because it is the only rout to what is 
really real; Subjectivity is dangerous.93 Since objectivism is typically contrasted with 
subjectivism, when most people hear a claim that metaphor is not objective, metaphor is 
then thrust into the subjective realm. However, Lakoff and Johnson's cognitive view also 
denies many of the principles of subjectivism: We can trust intuitions and feelings; 
These intuitions and feelings are more important than objectivity; Objectivity is 
dangerous. 
They deny objectivism's claim that truth is absolute and unconditional while also 
denying subjectivism's claim that truth is individually obtained without regard to the 
outside world stating 
What objectivism misses is the fact that understanding, and therefore truth, is 
necessarily relative to our cultural systems and that it cannot be framed in any 
absolute or neutral conceptual system. Objectivism also misses the fact that 
human conceptual systems are metaphorical in nature and involve an 
imaginative understanding of one kind of thing in terns of another. What 
subjectivism specifically misses is that our understanding, even our most 
imaginative understanding, is given in terms of a conceptual system that is 
grounded in our successful functioning in our physical and cultural 
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environments. It also misses the fact that metaphorical understanding 
involves metaphorical entailment, which is an imaginative form of 
rationality.94 
Lakoff and Johnson suggest here that there is a third option, a middle ground between 
objectivism and subjectivism called "An Experientialist Synthesis." 
The experientialist synthesis acknowledges that we all have situations where it is 
more or less appropriate to use reason or imagination. For example, we should probably 
exercise reason when buying a car, yet a romantic dinner should probably involve a bit 
more imagination. Likewise, evaluating a new scientific theory should involve reason, 
yet discovering scientific theories often involves a great deal of imagination. Thus, the 
experientialist synthesis unites different areas. In particular, metaphor is a link between 
rational and subjective thought. Thus, they call metaphor "Imaginative Rationality" 
because "Reason, at the very least, involves categorization, entailment, and inference. 
Imagination, in one of its many aspects, involves seeing one kind of thing in terms of 
another kind of thing - what we have called metaphorical Metaphor is the 
bridge between rationality and emotion, reason and imagination, the known and the 
unknown. Metaphor does this by creating new meaning and new understandings-new 
reality. 
In summary: This chapter considers various issues relating to whether metaphor is 
merely a colorful linguistic expression or whether it plays some type of cognitive role. In 
the Davidson section, we see that (1) literal meaning and literal truth conditions are not 
independent of context, (2) that it may not be desirable for metaphors to have truth 
conditions, and (3) that Davidson does not offer a clear argument against a cognitive 
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view of metaphor. Lakoff and Johnson analyze some of the commitments of a cognitive 
view of metaphor: (1) metaphors have at least four aspects (irreducibility, focusing, 
creative, and experiential), (2) the notion of dead and alive metaphors, and (3) that the 
cognitive (experiential) view denies objective and subjective truth. In the next chapter, 
we will review some metaphors in science and ethics. 
Chapter IV: The World Is? 
Introduction 
Metaphor involves understanding one thing in terms of another. It is because of the 
cognitive nature of metaphor that I suggest metaphor as a possible link between science 
and ethics. Some responses to two questions-"What is the world?" and "How do we 
understand the world?"--demonstrate the possibility of a metaphoric connection between 
science and ethics. Two competing answers typically given to these questions are "The 
world is a machine" and "The world is an organism." We usually hear this in the phrases 
people use to describe the Universe or the Earth, for example, by referencing Kepler's 
"Clockwork universe," or the ancient notion of "Mother Earth." For modem western 
civilization, and for most science, the preferred operational metaphor is "The world is a 
machine." However, "The world is an organism" is much older, and is finding renewed 
interests within both science and ethics. Consistent with a cognitive view of metaphor, 
neither metaphor is "True" or "False." The metaphor chosen is useful or not based on 
how it captures our experience and understanding of the world. Further, the metaphor we 
use will affect our world-view. 
In this chapter, we will briefly examine these two foundational metaphors within 
science and ethics. With each metaphor we will see an intuitive account of the appeal for 
using the metaphor (kind of a comparison of similarity used as a description). 
Furthermore, by using the four cognitive aspects of metaphor, we see a more detailed 
interactive view generating meaning by understanding one system in terms of another. 
While examining these metaphors, we will see how science and ethics are intertwined by 
the cognitive structure of metaphor. To show how metaphorical thought is crucial to 
some scientificlethical arguments, the chapter will end with a section on Descartes' and 
Hume's use of the mechanical metaphor to analyze the "Reason" of animals. 
The World is a Machine 
Within the western sciences and analytic philosophy traditions it should not be 
surprising that "The world is a machine" has gained dominance in use. In fact, it has 
gained so much support that it is often difficult to conceive how the world could be 
anything different from a highly complex machine. This tradition developed in the 
sixteenth century when "geared mechanical clocks served as symbols of cosmic order; 
God was the supreme clockmakerg6"; and when "Eventually, God was reduced to a 
minimal role in the clock model of the universe - he wound up the mechanical cosmos 
and left it to tick away into eternity.97" From here, we see two main influences in the 
acceptance of the view expressed in this metaphor. First, we directly experience the 
results, or successes, of a science that has embraced this view, e.g., antibiotics, DNA as 
the genetic code, and email. Second, this view may start to develop at a young age 
through religious commitments. This arises from an "intellectual" tradition within the 
Judeo-Christian-Islam religions of a world created by a "PerfectRational God." Within 
this tradition many people associate God with a Designer, a Blacksmith, a Builder, or an 
Architect. These, in turn, are often associated as aspects of an Engineer. Because the 
prototypical engineer is someone who uses reason to build machines, God must build 
machines. Thus, the world is a machine. Now, considering that both scientists and 
religious leaders occasionally bombard the average person with the idea that "the world is 
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a machine," the average person would have a hard time rejecting this particular world- 
view. 98 
It is by studying the above tradition that we begin to see the complex connections 
between God-math-machines-world-ethics. First, take a belief in a world created by God. 
Then, add to this belief an understanding that God is rational and follows rules or laws of 
reason. The primary model of rationality and reason is mathematics (or some type of 
formal system). Thus, the world is created with mathematical precision and math is the 
language used to describe the universe. A well-made machine works with the same 
precision and certainty as a mathematical formula. Thus, the world constructed with 
mathematical precision will behave as if it were a machine. Hence, the world is a 
machine. We can also see this with the pioneers of the mechanical view 
For the mechanists, God became a clockmaker and an engineer constructing 
and directing the world from outside. It was Mersenne's hope and intention to 
replace The Imitation of Jesus Christ by The Imitation of the Divine Engineer. 
The engineer's art gave humanity not only the opportunity to imitate God 'in 
external productions' but also the possibility of dominion over the earth. For 
Gassendi, God was the external governor and director of the world. For 
Descartes, the corpuscular world and natural bodies, including the human 
body, operated according to the same mechanical laws as clocks and other 
machines.99 
We will see this view, especially the ethical claims, further developed as we look at the 
cognitive aspects of this metaphor. 
Once again, the four aspects of metaphor we will consider are: irreducibility, 
focusing, creative, and experiential. "The world is a machine" is irreducible because, as 
has been previously argued, metaphors need not be viewed as either true or false. If 
98 I take it as fairly obvious that scientists use this metaphor in world descriptions. As for the religious use, 
I base this on the popularity of the Design Argument for God's existence. 
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scientists only use this metaphor, then "Without an awareness of the oneness of things, 
science can give us at most only nature-in-pieces; more often it gives us only pieces of 
nature.loO" Furthermore, according to Barbara McClintock, people mistake models for 
reality and make tacit assumptions, "an implicit adherence to models that prevents people 
from looking at data with a fresh mind. These tacit assumptions impose unconscious 
boundaries between what is thinkable and what is not.lO'" One may see this, for example, 
in the differences in ape studies when men or women carry out the research program. 
While the mechanical metaphor should not be viewed as TrueFalse, the history of 
science has shown that it has been very useful. (Recent history however shows a 
challenge to the successful mechanical model, e.g., Einstein's Relativity Theory and 
modem Quantum Mechanics.) This usefulness is a direct result of the way the metaphor 
focuses attention onto specific aspects of understanding the world. 
This focus, according to Carolyn Merchant, began when Francis Bacon changed 
our understanding of the world by moving from the idea of mother earth to earth the 
servant: bound into service, made a slave in constraints, molded by the arts, in which we 
discover hidden plots and secrets.lo2 Bacon further developed modem scientific 
investigation by making it mechanical: breaking down a problem into its component 
parts, isolating from the environment, solving each portion independently, creating new 
things, and removing ethical constraints against manipulative magic.lO' A TrueFalse 
distinction was not originally part of this understanding. As Mersenne thought, we 
use mechanism not as an absolute truth but as a useful way of ordering 
knowledge about the practical everyday world. Ultimate knowledge was not 
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possible, but a pragmatic knowledge based on everyday experience and the 
appearances of the senses could be attained. Viewing the world as a machine 
was the most practical and useful way to organize information derived from 
the appearances. '04 
Thus, we have, under the mechanical metaphor, the primary focus as a "stress on 
analysis, or taking things apart to understand them.Io5" This follows both a mechanical 
and mathematical approach. From a mechanical perspective, this follows from the 
experiences of working with machines and the practice of taking apart machines to 
understand how the parts interact with each other. From a mathematical perspective, this 
follows from simplifying equations, or breaking down a problem into smaller parts and 
solving each part independently. This mechanical-mathematical understanding follows a 
reductionist-materialist approach of understanding the whole in terms of the parts. Thus, 
to understand the world, a scientist may break up a compound into its constituent parts, 
dissect an animal to see how it is connected, break up rock formations to study the layers 
of fossils, isolate chemical compounds in an herbal remedy to produce medication. 
A secondary focus is "stress on passive matter.. .physical things change their 
behavior only when pushed or pulled by other material things or when acted upon by 
external forces.lo6" Again, at its most basic level, a machine only changes or operates by 
a contact force-e.g., gears turning chains to spin wheels. Once an outside force starts it, a 
machine may operate for a while, but there must be an initial start. In addition, a machine 
left unattended will eventually run down. This fits in nicely with the experience of a 
world that has material objects that do not move unless acted on. This idea of "passive 
matter" gives rise to a new ethics of treating nature as humans learn to control aspects of 
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the environment. More control of the environment makes the world seem more machine 
like. As a result, "Because nature was now viewed as a system of dead, inert particles 
moved by external, rather than inherent forces, the mechanical framework itself could 
legitimate the manipulation of nature.lo7" After all, most people do not object that, in 
itself, the manipulation of mathematical equations or machines is in any way "unethical." 
Another focusing aspect is "stress on matter in motion as basis for physical 
explanations.108" Change bases itself on motion or contact between physical parts. For 
example, Descartes describes a flame when it "burns wood or some other similar 
material, we can see with the naked eye that it sets the minute parts of the wood in 
motion and separates them from one another, thus transforming the finer parts into fire, 
air and smoke and leaving the courser parts as ashes.lo9" There is no Aristotelian essence 
or Platonic form of heat that makes a flame independent of the burning, changing 
material. The flame and heat occur because fast moving particles bounce around in 
contact with each other and other objects. More currently, an earthquake does not happen 
because Zeus was angry, but because of stress along fault-lines. 
The last focusing element we consider is a restatement of the metaphor itself with 
"stress on engineering models.. .explicitly w/ appeals to 'God as Engineer,' or implicitly 
W/ frequent appeals to factory, blueprint, or computer  model^."^" This focusing element 
leads to the creative and experiential nature of this metaphor. 
lo' Merchant, Carolyn. The Death of Nature. 193 
lo* Recker, Doren. Philosophy of Science Course Book. 56 
lo9 Descartes. The World or Treatise on Light. AT XI 7 Reprint in: CSM 83 
"O Recker, Doren. Phllosovhv of Science Course Book. 56 
67 
Many of the creative and experiential aspect of the metaphor are outlined in Eugene 
Russo's comments in "The ~cientist'"" This article outlines a panel session at a History 
of Science Society meeting in Pittsburgh. The panel's discussion centered on scientific 
mechanisms in the past and present, and traced modern mechanistic ideas to the 17" 
century. Russo reports Peter Macharner's claim that Galileo Galilei was the first to 
popularize the mechanical world-view because 
Much of Galilee's mathematics related to the nature of matter and motion can 
be elegantly illustrated and realized via simple machines. Soon after, Rene 
Descartes' collision laws, Dutch mathematician Christian Huygens' laws of 
motion, and, most notably, Sir Isaac Newton's introduction of forces all 
influenced how mathematical laws lend themselves to actual mechanisms in 
theory and practice. ' l 2  
Thus, simple machines (lever, pulley, wedge, inclined plane, wheel, and screw) provide a 
conceptual link between math and the world. As machines become more complex and 
mathematics becomes more advanced to describe the mechanics, there is a stronger tie 
between machines-math-world. This provides a cognitive view as, according to 
Machamer, "It's not just having the mathematics. It's saying here's a problem in the 
physical world, now think about it this way.. .. It sets the way in which you think, and 
how you have to structure problems, and gives you the canon for s~lution."~" Once 
physical sciences began to have success with mechanical models, others sciences, 
according to Machamer, began to try out mechanistic models. This exemplifies the 
creative and experiential aspects because, as Ramsey says, mechanisms are "one of the 
ways we have made things intelligible to ~urselves.' '~" Machamer agrees, "Part of the 
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appeal for mechanisms is that you have this way of literally showing how the damn thing 
works.' 15" 
Carolyn Merchant gives further experiential and focusing aspects of the mechanical 
metaphor: 
The brilliant achievement of mechanism as a world view was its reordering of 
reality around two fundamental constituents of human experience - order and 
power. Order was attained through an emphasis on the motion of indivisible 
parts subject to mathematical laws and the rejection of unpredictable animistic 
sources of change. Power was achieved through immediate active 
intervention in a secularized world. The Baconian method advocated power 
over nature through manual manipulation, technology, and experiment.ll6 
This new focus provided many payoffs within science. The success of the metaphor 
seems clear, although success, in this case, is in getting results, not in a claim to finding 
truth. Because of the cognitive influence of the metaphor, it psychologically affects 
people. We begin to see the transition from science to ethics by way of metaphor. 
Merchant sums up this tie in several parts of her book: "Between the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries the image of an organic cosmos with a living female earth at its 
center gave way to a mechanistic world view in which nature was reconstructed as dead 
and passive, to be dominated and controlled by  human^."^" The world is a machine. We 
control machines. Suddenly the world is controllable by us! We take apart machines to 
tinker with, fix, break, etc. Therefore, the world can be taken apart and tinkered with, 
fixed, broken, and is basically now opened up to our use. 
All this change from a conceptual shift partly facilitated by a metaphor change: 
The philosophy that the world was a vast machine made of inert particles in 
ceaseless motion appeared at a time when new and more efficient kinds of 
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machinery were enabling the acceleration of trade and commerce.. .the death 
of the world soul and the removal of nature's spirits helped to support 
increasing environmental destruction by removing any scruples that might be 
associated with the view that nature was a living organism. Mechanism 
substituted a picture of the natural world, which seemed to make it more 
rational, predictable, and thereby manipulable. l8 
If we add this manipulative view with the reductionist mindfrarne, then we get problems 
with the environment like at Love Canal or the acidification of the Adirondacks Lakes: 
'We've been spoiling the environment just dreadhlly and thinking we were 
fine, because we were using the techniques of science. Then it turns into 
technology, and it's slapping us back because we didn't think it through. We 
were making assumptions we had no right to make. From the point of view of 
how the whole thing actually worked, we knew how part of it worked.. ..We 
didn't even inquire, didn't even see how the rest was going on. All these 
other things were happening and we didn't even see it."I9 
We still have the subtle tie between God-Math-Machines-World, 
Mechanism, which superseded the organic framework, was based on the logic 
that knowledge of the world could be certain and consistent, and that the laws 
of nature were imposed on creation by God. The primacy of organic process 
gave way to the stability of mathematical laws and identities. Force was 
external to matter rather than immanent within it. Matter was corpuscular, 
passive, and inert; change was simply the rearrangement of particles as motion 
was transmitted from one part to another in causal nexus. Because it viewed 
nature as dead and matter as passive, mechanism could function as a subtle 
sanction for the exploitation and manipulation of nature and its resources.120 
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The World is an Organism 
Despite both the success of the mechanical metaphor and the difficulty of seeing 
the world as anything but a machine (because it is so ingrained in our western teaching), 
there is the competing metaphor to consider, which is older than "The world is a 
machine" metaphor and is regaining use-"the world is an organism." Like the previous 
mechanical metaphor, the organism metaphor gains initial plausibility because of its 
appeal to religious belief or life experiences. For an example of the older version of the 
organism metaphor, we can refer to creation myths similar to some versions of Greek 
mythology. One such myth, in a Greek context, goes something like this: In the 
beginning, the universe was fire and Chaos; Out of Chaos, Ge (Greek) or Gaia (Roman) 
arose; Gaia gave birth to the Earth and to the human race. Thus she was worshiped as the 
Mother Goddess or Mother Earth. Although the names and details change, many ancient 
or "primitive" cultures have this shared view of "Earth as Mother" or shorter "Mother 
Earth." Thus, we see that "nature was traditionally feminine.I2l" This view ties together 
with an ethics: "As long as the earth was considered to be alive and sensitive, it could be 
considered a breach of human ethical behavior to carry out destructive acts against it.122" 
Merchant relates an example of this: 
Smohalla of the Columbia Basin Tribes voiced the Indian objections to 
European attitudes in the mid- 1800s: You ask me to plow the ground! Shall I 
take a knife and tear my mother's breast? ... You ask me to dig for stone! 
Shall I dig under her skin for her bones?. . .You ask me to cut grass and make 
hay and sell it, and be rich like white men! But how dare I cut off my 
mother's hair.'23 
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This follows directly from the idea that the earth is a nurturing mother, not some cold- 
lifeless inanimate mass. 
Even in non-religious experience, the world can be understood as an organism. 
Certain aspects of the world seem to correspond to biological systems: The wind is the 
breath, rivers and streams are the circulatory system, the rainforests are lungs, rocks are 
bones, etc. Not only can we understand the world in these terms, but experience shows 
us a world of birth, growth, death, decay, and rebirth.. .and it appears that this happens 
for all types of matter, both organic and inorganic. The claim that inorganic matter 
behaves this way could be controversial, yet scientists use language consistent with this 
idea, e.g., the birth of mountains, the growing mountains; earthquakes, meteors, and 
rivers can wear mountains down-thus implying death and decay. Cyclic views of nature 
are very compatible with the idea that the world is an organism. This particular view is 
variously classified as classical, primitive, ancient view, or earth-centered. 
As we have seen, beginning in the seventeenth century, this organic world-view was 
largely replaced by the mechanical view. As the mechanical models proved successful, 
the organic models gave way, although they never completely disappeared.'24 Scientists 
and philosophers continue to hold (and use) the organism metaphor, yet for various 
reasons this view declined. There, however, has been a reemergence of organic models: 
Books on ancient goddesses that became the basis for a renewed earth-rooted 
spirituality. They revived interest in statues, images, poetry, and rituals 
surrounding prehistoric earth goddesses, the Mesopotamian Innana, the 
Egyptian Isis, the Greek goddesses Demeter and Gaia, the Roman Ceres, the 
European paganism, as well as Asian, Latin American, and African female 
symbols and myths.125 
124 Merchant also relates how social views of women influenced the decline of the metaphor, e.g., woman 
as nurturer to woman as witch allowed for an idea of 'controlling women' + 'controlling earth.' 
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This seems to be the case because to many, like James Lovelock, the mechanical view 
was cold and hard, it took the heart and soul out of science.126 Furthermore, this could be 
a reaction to how science is applied or a reaction to the implications of humanity's place 
in the world. (More evidence that the cognitive aspect of metaphor links science and 
ethics.) The organism view also gained acceptance from researchers, as there is an 
increasing realization that the mechanical view limits progress or advances in scientific 
knowledge. For these reasons, the organic model is making a comeback. To better 
contrast this view from the mechanical view, the four cognitive aspects of this metaphor 
will help clarify its meaning. 
"The world is an organism" is irreducible in much the same way that "the world is a 
machine" is irreducible. From a scientific standpoint it is not clear that anything is 
gained by viewing the metaphor as true or false; that is, the metaphor is best viewed as 
useful or not. The usefulness of this metaphor, like that of many metaphors in science, 
rests on its ability to focus attention to particular aspects or areas of research. It however 
does rely on a holistic philosophy: everything is connected to everything else; emphases 
are on interactive processes; the whole has primacy over the parts; and we focus on 
unitylstructure and function.'27 This holistic aspect, as we will see, heavily carries into 
ethical grounds, which makes some scientists (and philosophers) question the motive of 
using this metaphor. Yet, as scientists try to grasp with the non-mechanical nature of 
quantum mechanics, the organic metaphor does become more appealing, as opposed to a 
reductionist approach. 
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The primary focus of this organic view is a "Stress on interconnections between 
things, or understanding things only in proper context.I2*" This follows fiom 
understanding that, when conditions are not "as in nature," the observations or 
experiments could be flawed because the researchers influence the tests. (As we see with 
studies into light or quantum mechanics.) Rather than following a view of reductionism, 
the organic view stresses a holistic, non-reductionist approach to understanding or a view 
that the whole can be more than the sum of the parts. Thus, to understand the world, a 
scientist may see what compounds naturally occur in nature, observe animals in their 
natural habitat, or try to reproduce (rather than dissect) nature in a lab. 
A second focus is a "Stress on active matter.. .[in which] physical things have their 
own internal motive forces, principles of self motion, or are 'Centers of Activity' within 
an otherwise continuous field, etc.'"" That is, matter is active, as opposed to passive inert 
material. Matter displays principles of self-motion and self-expression rather than merely 
reacting to external influence. This may go back to one of Aristotle's Causes, in 
particular, everything moving toward some natural end because all of nature has a 
"natural place" where it will end up when not interfered with. 
A third focusing element is a "Stress on interactions between different centers of 
activity," or "similarities between things that are not obviously connected as a basis for 
physical explanations.130" For people who grew up with George Lucas's Star Wars, this 
sounds similar to the idea of the Force-something that connects all things, like an energy 
field. These interactions stressed by the organic view are similar to old style magical 
thinking or a micro/macro view of the world. 
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A fourth and final focus of the organic view is pretty much a restatement of the 
metaphor with a "Stress on biological models.. .interconnection of organ systems within a 
living animal. '"" This last focusing element is part of the creative and experiential 
nature of this metaphor. 
The creative and experiential elements are seen in examples, which range, for 
example, from an entire species population to the world. Recker writes 
interpretations of the behavior of social insects have long been informed by 
the organic metaphor of populations as 'superorganisms' [e.g., Wheeler]. 
That is, interpreting an 'organism' as 'a self-sustaining biological unit,' which 
must acquire and metabolize energy, protect its individual integnty, reproduce 
itself, etc., social insect populations can be h i t h l l y  described as 
organisms. 132 
Another example of this is James Lovelock's "Gaia Hypothesis.'' This is, "a scientific 
claim that the earth's 'biota', tightly coupled with its environment, acts (and has acted 
since life on earth developed any complexity) as a single, self regulating living system in 
such a way as to maintain the conditions that are suitable for life.13)" That this is a 
cognitive view of metaphor is further shown by Lovelock's description of alive, "I 
recognize that to view the Earth as if it were alive is just a convenient, but different, way 
of organizing the facts of the Earth. ..the thought that Earth may be alive: not as the 
ancients saw her-a sentient Goddess with a purpose and foresight-but alive like a 
tree.'34" As we can see in the environmentalists' movement, this view aims at changing 
the understanding of humanity's relationships to the Earth. They give up the "cold 
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lifeless" mechanical view where we tinker with nature. In its place humanity becomes 
active co-participants in the world. 
We can really see this experiential nature when observing radical environmentalists 
who claim that humanity has become a plague or cancer on mother earth. Other 
environmentally concerned individuals express this a bit more mildly 
Today, a global crisis.. .threatens the health of the entire planet. Ozone 
depletion, carbon dioxide buildup, chloroflurocarbon emissions, and acid rain 
upset the respiration and clog the pores and lungs of the ancient Earth 
Mother.. .Toxic wastes, pesticides, and herbicides seep into ground water, 
marshes, bays, and oceans, polluting Gaia's circulatory system.. .A new 
partnership between humans and the earth is urgently needed.'35 
The metaphor itself helps in shaping belief, and it is this cognitive nature of metaphor 
that provides the link between science and ethics. 
The creative aspect of the organism metaphor is slightly different depending on 
whether we are considering the primitive or modem view. As we have already seen, the 
primitive view arose more from religious belief and observations of the natural world. Its 
view is more "Natural" in the sense that in more primitive cultures machines and 
mathematics were not complex enough even to be considered as a model for the world. 
The creation of the modem organism metaphor is more complex. It appears that the 
modem view is more of a reaction to the apparent inhumanity of the mechanical view as 
well as a growing understanding that the mechanical view is not the only option in 
science, i.e., a growing realization that other views can produce results in the scientific 
enterprise. The experiential nature of the organic metaphor is most evident by studying 
how scientific exploration is conducted within this view, for example in ape studies. 
135 Merchant, Carolyn. The Death of Nature. xv 
Under a mechanical model, the following types of activities would be appropriate: 
Go out to the field and capture a bunch of apes; take them back to the lab and start 
experiments. Kill a bunch of them for dissection (anatomical studies, morphology, etc.) 
and take fluid samples to analyze. Map the genetic sequence. Poke, prod, shake, shave, 
and do other experiments on them. Gather number crunching data and see what is there. 
Under an organic model, the following study would be appropriate: Go out to the field 
and secretly watch apes in their natural habitat. Observe them with little or no direct 
interactions. See how they interact with each other and the environment. At a 
hndamental level, this is seen in the contest between scientists relying on field 
experience versus scientists working primarily with lab experiments. It is important, 
however, to keep in mind that a more complete understanding of apes comes about by 
using both metaphors. The machine metaphor is likely to omit such issues as ape social 
structure and communication, while the organism metaphor is likely to lose 
understanding of medical treatment of primates and genetic characteristics of the apes. 
Since both metaphors capture particular aspects of our experiences, both are needed to 
understand those experiences more adequately. It is not just a matter of gathering more 
information or new data, but a new way of understanding nature. This is evidence that 
progress is not made by only gathering more or newer data: "Revolutionary thinkers are 
not, primarily, gatherers of facts, but weavers of new intellectual s tr~ctures. '~~" Progress 
is made with metaphors. 
It may be important to note that making a claim, while using a particular metaphor, 
will not result in a standard set of conclusions. That is, people using the same metaphor 
are not bound to conceptualize the same interpretations or conclusions within scientific or 
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philosophic debate. The metaphors, however, are prevalent as a major influence in 
philosophical discourse. As an example, we can look at the mechanical metaphor used in 
Descartes' and Hume's work regarding reason in humans and animals. I choose this 
example because many traditional and popular ethical (mis)treatments of animals rely on 
a notion of animal intelligence or reasoning power. Although some people-like 
Utilitarian Peter Singer, prefer to challenge this notion from "outside"-this analysis will 
allow challenges from "insideyif so desired or appropriate. 
The World is a Machine: Descartes and Hume, Animal Reason 
Do animals and humans have the same reasoning faculties? There seem to be two 
basic views when it comes to answering this. In one view, which is advocated by RenC 
Descartes, animal and human reasoning is a difference in kind, not degree. The other 
view, which is advocated by David Hume, claims that animal and human reasoning is a 
difference not in kind, but in degree. Both philosophers rely on the mechanical 
metaphor; yet attain different results because of the different approaches used (a 
rationalists / an empiricists view of knowledge). Rationalism =d,f the epistemological 
theory that significant knowledge of the world can best be achieved by a priori means."' 
For example, Descartes' arm-chair-philosophy takes a person from the certainty that "I 
exist" to the certainty of the existence of God and an external world. Empiricism's =d,f 
the epistemological theory that genuine information about the world must be acquired by 
a posteriori means, so that nothing can be thought without first being sensed.'" For all 
the claims that Descartes and Hume are diametrically opposed, they are in many ways 
similar. For example, Hume and Descartes' bodies of work are very similar in goals: 
both seek the limits of human reason by utilizing skepticism and an analytic 
"mechanical" method for inquiry. One of the most striking similarities between these 
two philosophers is their reliance on a mechanical view of nature. This mechanical view 
permeates the works of both Hume and Descartes. However, they each arrived at the 
metaphor in slightly different manners. 
During his time in the military, Descartes met Isaac Beeckman, an engineer with a 
medical degree. Beeckman developed a micro-mechanical view of nature while working 
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with mechanics. In his micro-mechanical view, all physical phenomena were explainable 
by the shape, size, and position of small corpuscular objects of which visible bodies are 
composed. Under the view, causes (the particles) are not directly observable, but the 
effects are observable. This is a departure fiom traditional views of objects in nature with 
qualities, essences, or magical powers. In fact, "magic" was simply dismissed as empty 
words or superstitious nonsense.'39 
Descartes maintained and firther developed this mechanical view of nature. He used 
the "world is machine" metaphor (or variants of) as the underlying model of the world, 
crucial in the pursuit of natural philosophy. Adding to many of Beechan's ideas, 
Descartes held that the observed nature is explainable mathematically by uncovering the 
underlying parts. Hence, fiom Beechan,  Descartes develops a coherent mathematical- 
mechanical view of the world. It was this education, plus the success in using the model, 
that influenced Descartes to adopt the mechanical view. 
Hume's acceptance of the mechanical view of nature might also be a product of his 
 circumstance^.'^^ In his younger years, Hume went to the University of Edinburgh. 
While at the university, Hume studied many of the same subjects as Descartes: a 
classical education of Greek, logic, metaphysics, and natural philosophy. Hume also took 
elective courses in ethics and mathematics, while becoming familiar with the works of 
John Locke and Isaac Newton. This conditioned Hume to the acceptance of a mechanical 
view, that is, by the time Hume needed conceptual tools to build his own theories, the 
mechanical view was commonly accepted. There was a good precedent for accepting the 
view. The mechanical view had not only been developed by Descartes, who had some 
139 Alternatively, to paraphrase a later scientist, magic is just science/technology we do not understand. 
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success in science and mathematics by using it, but also was further developed and 
successfully used in natural philosophy (physics) by Isaac Newton. Because of this, the 
mechanical view would be much more prevailing and acceptable during Hume's time. 
Both Descartes and Hume relied on the mechanical view of analysis, where 
understanding comes from first dissecting complex objects to their simple components 
and then using various types of deduction to arrive at truth. They differ, though, in what 
they considered the simple components to be. For Descartes the simple components are 
objects that are clear and distinct to the mind. For Hume, the simple components are 
simple perceptions. Hume held that the difference in human and animal reason is one of 
degree, that is, humans and animals have similar reasoning faculties. On the other hand, 
Descartes held that the difference in human and animal reason is one of kind, that is, 
there is a fundamental difference between humans and animals. 
Hume deals with animal reason in Section IX (Of the Reason of animals) of his 
Enquiry. As already noted, Hume relies on the idea that all animals (including man) are 
machines: "Every thing is conducted by springs and principles, which are not peculiar to 
man, or any one species of anirnal~.'~'" Hume's argument relies on a strict analogy 
between humans and animals. Whenever we observe anatomical similarities in animals 
(including humans), we judge similar functions. Likewise, it is reasoned, similar 
behavior comes from similar motivation. With respect to reasoning ability, humans are 
similar to animals not only in anatomical structures (in some cases) but also in that both 
learn primarily through experience. Thus, human and animal reasoning is understood 
(from Hume's position) as a difference in degree, not kind. 
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Hurne begins his section on the reason of animals by reminding the reader that, "All 
our reasoning concerning matters of fact are founded on a species of ANALOGY, which 
leads us to expect from any cause the same events, which we have observed to result 
from similar causes.'42" Hume then states the standard evaluative criteria when using 
arguments from analogy 
Where the causes are entirely similar, the analogy is perfect, and the 
inference, drawn from it, is regarded as certain and conclusive.. .but where the 
objects have not so exact a similarity, the analogy is less perfect, and the 
inference is less conclusive; though still it has some force, in proportion to the 
degree of similarity and resemblance. 143 
This part of the argument may serve at least two purposes. First, because he deals with 
the reasoning ability of animals, Hume establishes the basics of his philosophy regarding 
human understanding. Hume's goal in the Enquiw concerns itself with building a 
science of human understanding. Hume thinks that his theory explains how humans 
reason. He wants to show that his theory is even more compelling because it also 
explains reasoning in animals, adding to its explanatory power. The second purpose of 
this reminder is that one can take it as an indirect argument against Descartes' claim that 
humans and animals are fundamentally different. We will see a possible application of 
this used against Descartes later. Since Hume and Descartes rely on the idea that 
"animals are machines" one consideration in deciding which philosopher has the better 
argument is discovering which philosopher has the stronger analogy. 
Hume claims that "First, it seems evident, that animals, as well as men learn many 
things from experience, and infer, that the same events will always follow from the same 
142 Hume, David. An Enauiw Concerning Human Understanding. 69 
143 Hurne, David. An Enauiw Concerning Human Understanding. 69 
82 
causes.'44" Hume follows this claim with examples with which most people can identify. 
We learn about properties of external objects best by experience. For example, tell a 
child not to play by a fire and the child might listen or not, but most of the time someone 
has to keep reminding the child. The same child burned once will probably remember 
and learn from the experience. Animals behave similarly to this-pleasure and pain are 
fast teachers. Experience is also evident when examining the differences in the abilities 
of young and old members of a species. The older members, again both in human and 
animal society, seem to act with more knowledge gained from experience while the 
younger members are not as skilled. 
Hume continues by reminding how we educate animals: "This is still more evident 
[learning from experience] from the effects of discipline and education on animals, who, 
by the proper application of rewards and punishments, may be taught any course of 
action, the most contrary to their natural instincts and propensities.145" A common 
example is training a dog to sit or to not urinate in the house. A dog is praised, patted on 
the head, talked to in a funny way, etc. when he does what he is told. When the dog is 
"bad," he is swatted with a paper, yelled at, and banished to the back yard. It is not hard 
to see the same type of training with children. A child eats his vegetables and its, "oh 
look at that.. .how nice, how good, you're a big boy now, now you can play Nintendo." 
However, the poor kid who does not eat his greens is punished by not getting desert, 
washing dishes or exile to his bedroom. We never seem to refrain from training animals 
or humans by positive and negative feedback.'46 
Hume, David. An Enauin, Concerning Human Understanding. 70 
'45 Hume, David. An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. 70 
146 We do this even in school: stickers, A's, and scolding. 
Now Descartes, as we will see in more detail later, claims that animals are merely 
reacting to stimulus: like machines react to input. Nevertheless, Hume's position 
challenges Descartes' analogy. Hume denies that animals are merely reacting to stimulus 
but are engaged in reasoning similar to human reason, "The animal infers some fact 
beyond what immediately strikes his senses; and that this inference is altogether founded 
on past experience, while the creature expects from the present object the same 
consequences, which it has always found in its observation to result from similar 
objects." If animals are machines, then they are complex enough to learn from 
experience. Hume could also point out that Descartes agrees that the human body is also 
a machine. Yet, Descartes tries to pull human learning into a mental realm. Hume would 
deny that Descartes has grounds to make this move. 
One of the consequences of Hume's philosophy is the realization that human reason 
is often not "rational" when it comes to matters-of-fact. Hume points out that a large part 
of human "reasoning" is devoted to the relationship of cause-and-efect. Hume made 
famous the "Problem of Induction7'-Cause-and-effect requires that the present (or future) 
will resemble the past. We have past experiences of effects that were always proceeded 
by something we call a cause; yet, there is no guarantee that this relationship must always 
hold true. One of Hume's examples involves playing a game of billiards. If knowledge 
of cause-and-effect is based on reason, then people should be able to infer, without 
experience, the exact motions of the balls as one strikes another. However, people must 
have experience to make inferences. Thus, belief in cause-and-effect is not formed by 
"reason." Hume says that this is also true with animals 
Secondly, It is impossible, that this inference of the animal can be founded on 
any process of argument or reasoning, by which he concludes, that like events 
must follow like objects, and that the course of nature will always be regular 
in its operations ....[ it takes philosophical geniuses to figure out the 
arguments] ... Animals, therefore, are not guided in these inferences by 
reasoning: Neither are children: Neither are the generality of mankind, in their 
ordinary actions and conclusions: Neither are philosophers themselves, who, 
in all the active parts of life, and, in the main, the same with the vulgar, and 
are governed by the same maxims.14' 
Hume ends with one more similarity between humans and animals, animals learn by 
experience, yet also have instincts. Our "experimental reasoning" is nothing but "a 
species of instinct or mechanical power. 14'" 
To summarize Hume's position: Animals and humans are both highly complex 
machines. As machines, animals make inferences in the same manner as humans. Both 
humans and animals learn from experience; that is, experience is the basis of all 
knowledge. Humans and animals both believe that the future will be like the past. This 
induction is not by reason but custom. Animals may have fewer capabilities than humans 
may e.g., not able to use much abstract reasoning. Yet, the difference is a matter of 
degree, not kind. Humans are merely more complex machines than other animals. 
Although Descartes also holds to the mechanical view, he believes that humans and 
animals differ in kind, not degree. 
We now turn to Descartes' arguments. Descartes' basic argument is that animals are 
machines. As machines, animals are capable of reacting to the environment (much as a 
thermometer reacts to temperature change) but are unable to use reason because they do 
not have a mind. Humans, on the other hand, are more than machines. Descartes 
believes it is obvious (with a little introspection) that humans have a mind capable of 
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reasoning power. All that is required to test whether one is dealing with human reasoning 
or animalistic reaction is from the use of two criteria. First, humans are capable of 
meaningful language. In this case, language conveys abstract and concrete information. 
Second, humans have a general use of reason capable of dealing with new problems or 
situations. In other words, humans are generally not specialized for one task, but capable 
of accomplishing or learning many tasks. Let us look at some of the specifics of 
Descartes' argument. 
As we have already seen, Descartes is also committed to a mechanical view of nature. 
However, interestingly enough, Descartes is not committed to materialism. He is, rather, 
a dualist. In both the Discourse and Meditations Descartes commits himself to the idea 
that humans are composed of both mental and physical substance. Since we can imagine 
thinking without a body, the essence of the self is thinking. Thus, the body is distinct 
from the mind and we do not (strictly speaking) need the body for personal identification. 
The human being is composed of some sort of blend of non-material thinking substance 
and material physical substance. 
The body, in and of itself, is a machine. Descartes states, "I suppose that the body to 
be nothing but a statue or machine made of earth, which God forms with the explicit 
intention of making it as much as possible like us.149" Within this body is a rational soul 
that interacts with the brain. Descartes establishes the idea of the body as machine by 
comparing bodies with mechanical objects popular in his time: 
You may have observed in the grottos and fountains in the royal gardens that 
the mere force with which the water is driven as it emerges from its source is 
sufficient to move various machines, and even to make them play certain 
instruments or utter certain works depending on the various arrangements of 
the pipes through which the water is conducted. One may compare the nerves 
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of the machine I am describing with the pipes in the works of these fountains, 
its muscles and tendons with the various devices and springs which serve to 
set them in motion, its animal spirits with the water which drives them, the 
heart with the source of the water, and the cavities of the brain with the 
storage tanks. I5O 
Thus, we can see how Descartes establishes a correspondence between pipes and blood 
vessels, water flow and blood, springs and pulleys with tendons and muscles. The body, 
under this view, is merely a very complex machine, while the mind is an immaterial 
mental substance. 
At this stage, Hume is capable of responding to Descartes in various ways. Hume 
would agree, as we have seen, with Descartes that the body is a machine. However, 
Hume would object to the notion that there are two separate substances of mind and 
body. Hume's attack works, in this case, by testing the idea of either "substance" or 
"self." Hume has a fairly good empirical test for concepts, "When we entertain, 
therefore, any suspicion, that a philosophical term is employed without any meaning or 
idea (as is but to frequent), we need but enquire, fiom what impression is that supposed 
idea deri~ed.'~'" Now, Locke had already claimed that substance was, "A something we 
know not what" that props up and supports the primary and secondary qualities of 
objects. Hume pushes this further and says that we have no experience of substance; we 
only perceive the qualities of objects. Thus, under Hume's empiricism, since there are no 
simple impressions of "substance," it makes no sense to claim that there is some type of 
physical or mental substance that composes the underlying object. Hence, if we do not 
know of substance, we cannot claim that animals are strictly physical substance while 
humans are a combination of mental-physical substances. Because of Hume's analysis of 
- - 
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substance, it seems that Descartes' distinction of mental and physical substance is unclear 
or controversial enough to weaken Descartes' claim that human reasoning is of a 
different kind than animal reason. 
A weak objection to both Descartes and Hume is that it is unreasonable to suppose 
that a body is a machine. Yet, it is easy to find cases where the body is merely reacting to 
the environment much like a machine. For example, when a hand comes too close to a 
flame, the body will reflexively gasp and pull the hand away; when a person falls, her 
arm usually shoots out to catch her. Descartes could claim that this is no different from a 
complex mechanical machine in which when a pipe is filled with air a sound comes out, 
or when a machine starts to tip over counter-weights swing to keep it in balance. Hurne 
would agree that we react with principles and springs. 
Despite the previous objections regarding substance and false analogy, Descartes still 
has a claim that humans are more than automatons (animals or machines), because 
humans have a reasoning capability that machines and animals do not have, and 
presumably never will. In other words, if both animals and human bodies are machines, 
but humans are different in kind, then Descartes must account for a relevant difference 
(or way to distinguish) between humans and automatons. Descartes summarizes this 
problem: "if any such machines bore a resemblance to our bodies and imitated our 
actions as closely as possible for all practical purposes; we should still have two very 
certain means of recognizing that they were not real men.'52" Here, Descartes describes 
his criteria, or tests 
The first is that they could never use words, or put together other signs, as we 
do in order to declare our thoughts to others.. .[it may be possible to have a 
machine that gives outputs for certain inputs]. . .but it is not conceivable that 
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such a machine should produce different arrangements of words so as to give 
an appropriately meaningful answer to whatever is said in its presence, as the 
dullest of men can do. 153 
This first test is much like the Turing Test for computers that will come up later. The 
second test deals with a notion of being able to perform multiple tasks. Descartes says 
Secondly, even though such machines might do some things as well as we do 
them, or perhaps even better, they would inevitably fail in others, which 
would reveal that they were acting not through understanding but only fiom 
the disposition of their organs. For whereas reason is a universal instrument 
which can be used in all kinds of situations, these organs need some particular 
disposition for each particular action; hence it is for all practical purposes 
impossible for a machine to have enough different organs to make it act in all 
the contingencies of life in the way in which our reason makes us act.'54 
Later in this essay, we will see how Hume may respond, as well as explore some 
problems with these two criteria. 
Descartes further develops these two tests in the same section of the Discourse. First, 
he points out that humans learn how to communicate with each other in all types of 
situations. Given time, "there are no men so dull-witted or stupid - and this includes 
even madmen - that they are incapable of arranging various words together and forming 
an utterance fiom them in order to make their thoughts underst~od. '~~" Descartes states 
that animals are unable to communicate similarly. Some people would claim that animals 
would be capable of meaningful communication except that they cannot communicate 
because of missing organs, like vocal cords. Descartes counters: 
we see that magpies and parrots can utter words as we do, and yet they cannot 
speak as we do: That is, they cannot show that they are thinking what they are 
saying. On the other hand, men born deaf and dumb, and thus deprived of 
speech-organs as much as the beasts or even more so, normally invent their 
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own signs to make themselves understood by those who, being regularly in 
their company, have the time to learn their 1 a n g ~ a ~ e . l ~ ~  
Thus, Descartes reaches his conclusion that 
This shows not merely that the beasts have less reason than men, but that they 
have no reason at all. For it patently requires very little reason to be able to 
speak; and since as much inequality can be observed among the animals of a 
given species as among human beings, and some animals are more easily 
trained than others, it would be incredible that a superior specimen of the 
monkey or parrot species should not be able to speak as well as the stupidest 
child - or at least as well as a child with a defective brain - if their souls were 
not completely different in nature from ours. 157 
One counter-argument against the language criteria is very Hurnean in nature. 
Experience shows that there is communication among animals. Dogs and cats will let 
their owners know when they need feeding or letting outside. Hunters know that deer or 
birds can warn others of dangerous predators. Descartes, like many contemporary 
thinkers, dismisses these as not representing significant communications: 
And we must not confbse speech with the natural movements which express 
passions and which can be imitated by machines as well as by animals. Nor 
should we think, like some of the ancients, that the beasts speak, although we 
do not understand their language. For if that were true, then since they have 
many organs that correspond to ours, they could make themselves understood 
by us as well as by their fellows. 158 
This could mean that animals must have some kind of direct experience to get the full 
content of the communication, but are unable to transfer abstract information. For 
example, for animals to teach each other about the dangers of a snake, it appears that 
there has to be a snake around and other animals exhibiting behavior that shows that the 
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snake is dangerous. With humans, we can tell each other to be aware of things that look 
like garden hoses that hiss. Humans can go beyond the immediate situation. 
Hume, being an empiricist, would tell us we need to look at the evidence and study 
the situation, that we could not just sit in our rooms and make up a priori arguments. (A 
sarcastic Hume would also be able to point out that the "rationalist" Descartes is playing 
the empiricism game.) There are studies that seem to indicate that apes can teach each 
other sign language, tool use, and fun tasks such as how to unwrap candy wrappers. If 
these stories are true, then it seems that they weaken Descartes' position on the reasoning 
capabilities of animals. 
Descartes finishes with statements on the second test that relate to the adaptability of 
humans. He says 
It is also a very remarkable fact that although many animals show more skill 
than we do in some of their actions, yet the same animals show none at all in 
many others; so what they do better does not prove that they have any 
intelligence, for if it did then they would have more intelligence than any of us 
and would excel us in everything. It proves rather that they have no 
intelligence at all, and that it is nature that acts in them according to the 
disposition of their organs. In the same way a clock, consisting only of 
wheels and springs, can count the hours and measure time more accurately 
than we can with all our wisdom.'59 
One might misrepresent this statement by claiming that if an animal is better than humans 
in one skill than we are, and if an animal has intelligence, then the animal would be better 
than humans would at everything. This strawman is quickly knocked down by quick 
counter-example. Many people that excel in one activity, basketball or physics or music, 
seem to have intelligence, but are not better than everyone at everything. Another way in 
which this could be false is that humans just may not have found the animals or machines 
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that are superior in skill. However, Descartes' point is that machines, as animals, are 
specialized. Humans, however, are more general. To this real point, I think there are two 
responses. One, humans may be specialized in mental power, thus they are more 
machine-animal like (especially if compared to computers). Second, as Carl Sagan 
would say, "Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.'60" 
Ultimately, Descartes' argument relies on the strength of the analogies between (1) 
animals and machines and (2) humans and machines. The dissimilar treatment between 
the two cases makes Descartes' conclusions weak. As we have seen, problems first arise 
when Descartes utilizes the idea of two substances. In this, Hurne argued, we really do 
not have an idea of what a "substance" is. Another problem that Hume had with 
Descartes was Descartes' use of two substances, yet with no account for the interaction 
between the "rational soul" and the body. Suppose that we accept the analogy that 
animals are machines, but dismiss substance talk and arbitrary considerations. We then 
have Hume's basic position.16' 
Therefore, we can see that both philosophers were relying on two fundamental 
similarities. Both rely on a mechanistic worldview and both are arguing by analogy. 
Hume's analogy is that humans and animals are similar in many ways. Humans and 
(some) animals share physical structures, behavior, and learning methods. These 
similarities, according to Hume, are enough to establish that humans and animals have 
similar reasoning powers, thus the difference is only in degree. Descartes' analogy is 
close. Descartes would agree with Hume about shared physical structure, behavior, and 
(to a limited extent) learning methods. However, Descartes will add mental substance to 
160 Sagan, Carl. The Demon Haunted World 
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humans. Thus, while the human body is mechanistic, the mind is distinct. In this 
manner, Descartes concludes that humans have reason and animals have reactions to the 
environment, thus the difference is one of kind. On a cursory inspection, it might appear 
that Descartes has the stronger argument. After all, arguments by analogy require that 
there must be a good fit between the two objects of comparison. Moreover, it looks as if 
Descartes shows that there are relevant differences between animals and humans. 
Nevertheless, this conclusion is misleading. When Hume takes away the force of 
Descartes' use of "substance," the distinction that Descartes makes with mental and 
physical substance falls apart. Descartes' analogy collapses into Hume's analogy. Yet I 
hesitate to conclude that-even though Hume's arguments are stronger than Descartes' 
arguments-they are necessarily correct. 
I hesitate because Hume and Descartes' arguments both rely on a strictly mechanical 
view of nature. Descartes thought of animal and human bodies as machines. He then 
added that humans have a mind as a non-material substance. When Descartes adds on 
mental substance, this seems to add on more complexity than needed to explain the 
phenomena. This results in less of a fit in his analogy, which weakens his argument. 
Hume's arguments seem to provide a better fit in the analogy, making Hume's arguments 
the stronger. 
For the rest of this section, I would like to outline why Hume's arguments are not 
necessarily conclusive because of the looseness of the metaphor that animals are 
machines. 
One minor problem is that it can be very difficult, if not impossible, to delineate exact 
(or literal) meaning when using a metaphor, thus it is possible to smuggle in extra- 
unwanted aspects of meaning. The analogy relies on the idea that animals (or bodies) are 
machines. As a metaphor, "animals are machines" could have many meanings. Both 
Descartes and Hume would agree that a part of this meaning is that, like mathematics, 
when machines are functioning properly, the behavior is consistent and necessary. That 
is, if everything is working properly, machines react in a precise manner. For example, 
in mathematics, when the conditions are right, the sum of two and three will always be 
five. Likewise, when dealing with machines, pulling a lever will set a spring and the 
machine will operate. Yet, what kind of other meaning is each philosopher bringing into 
the analogy? Since Descartes was a devout Catholic and Hume was, in all likelihood, an 
agnostic (if not an atheist), it is entirely possible that they both incorporated their own 
personal beliefs into their philosophy. Descartes may have felt the need to rationalize the 
religious view that humans are naturally superior to animals. Hume may have thought 
that the belief in human superiority was one more area where religion used dogmatic 
practices to control people. As this hypothesis is, for the most part, untested, I leave it as 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
The second problem with using a metaphor (and I take it that this is a potentially 
serious problem) is that the meaning can change radically over the years. This is 
especially true when dealing with the "animals are machines" metaphor, because we must 
consider what kind of machines Descartes and Hume had to use as examples. Descartes 
had Church Organs, waterworks in gardens, and pumps. I am not sure what Hume had to 
use as his primary examples of machines, but it seems reasonable to assume that he had 
similar machines. The types of machines become a crucial point when one considers the 
complexity of machinery in contemporary times. We now have more complex feedback 
systems in, for example, refrigerators and heaters that automatically regulate temperature. 
We also have airplanes and spaceships that can fly themselves162 and computers that can 
beat chess masters. The order of complexity in modern machines is astounding when 
compared with machines of the 17 '~ and 1 gth centuries. This problem is compounded as 
people realize the benefit of using both machine and organic metaphors and in turn use 
machine models for organisms and organic models for machines. In R e f i ~ r i n a  Life, 
Keller says 
Can it be any surprise, then, that in the bootstrap process of modeling 
organisms and machines, each upon the other, not only do organisms and 
machines come increasingly to resemble each other but that, as they do, the 
meaning of both terms undergoes some rather critical changes?'63 
This is also another example of Gould's idea that progress and understanding change as 
we develop and have access to new metaphors.1M 
Perhaps Descartes' tests could help in this situation. After all, Descartes has his test 
to determine whether dealing with a mindless automaton or a human intelligence, the two 
tests of language and adaptability. These two tests are still one common standard for 
reasoning and intelligence. For example, Alan Turing uses a form of the language test as 
a pre-requisite for believing that a computer has artificial intelligence. The Turing Test 
examines a computer's ability to mimic human intelligence. According to the test, a 
machine can mimic human intelligence when it can indefinitely fool a person into 
thinking that the person is having a conversation with another person, rather than a 
machine. A further example is in developing computers that not only beat master chess 
players but also can write poetry. 
'62 At one time, the only human function in landing the Space Shuttle was to pull a handle when landing. 
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Nevertheless, from a humean standpoint, these tests cannot a priori rule out the 
eventual intelligence (or reasoning powers similar in kind) of evolving animals or 
machines. The soundness of either position's arguments must rely on empirical tests. 
There are many sophisticated arguments about why computers or animals can never 
become intelligent. This may be a straw-man argument, but it seems that most arguments 
of this type boil down to the following: We have not seen animal intelligence and 
computer intelligence has not been achieved, therefore it cannot be done. There is now 
no computer/animalletc. that can pass the Cartesian tests, therefore there are none and 
will never be any. This seems like the worst type of armchair philosophy and arrogance. 
The history of science has shown that unless there are theoretical limitations, like going 
faster than the speed of light, scientists often show the naysayers wrong. 
However this comes out, we now have evidence of the persuasiveness of the machine 
metaphor, and its prevailing influences on modem philosophy/science. These examples 
show the necessity (and danger) of metaphor in developing thought and connecting areas. 
There are two themes that we must keep in mind. First, the metaphors in science 
determine the questions and answers we get. Second, because we use metaphors in 
science, we should not be surprised that the cognitive structure is also used in ethics. We 
now turn to this as we examine evolutionary metaphors. 
Chapter V: Evolutionary Metaphor 
Introduction 
One of the more obvious connections between science and ethics involves the 
biological metaphors that Charles Darwin used in his theory of evolution. From science 
we have Darwin's "Natural Selection" and "Struggle for Existence," Spencer's "Survival 
of the Fittest," and Alfred Tennyson's "Nature Red in Tooth and Claw." From these, we 
get politicians and business leaders practicing cutthroat tactics to get ahead. For 
example, Teddy Roosevelt said "In this world the nation that has trained itself to a career 
of unwarlike & isolated ease is bound, in the end, to go down before other nations which 
have not lost the manly and adventurous qualities,'65" while a quote from John D. 
Rockefeller states 
The growth of a large business is merely a survival of the fittest.. ..The 
American Beauty Rose can be produced in the splendor and fragrance which 
bring cheer to its beholder only by sacrificing the early buds which grow up 
around it. This is not an evil tendency in business. It is merely the working 
out of a law of nature and a law of ~ 0 d . l ~ ~  
In this chapter, we see how evolutionary metaphor provides a cognitive link between 
science and pseudoscientific ethics. This involves (1) a case study, Darwin's Theory of 
Evolution, in the applicability and acceptability in the use of metaphors in science; and 
(2) a case study, Galton and Spencer's use of these metaphors in ethics, showing the 
transfer of understanding h m  science to ethics. 
-- 
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Evolutionary Metaphor: Science 
Charles Darwin wrote of his book, "This whole volume is one long argument.167" 
At one time it may have been common knowledge what the long argument stated, but at 
this time, we can only narrow down the possibilities as follows: (a) The argument is 
against special creation or design; (b) The argument is for history and accidents in the 
evolution of species; or (c) The argument is for Natural Selection. Whatever the case 
may be, Darwin made extensive use of metaphor in his theory of evolution. In fact, his 
main theory of descent with modification by means of natural selection is a metaphor. In 
this section we examine the role of metaphor as used by Darwin. We will see that 
Darwin's use of metaphor is not only a pedagogic tool introducing his theory, but a 
crucial component in understanding his theory. 
As I have already argued, one of the uses for metaphor is to help organize and 
connect ideas by giving new perspectives, thus playing a cognitive role in understanding. 
Metaphor accomplishes this by means of the four aspects associated with the use of 
metaphor: Irreducibility, Focusing, Creation, and Experiential. A heavily metaphorical 
theory such as Darwin's should provide an excellent case study for determining how 
applicable these aspects are to scientific examples. 
The practitioners of science in the 19 '~  century were primarily following induction or 
Newton S Four Rules of Scientrfic Reasoning. 16* Newton's rules state: 
Rule One: We are to admit no more causes of natural things than such as are 
both true and sufficient to explain their appearances. Rule Two: Therefore to 
the same natural effects we must, as far as possible, assign the same causes. 
Rule Three: The qualities of bodies, which admit neither intensification nor 
remission of degrees, and which are found to belong to all bodies within the 
16' Darwin, Charles. On The Origin of Species: A Facsimile of the First Edition. 450 
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reach of our experiments, are to be esteemed the universal qualities of all 
bodies whatsoever. Rule Four: In experimental philosophy we are to look 
upon propositions inferred by general induction from phenomena as 
accurately or very nearly true, notwithstanding any contrary hypotheses that 
may be imagined, till such time as other phenomena occur, by which they may 
either be made more accurate, or liable to exceptions. 169 
These rules were based on the belief that the role of science is to discover verae causae 
(true causes) in nature. The methodologcal task of the scientist is to show (a) if an 
alleged scientific explanation is "True," then it would account for the relevant 
phenomena, and (b) determine that the alleged explanation is "True." Depending upon 
philosophical positions, this was interpreted to mean that the proper practice of science is: 
Nai've Empiricist, Positivist ?'era Cause, Empiricist Vera Cause, or Rationalist Vera 
~ a u s a .  
The naiiie (strict) empiricist view was not a view endorsed by many scientists, 
although historians and philosophers sometimes promote it. A good example of this view 
would be Hurne's extreme empiricism. According to this view there are r,o hypotheses, 
only knowledge gained by pure experience. Empirical generalizations would be suspect, 
and every experiment would have to be exactly reproducible, e.g., in a lab. So, for 
example, to show that bacteria are responsible for disease, it must be directly observed, 
not inferred. tJnder the naiite empiricist view, science 1s- limited to observed 
experimental results andlor establishing laws that describe (but do not hypothesize) 
events ir; the world. Under such a view the Wave i'%eonl qf Light would not be 
acceptable science because the actual wave is not observed, only inferred from 
'" 9~.i~~~~~~v.bun.kyot0-u_la~.i~~-suchii/newton's-1~1es.h&1 
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experiments. Because of the severe limitations imposed by this view, many scientists 
want a broader view of scientific methodology. 
The positivist Vera causa position allows the use of hypothesizing, but the 
justification involves empirical generalizations that are reproducible. This typically 
involved the use of Mill's Method (1843) of experimentation. This method is basically 
the ancestor of control and blind experiments in science. Although this view is broader 
than the naite empiricist view, it is limiting. Hypotheses and theories are not allowed as 
explanations unless there is some sort of directly observable test. Thus, for example, 
science is restricted to lab work, like chemistry and some physics. Yet atronowy, 
meteorology, and some areas of biology are almost impossible to work on as "'scie~ce" in 
this sense. 
The next position, empiricist Vera causa, allows hypotheses with constraint. A 
hypothesis might be accepted if it was (a) analogous to known causes, (b) has 
explanatory power, and (c) has predictive power of covering future cvents. For exanlple, 
Newton's theory of gravity relied on (a) a known analogy of twirling something on a 
string, (b) explained orbits, motion, and tides, and (c) predicted comets. Thus, Newton's 
theow . of - gravity is scientific under this view. The Wave Theor+ of Light is also 
"Scientific" under this view because (a) it is analogous to water and sourd waves, (b) it 
explains known phenomena, and (c)  it makes predictions about future events. The 
previous three methodological views do rely on, to various extents, the empiric~st belief 
that there must be some notion of experience in the forming of scientific knowledgz. l'he 
last methodological vlew drops this idea. 
Under the rationalist Vera causa position, it does not matter from where the idea 
comes. What matters is that at least the following conditions are met: (a) The hypothesis 
or theory must have explanatory power to cover the current data, (b) the hypothesis must 
make accurate predictions about future data, and (c) there must be consilience (does not 
have to be revised each time new data comes in). 
Two recognized scientists at this time, who influenced Darwin, were John F.W. 
Herschel and William Whewell. Herschel seems to lean towards the empiricist Vera 
causa position emphasizing analogy and explanatory power, while Whewell leans 
towards the rationalist vera causa position emphasizing consilience (explaining more 
data then originally designed to) and assumed hypotheses (not necessarily analogous) that 
cover data."' Therefore, by following either of these positions, Darwin is flrrnly within 
the scientific guidelines of the time. We can see that if one follows the empiricist vern 
causa or rution~~list very causu position of scientific practice, then metaphor can be used 
as a valid part of scientific reasoning. Metaphor can be used as a pedagogical tool for 
introducing concepts in the rationalist veru causa position, or it can be crucial for 
understanding through use of analogy under the empiricist veru callsa view. Further, 
metaphor can have explanatory power and show verifiable commitments (based on its 
entailments). So it is not out of line fbr scientists, like Darwin. to use metaphors in their 
scientific work, according to the last. less restrictive (Naive!) methodological views. 
Darwin's theory claims that evolution can be explained by "Descent with 
modification through means of natural selection." According to Recker, the first four 
chapters of Darwin's Origin make use primarily of the empiricist Vera causa 
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methodology.172 We see this in Darwin's strategy (a) he makes use of analogy, (b) the 
explanatory power of his theory is superb, (c) his theory makes predictions that are true, 
and (d) his theory links together and solves problems in many fields of science. His 
project makes extensive use of metaphors that are necessary for understanding his theory, 
for example, "Natural Selection," "Struggle for Existence," "The Wedge," "The 
Entangled Bank," and "The Tree of Life." We see these metaphors in the development of 
Darwin's work. 
While on a voyage with the HMS Beagle, Charles Darwin became convinced that the 
answer to the "New Forms Debate" involved the evolution of one species into another. 
Yet, he did not know how to explain the problem of the adaptation or functional integrity 
of species. To Darwin, adaptation and functional integrity were the main stumbling 
blocks of the current competing theories of evolution. As a result, his theory focuses on 
explaining adaptation and functional integrity. He first looks at the possibilities of the 
mechanism of change. Chamber's theory had no explanation for adaptation. Lamark 
explains adaptation with the use and disuse of organs, yet is committed to no extinctions 
and necessary progress (in a positive sense) of evolution. However, as had been shown 
by Cuvier, there is extinction. In addition, data from paleontology provided evidence that 
there is no necessary progress in species development. The religious view of special 
creation did not have a story to explain the phenomena, and was not "science" according 
to a growing number of scientists. Thus, after much thought, Darwin came upon the first 
new metaphor "Natural Selection." 
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In true empiricist Vera causa fashion Darwin builds his case for natural selection by 
starting with an analogy of artificial selection. Being a scientist that actually got his 
hands dirty with research, Darwin used experiments with pigeons and correspondences 
with professional breeders to come up with the idea of artificial selection for domestic 
animals. Through artificial selection, people breed fast horses, strong horses, milk cows, 
marbled meat cows, racing dogs, hunting dogs, and pigeons of all kinds. Selected traits 
are bred more distinct and pronounced in each generation. Thus, people can artificially 
select and enhance the traits of animals. Now, Darwin suggests 
Seeing what blind capricious man has actually affected by selection during the 
last few years.. .he will be a bold person who positively put limits to what the 
supposed Being [God] could effect during whole geologic periods.. ..let us 
consider whether there exist any secondary (natural) means in the economy of 
nature by which the process of selection could go on adapting, nicely and 
wonderfully, organisms, if in ever so small degree plastic.'73 
Darwin found that artificial selection needs three conditions to work: (a) variability 
in individuals, (b) a large population, and (c) prevention of interbreeding with "bad / 
undesirable" elements (or insurance of breeding between individuals with desirable 
traits).'74 To get natural selection, Darwin needed to show that the same three conditions 
for artificial selection could occur in nature. Variation in nature was easily observable. 
This is seen, for example, in problems with taxonomy in distinguishing between species. 
It turns out, for a large part, that the distinctions between species and varieties are 
arbitrary. The simple "Order" in nature is not found; rather classification is made by 
people. These people tend to be either lumpers (throw varieties together) or splitters 
(make varieties into separate species). We also can observe that populations, if 
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unchecked, increase at a geometric rate. Thus, large population numbers are not a 
problem. The only element left to check is with restrictive breeding. The key to solving 
this issue is in, another metaphor, "The Struggle for Existence." 
In 1798, Thomas Malthus published an anonymous paper "An Essay on the Principle 
of Population, as it affects the Future Improvement of Society with Remarks on the 
Speculations of Mr. Godwin, M. Condorcet, and Other Writers." In the essay Malthus 
shows that, "Population, when unchecked, increases in a geometric ratio. Subsistence 
only in an arithmetical ratio.175" This seemed to solve Darwin's question of restrictive 
breeding in nature: 
As many more individuals of each species are born than can possible survive; 
and as, consequently, there is a frequently recurring struggle for existence, it 
follows that any being, if it vary however slightly in any manner profitable to 
itself, under the complex and sometimes varylng conditions of life, will have a 
better chance of surviving, and thus be naturally ~e1ected.l~~" 
This ultimately leads to the principle of natural selection, which is the "preservation of 
favourable variations and the rejection of injurious  variation^.'^^" 
Natural selection, and only natural selection, provides scientific explanations for a 
wide variety of known phenomena. Natural selection overshadows the theory of organ 
change through use and disuse. Organs that are helpful to survival will not degenerate 
into useless limbs, but will maintain or increase their usefulness. Natural selection 
explains why we find that, "in North America there are woodpeckers which feed largely 
on h i t ,  and others with elongated wings which chase insects on the wing.. .Upland geese 
175 Malthus, Thomas. Essay on Population. http://www.fordham.edu~halsalVmod/l798malthus.html 
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1783, with webbed feet which rarely or never go near the water. Natural selection explains 
the instincts of Cuckoo's laying eggs in other bird's nest and the slave making instinct of 
ants. In both cases, there is more energy available for reproduction. Another 
phenomenon accounted for is similarity in morphology and embryology between species 
because organisms that descend from one another (or have a common ancestor) are 
bound to be similar in structure. Common ancestry provides the only "known cause" of 
crucial similarities among organisms. 
Natural selection and the struggle for existence also solved a number of problems 
(questions) that evolutionists needed to address. Where are all the transitional forms 
between one species and another? How can intermediate forms survive during the 
change from land to water, like an ungulate (land based wolf-sized cow-like mammal) 
evolving into a whale? How can bees engineer the most perfect storage structure 
desirable (hexagonal honeycomb)? How can the eye become so perfect? How can the 
classifications of animals work so well? 
Often transitional forms die out by selection against the mean of the population. The 
"average" population, without any natural adaptations, may slowly die out, although it is 
also possible for co-existence between the extremes of the population and the average. 
Thus, it is unlikely to find living transitional forms between very distinct species. 
Intermediate forms (from land to air, land to water, or water to land) are able to survive 
by slow gradual changes facilitated by natural selection. Accumulated changes that allow 
better survivability in a new environment can combine into a complete change in which 
ecological niche a species inhabits. The hexagon making hive bees can be explained by 
natural selection and adaptation of instincts allowing energy efficient traits to be passed 
-- 
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on to future generations. The eye can evolve from a simple light sensing nerve because 
being able to sense light is a tremendous advantage for survival. Thus, any change 
toward better light sensitivity would tend to accumulate. Taxonomy can work so well 
because of the descent link that follows from natural selection. In effect, the challenges 
against evolution can be answered through natural selection, a metaphor. 
There are several more metaphors that play secondary roles in the Origin of Species, 
all of them are contained in, and explained by, natural selection. Each metaphor is a 
further focusing element within the theory. The "Wedge Analogy" is much like the 
struggle for existence. Imagine a circle made up of many wedges. As one wedge is 
pushed in, another must go out. Therefore, as one species becomes better adapted to an 
ecological niche, another species will be edged out. This stresses that it is a "Dog eat 
Dog World" (a metaphor within a metaphor!). The struggle against nature also involves 
cooperation between species. The "Entangled Bank" visualizes the co-adaptation that 
must go on between changing members of the ecosystem. All species must live together, 
and thus evolve together (but cannot adapt a specific trait for the exclusive benefit of 
another species). 
An implied metaphor not given by Darwin is that, for lack of a better phrase, "shit 
happens." This focuses natural selection onto why species are not perfectly adapted for 
the environment they are in; natural selection works only good enough for species to get 
by, not necessarily thnve. For example, perfectly adapted species would include pandas 
with thumbs, rabbits that could digest food the first time around, and apes that can talk 
instead of relying on sign-language. As Darwin says, "Natural selection will not produce 
absolute perfection, nor do we always meet, as far as we can judge, with this high 
standard under nat~re."~" Another metaphor hinted at by Darwin is a "Division of 
Labor." Division of an organism's limbs to more specialized parts makes for a better- 
adapted organism. 
A metaphor used by other scientists, but downplayed by Darwin, is "Sexual 
selection." Sexual selection, while not as strong as natural selection, is important because 
organisms must pass on their traits (the gene theory advanced by Mendal was not used in 
Darwin's time). Darwin includes sexual selection in the struggle for existence and 
natural selection metaphors. Finally, the only picture in Darwin's book, The Origin of 
Species, is the "Tree of Life." The tree of life pictures horizontal (temporal link) and 
vertical (descent link) aspects bet-ween developments in animals, both of which are 
explained be descent with modification by means of natural selection. The tree shows 
how natural selection is not committed to necessary progress; shows order based on 
descent; and explains extinction in animals. Again, all of this is contained within natural 
selection, and is summarized (explained!) by these images. 
The use of metaphor was not without consequence, especially natural selection. 
Adam Sedgwick (a contemporary scientist with Darwin) said that, "You [Darwin] write 
of 'natural selection' as if it were done consciously by the selecting agent.'"" Darwin 
responds 
The term 'natural selection' is in some respects a bad one, as it seems to imply 
conscious choice; . . .No one objects to chemist speaking of 'elective affinity,' 
... the term is good so far as it brings into connection the production of 
domestic races by man's power of selection, and the natural preservation of 
varieties and species in a state of nature. For brevity I sometimes speak of 
natural selection as an intelligent power, --- in the same way as astronomers 
speak of the attraction of gravity as ruling the movements of the planets, or as 
Darwin, Charles. On The Orinin of S~ecies: A Facsimile of the First Edition. 202 
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standard under nature. Another metaphor hinted at by Darwin is a "Division of 
Labor." Division of an organism's limbs to more specialized parts makes for a better- 
adapted organism. 
A metaphor used by other scientists, but downplayed by Darwin, is "Sexual 
selection." Sexual selection, while not as strong as natural selection, is important because 
organisms must pass on their traits (the gene theory advanced by Mendal was not used in 
Darwin's time). Darwin includes sexual selection in the struggle for existence and 
natural selection metaphors. Finally, the only picture in Darwin's book, The O r i ~ n  of 
Species, is the "Tree of Life." The tree of life pictures horizontal (temporal link) and 
vertical (descent link) aspects between developments in animals, both of which are 
explained be descent with modification by means of natural selection. The tree shows 
how natural selection is not committed to necessary progress; shows order based on 
descent; and explains extinction in animals. Again, all of this is contained within natural 
selection, and is summarized (explained!) by these images. 
The use of metaphor was not without consequence, especially natural selection. 
Adam Sedgwick (a contemporary scientist with Darwin) said that, "You [Darwin] write 
of 'natural selection' as if it were done consciously by the selecting agent.lgO" Darwin 
responds 
The term 'natural selection' is in some respects a bad one, as it seems to imply 
conscious choice; . . .No one objects to chemist speaking of 'elective affinity,' 
... the term is good so far as it brings into connection the production of 
domestic races by man's power of selection, and the natural preservation of 
varieties and species in a state of nature. For brevity I sometimes speak of 
natural selection as an intelligent power, --- in the same way as astronomers 
speak of the attraction of gravity as ruling the movements of the planets, or as 
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agriculturists speak of man making domestic races by his power of 
selection. l g l  
This alludes to a problem with using metaphor; sometimes we focus on the wrong 
element; for example, although I cannot recall the source, I remember a discussion 
involving religious metaphors. The metaphor "The Lord is my Shepard" came up. While 
one of us focused on the idea of a guide and protector, the other immediately made the 
following comment, "So, the lord watches over us so that in the winter months we can be 
slaughtered and eaten? Are humans really batteries, ala The Matrix?" 
Despite the controversy of which aspects the metaphor focuses on, Darwin never 
gave up his metaphors, especially natural selection. Herbert Spencer suggested the 
metaphor "Survival of the Fittest." Nevertheless, for whatever reason, Darwin thought 
that he should stick with natural selection. Perhaps survival of the fittest suggested too 
much of the competitive nature of natural selection and not enough of cooperation. Now, 
given the various positions of the methodology used in science, the metaphor may be 
rejected, but it seems to have stood the test of time. The other metaphors seem to also be 
appropriate. The "struggle for existence" likewise has the necessary picture associated 
with it, as compared with the 'Sunday stroll for existence," It has been suggested that the 
"Tree of Life" might be better thought of as the "Coral of Life." Yet, the latter option 
would seem to lose the focus on descent or species linkage because the Tree gives 
application to space and time. The Wedge and Entangled Bank might be eliminated, but 
then new (probably longer) explanations would have to be substituted to get the message 
across, and the cognitive element might be lost. 
18' Darwin, Charles. Variation of Animals and Plants Under Domestication, Vol. I (1868). 6-7 
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Thus, we see that Darwin's main theory; "Descent with modification by means of 
natural selection" makes use of and requires the use of metaphors. These metaphors 
cover a wide range of data: Structural similarity between organisms, paleontological 
findings, embryology studies, taxonomy classification, morphological similarities, 
geological connections, psychology, artificial selection, ecological systems, etc. The 
view is committed to a history of every living thing coming from another living thing 
(every living species coming from another species), and no tinkering by God; it shows 
how we get transitional forms; it shows that intermediate forms can survive; and shows 
how instincts can build up. Natural selection is a powerful metaphor that is fundamental 
to understanding Darwin's work. Moreover, not surprisingly, metaphors associated with 
it have crossed over into ethics. 
Evolutionary Metaphor: Ethics 
Since metaphor involves understanding one area (target) in terms of another area 
(descriptor), the cognitive view of metaphor helps explain how people take ideas in 
science and transfer them to ethics. In the case of evolutionary metaphors, a basic 
reasoning could be as follows: "Evolution operates on living things, e.g., animals. 
Humans are social animals. Thus, evolution will operate on humans in a social 
manner. It is this basic kind of thinking that leads to what has become known as 
Social Darwinism. Given that many scientists object to Darwinism being applied to areas 
of ethics (usually relating to social, political, or economic areas), it is slightly ironic that 
some of the metaphors that Darwin used came from political and economic areas. For 
example, the metaphor of natural selection incorporates metaphors used by Adam Smith 
dealing with "struggle" and "Division of Labor." It was Adam Smith who originally 
popularized the idea of the "Division of Labor" and the idea that supplyldemand are 
interrelated by an "Invisible Hand" so that the best prices occur naturally. This implied 
that the market was following "blind" law. From here, Darwin borrowed a notion of law 
with no designer, yet ending up with order. This further gave example of competition's 
influence on selection since open competition allows more chances of variety, the filling 
of niches by the best product, etc. Thus, metaphorical thinking seems to "bounce" back 
'82 Sticklers for logic will note that there is a bit of a jump from the premises to the conclusion. This is an 
example of how metaphors bridge the gap between science and ethics. It may not be logically valid, yet it 
is how some people reason. I suspect that any number of logicians could turn this into a valid argument, 
and then evaluate its soundness. However, I consider that as getting away from this project of 
understanding how, or why, people make this jump. Thus, I leave it for discussion or later developments. 
and forth between science and ethics. In this section, we will review how Francis Galton 
and Herbert Spencer (mis)used evolutionary metaphors in ethical applications. 183 
Francis ~ a l t o n l * ~  (1 822- 19 1 1) founded the modem eugenics movement and was, 
ironically, a cousin of Darwin. Eugenics is a pseudoscience that focuses on the 
improvement of the human race by means of heredity. The name derives from the Greek 
words eu (good) and genesis (beginnings). Sometimes eugenics is further demarcated as 
positive eugenics and negative eugenics. Positive eugenics involves such practices as 
rewarding favorable unions between men and women or encouraging genetic engineering 
of favorable traits. For example, a family with an intelligent hardworking man who 
married a similar woman would receive a tax break. Negative eugenics involves 
preventing the birth of offspring from unfavorable unions between men and women, for 
example, the sterilization of people deemed feebleminded or criminal, aborting fetuses 
with certain characteristics, or genetically altering a fetus that naturally has "negative 
traits." 
Darwin's Origin of Species was first published in 1859. Reading this text influenced 
Galton into focusing on two areas. He first became a critic of religion, skeptical of 
clerics, the church, and its contribution to the social good. (He went so far as to conduct 
a statistical analysis of the efficiency of prayer.) Second, Galton asked the question, How 
are human societies shaped by evolutionary processes? This question, and a glimpse of 
the eugenics movement, is seen in his essay "Influences That Affect the Natural Ability 
of Nations," to which we turn now. 
Its like a double metaphor. Metaphors allow thnking about one thing in terms of another. So it is used 
once to understand science, then used again to understand ethcs.. .thus, the ethical metaphors are twice 
removed from the original meaning. "Metaphoric separation." ? 
Much of the background information concerning Galton was found at: 
http://www.maps.jcu.edu.au/hist~stats/galton/index.htm 
Galton makes use of the commonly held belief that humanity occupies a unique 
position on this world. His position is that as humanity developed and grew in 
intelligence, humans began to consciously modify the environment to make survival 
easier for our species. This happens because humans have the ability to look after our 
own interests by using knowledge of the past to prepare for the future. Another aspect of 
this position is that humanity has distanced itself fiom nature by forming complex 
civilizations and applying technology to us (specifically in the areas of health standards 
and care). Galton further claims that recent human history has shown that society has 
developed social institutions that are detrimental to human development and subvert the 
workings of natural selection. His main argument, and the beginnings of eugenics, is 
"the wisest policy is that which results in retarding the average age of marriage among 
the weak, and in hastening it among the vigorous classes.185" He develops this idea by 
using a sustained example to show the harm in not following this program. 
This example involves the use of two groups X and Y. Members of group X consist 
of people who marry young (say 22 years old), while group Y consists of people who 
marry later in life (say 33 years old). Galton claims that: (1) those in group X tend to 
have larger families; (2) as a result of this, population X will produce more generations in 
a given period, thus after an extended time, population X will vastly outnumber 
population Y; and (3) more generations are alive at the same time among population X 
than Y. From these assumptions, Galton shows how the number of members of each 
group changes over time. 
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First, we consider the first two claims, but ignore the third. Given that group X 
has larger families, X will produce more people and generations in a given time, thus 
outnumbering group Y. We can see this in the following chart: 
Table I: Comparing Population Increases 
For this chart we assume, as did Galton, that for each generation, group X grows 
by 1.5 and group Y by 1.25. Thus, all other things being equal, we see that the group, 
which consistently chooses to delay marriage, will rapidly become a minority. Now we 
add in the third claim, where at any given time there are more generations alive of group 
X than of group Y. For example, there could be three living generations of a family in 
group X (grandfather, father, and son), while a family in group Y would only have two 
living generations (mother, daughter). Thus, Galton concludes, "I trust the reader will 
realize the heavy doom which these figures pronounce against all sub-sections of prolific 
races in which it is the custom to put off the period of marriage until middle age.'86" 
After laying out this empirical groundwork, Galton moves into applying these results to 
ethics. 
As we may recall, Thomas Malthus had argued that unchecked population growth 
results in a geometric increase in population, while food resources only increase 
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arithmetically. Galton adds to this: "It is a maxim of Malthus that the period of marriage 
ought to be delayed in order that the earth may not be overcrowded by a population for 
whom there is no place at the great table of nature.18"' From his own suppositions and 
Malthus's hypotheses, Galton moves into his ethical claims regarding population control. 
Galton draws out the specific differences between groups X and Y. Members of group X 
are "imprudent" and feel free to disregard Malthus's maxim, while membership in group 
Y consists of the prudent who will attempt to follow Malthus's maxim. Galton further 
supposes that group X will be the poor, uneducated, unmotivated, riffiaff of society; 
while group Y will be the better off, educated, motivated, contributors of society. Thus, 
with each successive generation, group Y will become fewer and fewer until group X 
overpopulates them. This will result in a destruction of civilization and a return to 
barbarianism, with the possibility of the eventual extinction of the species. Thus, any 
country that allowed such actions would be destroying itself. Galton says 
I protest against the abler races being encouraged to withdraw in this way 
from the struggle for existence. It may seem monstrous that the weak should 
be crowded out by the strong, but it is still more monstrous that the races best 
fitted to play their part on the stage of life, should be crowded out by the 
incompetent, the ailing, and the desponding.lg8 
Galton then suggests that, in the future, society may control populations just like sheep 
are controlled in a well-ordered moor, or like plants are cultivated in an orchard-house. 
But in the meantime, "Let us do what we can to encourage the multiplication of the races 
best fitted to invent and conform to a high and generous civilization, and not, out of a 
mistaken instinct of giving support to the weak, prevent the incoming of strong and 
18' Galton, Francis. Influences That Aflect the Natural Ability of Nations. 
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hearty indi~idua1s.l~~" From here, Galton offers what he takes as examples of society 
thwarting natural selection. 
Galton's first example is the dark ages of medieval Europe. He attributes many 
problems to the fact that people that were gentle, or possessed a nature of charity, 
meditation, literature, or art had to associate themselves with the Church. The Church 
strongly encouraged (in some cases demanded) celibacy from its followers. Thus, the 
people who possessed the "good" characteristics were unable to pass on those traits. This 
is just like breeders of dogs who cut out individuals with traits that they do not want 
passed. Eventually those traits may disappear from the breed. Unfortunately, the Church 
was cutting out traits that were considered virtuous and civilizing. Galton's second 
example shows how this is still a danger. During his time, University Instructors would 
receive free rent, a paycheck, and other amenities as long as they did not marry. (We also 
see this in early American education with women schoolteachers not being allowed to 
marry. 190) His third example further shows the Church eliminating traits. The Inquisition 
culled the population by persecutions of intelligent freethinkers and radicals. 
Intellectuals who questioned nature (and the church) were either outright killed or forced 
to emigrate to other places. This hrther lead to inbreeding of a population that is 
considered "inferior." Thus, Galton claims, "we lead a dual life of barren religious 
sentimentalism and gross materialistic  habitude^.'^"' 
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Really early American (US) education did not allow women to teach, and the male teachers were 
sometimes allowed to marry. When women were allowed to teach, they were often required to remain 
single and not date. The decisions were all locally controlled. However there were teachers who were 
missionary couples (married) who were encouraged to have families. 
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Nevertheless, it is important to note, that emigration has positive effects on the nation 
that allows the people to enter: 
It is very remarkable how large a proportion of the eminent men of all 
countries bear foreign names, and are the children of political refugees, -- men 
well qualified to introduce a valuable strain of blood. We cannot fail to reflect 
on the glorious destiny of a country that should maintain, during many 
generations, the policy of attracting eminently desirable refugees, but no 
others, and of encouraging their settlement and the naturalization of their 
children. lg2 
Galton felt that in the present state of England, it was not clear which direction society 
was going. He pointed out that England did have many immigrants; however, the 
"ablest" men are discouraged from emigrating because they would feel safest at home. In 
addition, the emigrants tend to be less intellectual, more adventurous, and Bohemian in 
nature. 
This leads us to his conclusions regarding eugenics. In a new colony, many desirable 
traits are reinforced. Men must be strong and intelligent to survive. Since there are few 
women, the women may choose to marry the most fit man (strong and intelligent). This 
leads to a few generations of increasingly "better" individuals. Yet, as the colony grows 
in size and population, these strengthening factors are lessoned, like our group Y in the 
last few pages. These groups then encounters the conditions brought up with the first part 
of Galton's essay, for example other people move in and take advantage of the hard work 
of the previous generations. Eventually, this new group starts having families at younger 
ages, breed faster, and have more generations alive at a time. The race is then in danger 
of loosing itself back into forms of barbarianism. Thus, to prevent this, the following 
programs should be instituted: Most income should come from work, not inheritance; 
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highly gifted people should get an education; marriage is honored; pride of race is 
encouraged; the weak are encouraged to become celibate; and successful immigrants and 
refugees are encouraged to settle. 
For many reasons, Galton's essay is an interesting, albeit disturbing, read. For the 
purpose of this chapter, we focus on how Galton misused the metaphors used in Darwin's 
theory. These problems arise from the experiential and focusing nature of metaphors. 
One problem is in the term "Natural Selection." This has really focused people to look at 
how "Natural" the whole project is. Struggle is Natural. Thus, the problem with Galton 
is in his choice of guiding metaphors of natural selection. Although his essay does not 
mention them, it seems that he is relying on a literal view of struggling for existence, 
rather than a cooperative view. Yet, Darwin said of his theory, "I use the term Struggle 
for Existence in a large and metaphorical sense, including dependence of one being on 
another.19'" Galton (and many others) forgot this and have turned metaphor into alleged 
fact. Since he does this, Galton must take a stance: us vs. them. Under this mistaken 
view, there is no cooperation so that both groups can survive and flourish. Struggle is 
Natural; the elimination of the weak is natural; the survival of the strong is natural. 
Galton compounds the problem by smuggling in prejudiced notions. He wants the 
uneducated to stop having children because they (presumably) breed like rabbits and 
threaten the educated way of life. Yet Galton has no way to establish that the rich, 
educated, and affluent are the better members of society because Darwinian evolution is 
not committed to an idea of progress, merely surviving good enough to reproduce. 
Survival involves reproductive strategies that insure that the species survives. Under this 
model, if the uneducated do manage to outbreed and force the educated into extinction, 
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then that shows that a high level of intelligence is not necessarily a good survival 
strategy, like, e.g., cockroaches. 
The final mistake Galton, and many others make, is in trylng to ascribe morality from 
evolutionary theory. Granted, Darwin and many other scientists use evolution to explain 
the development of moral thought. However, they do not suggest that evolution answers 
how things should be, i.e., nature gives laws, not values. Whenever social or political 
philosophers use Darwin's metaphor, the struggle for existence, they tend to forget that it 
is a metaphor. Darwin gave this as a literal meaning of a fight for resources and used at 
least two metaphorical meanings to clarify what he means by "fight." On one hand, the 
fight is a competition between two (or more) species for limited resources. On the other 
hand, the fight is cooperation between two (or more) species for limited resources. In the 
Origins, it is ambiguous as to how "Red in Tooth and Claw" Darwin takes his metaphor. 
There are more examples of fighting, yet Darwin still stresses cooperation. Z?zis shows a 
concrete example where it is the use of metaphors that bridge the gap between science 
and ethics. Another example of this bridging is seen in Herbert Spencer's notions of 
superorganic evolution and survival of the fittest. 
Much as the modem eugenics movement can be traced back to Francis Galton, the 
ideas of Superorganic Evolution a.k.a. Social Darwinism and "Survival of the Fittest" can 
be traced to Herbert Spencer. Social Darwinism is the pseudoscientific claim that not 
only is society governed by evolution, but also that laws and institutions should be 
implemented that fixther human progress by eliminating the "weak or inferior" members 
of the society. It is unfortunate that the term Social Darwinism is used because the claim 
is more consistent with the evolutionary views of Robert Chambers or Jean-Baptiste 
Lanarck. Under these views, the evolution of species is associated with a notion of 
"progress" which is inherently "good." Further, this progress is necessarily (1) simple to 
complex, (2) general to particular, or (3) homogeneous (similar structures) to 
heterogeneous (diversified structure). Spencer uses an analogy, reminiscent of Plato's 
Republic, with the relationship between the ideal individual with the ideal state, to apply 
evolution to society. It seems that Spencer claims species evolution includes (1) a growth 
in size, (2) increasing complexity, and (3) differentiation in functions.'94 In a similar 
manner, Spencer claims that society evolves. For example, early societies are arranged 
like barbarian tribes. As the society increases in size, it will also become more complex. 
As society becomes more complex, there will be more differentiation in functions within 
the city. Thus, society evolves as species evolve. 
Now, under Lamarckian evolution, a surviving and thving species will necessarily 
evolve into more complex and more advanced species. Humans, with our language and 
intelligence, are considered the pinnacle of evolution. The modern ideal, according to 
Spencer, of a member in society is a person who is self-sufficient, individuated from 
society, and able to flourish by seeking happiness. This is a result of the natural forces of 
evolution. Thus, for society to remain advanced and good, we must get rid of artificial 
restrictions of evolution; that is, we must eliminate artificial laws that do not promote 
self-sufficiency, individual growth, or overall prospects for happiness. We see many of 
these ideas in Spencer's essay, "Poor-Laws" from his book Social 
Spencer immediately jumps into ethics by starting out his essay with a brief attack on 
Cobbett's notion that everyone has a "right to a maintenance out of the soil." This right 
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seems to be a claim that since everyone has a right to the necessities of life, the 
government (or society at large) has a duty to provide for these necessities. Spencer's 
concern is that there is no way to decide between which two extremes, starvation or 
luxury, this maintenance lays. There are two ways in which a maintenance can be 
provided, either through direct aid (money, food, etc.) or by giving jobs. With regard to 
direct aid Spencer asks, "Is it potatoes and salt, with rags and a mud cabin? Or is it bread 
and bacon, in a two-roomed cottage? Will a joint on Sundays suffice? Or does the 
demand include meat and malt liquor daily? Will tea, coffee, and tobacco be expected? 
And if so, how many ounces of each?196" With regard to having work provided for an 
individual, Spencer points out that the government (or society) is the people. Thus, if the 
government is responsible for finding people work, that is just saying that people should 
find work for other people. Spencer claims that as a result of this, an individual should 
just take responsibility to find work for himself. The rest of his essay is an argument that 
if a person desires to contribute to charity, then the decision should be voluntary and 
should contribute to the overall social good. This is because genuine charity benefits 
both the giver and receiver, while forced charity harms both. Spencer spends a 
significant amount of the essay concentrating on showing the harm realized from forced 
charity. 
First, Spencer notes that, in general, people do not like paying a tax for welfare. For 
people who are not by nature inclined to give charity, they feel that they are forced to 
give to a project in which they do not believe. Spencer points out that people are not 
normally required to give to causes that they do not agree to; for example, people are not 
usually forced to give money to a church that they are not a member of. Spencer further 
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claims that even if people want to give charity, they should not be forced to give money. 
For people that are inclined to charity, the tax collectors represent a middleman that gives 
charity by proxy. For this group the problems can include not receiving satisfaction of 
personally helping people, not having a choice as to which charity the money will benefit, 
or knowledge that government waste will lessen the effect of the donation. For both 
groups of people (the willing and unwilling), Spencer claims this creates hostility and a 
retards peoples' sympathy. Yet, it is feelings of sympathy that usually give rise to giving 
charity. Thus, forced charity is counterproductive to the underlying motive for charity. 
Therefore, there must be a problem with forced welfare if the welfare itself contradicts 
the basic reason for beginning it. 
The second harm caused to society from welfare (or poor laws) is that the act goes 
against nature. This is where we see metaphorical thinking taken as biological- 
sociological fact within Spencer's thought. For Spencer, natural selection is a struggle 
and a fight in which nature is "red in tooth and claw." Further, the helpless and weak are 
systematically eliminated by the strong in a struggle for the "survival of the fittest." 
Because the weak members of a species or society are eliminated, the remaining strong 
members are more able to be independent and thus are more likely to attain Spencer's 
ideal of human happiness. Spencer sees in nature a tendency to eliminate the weak in 
favor of the strong. This is the natural state of nature. From here, Spencer derives the 
idea that poor-laws are unnatural, and thus we should eliminate them. Spencer admits 
that at first glance this seems like a hard course of action. After all, it does seem harsh 
that the unskilled laborers, the starving artists, and the widows and orphans should be left 
to struggle or die without government assistance. Yet, he argues, "under the natural order 
of things society is constantly excreting its unhealthy, imbecile, slow, vacillating, 
faithless members. 19'" Further, people who advocate poor-laws 
advocate an interference which not only stops the purifying process, but even 
increases the vitiation - absolutely encourages the multiplication of the 
reckless and incompetent by offering them an unfailing provision, and 
discourages the multiplication of the competent and provident by heightening 
the difficulty of maintaining a family. 19' 
Since we have a choice of some suffering now or a lot of suffering later, Spencer 
advocates we adapt a policy that strives for long term planning and happiness rather than 
short-term assistance and future misery. 
The third harm to society, also relating to Spencer's idea of what is natural, is that 
poor-laws will eliminate an important trait fkom civilized society. Spencer believes that 
as species evolve into more complex organisms, the more evolved species learn through 
struggle and self-sacrifice. Likewise, Spencer conjectures, civilizations evolve from a 
savage existence of instant gratification to a civilized form by struggling and learning 
self-sacrifice. Strong individuals may form a society, but there is a danger that others 
will take it over (possibly by swamping). As long as natural forces are acting upon the 
society, then the civilization should continually advance or stabilize. Forced charity, 
however, eliminates the advance or stability. The charity takes resources from the strong 
members of the society-the workers and people whose skills and talents helped form 
it-and redistributes the resources to weaker members of the society. Thus, the weaker 
individuals no longer have to compete as the stronger individuals. The weaker 
individuals no longer have to learn self-reliance or sacrifice for long-term goals. As a 
result, people that benefit from poor-laws do not learn the lessons necessary to survive in 
19' Spencer, Herbert. Social Statics. 1896, 2nd ed. 15 1 
lg8 Spencer, Herbert. Social Statics. 1896, 2"d ed. 15 1 
a modern society. Add this to Galton's work, and we see that the "ignorant poor" will 
outgrow the "educated well-off." Thus, there will be more people living on the charity of 
fewer people. This will increase the total distress of society. 
The redistribution of money, by forced charity, does not result in a net increase of 
social stability or utility. Consider two individuals, Johnl and J o h ,  who live in 
relatively identical worlds with only one major difference, the requirement of spending 
earnings on a tax for charity. Both of our Johns have jobs, a family to support, and 
certain life fulfilling hobbies. As with most families, the Johns have to budget for the 
necessities of life (taxes, food, clothing, and shelter). After paying for these, they both 
have some leftover money. Now, this is where the differences come into play: consider 
that John, lives in a world where he is free to spend his money, while Johnz must pay 
more taxes to hnd  charities. Johnl has several options. He can save the money, invest 
the money, or spend the money on luxury items. Presumably, if Johnl saves or invests 
the money, that money will eventually be used for either buying more necessary items or 
eventually used as a luxury. Either way, eventually Johnl will buy a service or a product. 
The person who Johnl bought from will have the same options (and results) of John,. 
Thus, in the case of Johnl, money/services/products are continually in circulation. 
Therefore, if Johnl buys a DVD, many people benefit-The people who made the DVD, 
the people who sold the DVD, and all the middlemen. Now, consider John*. His money 
goes to someone who is not providing any service or producing a product. Thus, the 
people who benefited by Johnl are not benefiting. We see that in these types of forced 
charity, all that happens is a redistribution of money from someone directly working in 
society to someone not working-money is going from laborers and producers to non- 
workers. 
These three harms to society lead Spencer to conclude that forced charity results in a 
worse society. Thus, according to him, we should eliminate programs that result in 
forced charity. He does not claim that all charity is bad. He believes that people should 
give charity that result in helping peopIe to help themselves to become contributing 
members of society. This will advance society and, when voluntary, help advance 
peoples sense of well being through helping others. However, forced charity looses the 
benefits by artificially getting in the way of progress towards the ideal society. 
Spencer, like Galton or other Social Darwinists, is guilty of misusing metaphors. 
Once again, we see the experiential and focusing nature of metaphor. In particular, 
Spencer is guilty of exclusively using one focusing metaphor while ignoring others. 
Spencer concentrates on the idea that evolution is a struggle between fighting species 
where only the strong survive. He ignores the cooperative aspect of evolution where 
strength can be measured as cooperation against nature (or cooperation with nature). 
Spencer also suffers from inserting the ideas of "progress" and "good" into evolution. He 
sees western culture as "progress" and "good." However, it should be noted, Spencer is 
far from alone in the belief that "ours is the best, most progressive, civilized nation." 
Finally, Spencer's own metaphor, Evolution is the "Survival of the fittest" is rather poor. 
It is not clear how to interpret this metaphor. Who or what is surviving the fittest, the 
group or the individuals? How do we measure fitness? If by the group, then Spencer 
must admit that if the poor and weak can beat out the well off and strong, then the former 
are the fittest to survive. Thus, they are the more advanced. 
We started this chapter looking at metaphors that Darwin used in his theory of 
evolution: Artificial and Natural Selection, Struggle for Existence, The Wedge, The Tree 
of Life, The Entangled Bank, Division of Labor (borrowed from Adam Smith), and The 
Invisible Hand (borrowed from Adam Smith). We saw how Darwin created these 
metaphors to explain and understand his theory. Further, we know that each metaphor 
acts as a focus to a particular area of the theory. These metaphors are irreducible and 
have influenced people's understanding and experiences. These metaphors were so 
powerful that they helped bridge the gap between science and ethics, as we saw with 
Galton and Spencer. The ethical theories tended to use metaphors focusing on one 
limited area of the theory: struggle and competition, e.g., survival of the fittest. These 
examples show a plausible connection between science and ethics. Metaphors structure 
our thinking. Metaphors allow us to understand one area in terms of another. Thus, it 
should be no surprise that metaphors cross over from science to ethics. The next chapter 
will examine some more contemporary uses of metaphors that combine world metaphors 
with evolutionary metaphors. 
Chapter VI: Miscellaneous Metaphors: Nazi, Lifeboat, Math 
Introduction 
I take it that the previous chapters have adequately sustained my thesis that it is 
plausible that the cognitive view of metaphor accounts for the ease in which people 
combine science and ethics; metaphor is a bridge between science and ethics. In the 
second chapter we saw various aspects of metaphor theory representing three main views: 
CTM, ITM, and STM. In that chapter, we saw how metaphors involve either 
metaphysical claims regarding existence or epistemological claims regarding 
understanding. Chapter three explored the ideas of metaphor as colorful linguistic 
expressions or as containing cognitive meaning. Although some metaphors may be 
colorhl expressions, it was established that metaphor can (and often does) provide for 
cognitive understanding. In chapter four, the "World" metaphors give the first sustained 
examples of the interaction of science and ethics by means of metaphor. The previous 
chapter, number five, used "Evolutionary" metaphors as another example of the 
connection between science and ethics. In this chapter, I finish this thesis with three 
more examples of the prevalence of metaphor within ethics and science, although with 
less emphasis on the connection between the two. The first example, metaphors within 
Nazi Germany, I use as an example of the consequence of taking metaphor as TrueRalse 
within science, pseudo-science, and politics. The second example, Garrett Hardin's 
"Lifeboat Ethics" I use as an example of relatively contemporary use of metaphor in 
ethical arguments. Finally, I finish with some thoughts on mathematics / ethics and 
metaphor. 
Nazi Metaphors 
"The people who get to impose their metaphors on the culture get to define what we 
consider to be true-absolutely and objectively true.19"' 
Robert Jay LiAon's The Nazi Doctors: Medical Killing and the Psycholony of 
Genocide provides a look into how Nazi Germany used biological and medical metaphor 
to institute and justify a policy that most people agree is highly unethical-Genocide. In 
this section we review some of the metaphors used by the Nazis as seen in Lifton's book. 
In this review we will see how biological ideology and metaphor structured the role of 
the physician and the Nazis' view toward the Jewish people. We will hrther see how the 
Nazis made use both of organic and mechanical metaphors in their reign. 
What is the role of a physician and what is the physician's relationship to her patient? 
People typically see physicians as the healers and caretakers of their patients. James F. 
Childress and Mark Siegler discuss five contemporary metaphors used to understand the 
relationship between patients and physicians:200 (1) Parental - the physician takes on the 
active role of a parent, while the patient is either a passive infant or a guided adolescent. 
This metaphor stresses that the physician knows best, while the patient has few rights and 
little to no autonomy in determining appropriate treatments. The parental model assumes 
ignorance on the part of the patient and does not consider that the physician and patient 
may have differing views (or values) when it comes to health care. (2) Partnership - 
both physician and patient are partners in a shared value of health. This adult-to-adult 
model highlights the equal power between patient and physician and downplays the 
assumed ignorance of the parental metaphor. There is not an automatic assumption that 
199 Lakoff & Johnson. Metaphors We Live By. 160 
200 Childress & Siegler. Metaphors and Models of Doctor-Patient Relationships: Their Implications for 
Autonomy. Reprint in: Mappes and DeGrazia. Biomedical Ethics. 64-72 
the physician initially knows what is best for the patient. However, it presupposes a trust 
that may be unjustified. (3) Rational contracts - a compromise between the ideal 
partnership and the realization that trust is not immediately possible between a physician 
and a patient. It highlights two possible misleading ideas: (a) sick people view health 
care as an exchange in goods and services; (b) sick people are always able to make 
rational choices. The rational contract downplays the ideas of physician benevolence, 
care and compassion. (4) Friendship - a model like the "good old country doctor / 
friend." Friendship stresses how one person (the doctor) assumes the interest of the other 
(the patient). Although a common metaphor for areas with low population, the metaphor 
becomes strained in areas with high populations, HMOs, and doctors with conflicting 
interest. It can also be hard to accept a friendship based on payment for services. (5) 
Technician - the doctor as a plumber, engineer, or body mechanic, merely fixing what is 
broken or contracted for. This model highlights the new advanced technology that 
medicine depends upon, yet downplays the social status traditionally given to a physician. 
These five metaphors seem to capture the most common views of the relationship of a 
physician to his or her patients. It is interesting to note that each of these metaphors 
highlights a relationship between a doctor and individual patients, but downplays the 
relationship of a physician to the general-public or society-at-large. The Nazi metaphor 
is radically different from the above five common metaphors (although it has elements of 
the parent and technician metaphor.) The Nazi doctors worked under biological and 
medical metaphors that (1) changed the relationship of the physical from his patients to 
the society and that (2) systematically made acceptable a different metaphor for the 
physician-From the Physician HealerICaretaker to The Physician HealerIKiller. This 
changing role of the physician is partially the result of misguided biological ideology and 
medical metaphor. 
The biological ideology the Nazis used is a combination of pseudoscientific genetics 
and eugenics. From genetics, the Nazi leaders instilled the ideas of "Racial Purity" and 
inherent Aryan virtue. These ideas allowed a rationalization to adopt a program of 
eugenics in which the Nazis hoped to achieve direct control over human progress. Lifton 
speaks of this Nazi state as a "biocracy" which models itself from "theocracy, a system of 
rule by priests of a sacred order under the claim of divine prerogative.. .of cure through 
20177 purification and revitalization of the Aryan race. The Nazi program appealed to both 
a divine mission (part of an inherited anti-Semitism) and misguided (although scientific 
sounding) biological ideals. 
The Eugenics program in Germany began much as eugenics programs in Western 
Europe and the United States. For example, negative eugenics was practiced by 
prohibiting marriage between individuals with mental illness or retardation, and between 
members of different races.202 Many States with in the U.S. had also instituted forced 
sterilization laws for the criminal or insane. Germany similarly adopted positive and 
negative eugenics programs as well as sterilization. This eugenics program eventually 
turned into a 5-step progression to mass murder. Lifton identifies the following major 
steps that this program underwent: (1) Sterilization, (2) Child Euthanasia, (3) Adult 
Euthanasia, (4) Direct Medical Killing, and (5) Mass Murder. The justification for most 
of this process relied, in a large part, on biological metaphor. 
''' Lifton, Robert Jay. The Nazi Doctors. 17 
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The first step in justifying mass murder in a biological context is to destroy the 
distinction between healing and killing, that is (1) destroy the notion that healing (for a 
physician) is automatically morally praiseworthy while (2) also establishing that killing 
(again by a physician) is not morally blameworthy. To make this change, medicalized 
killing needed to be understood as (1) a surgery and (2) a therapeutic imperative.203 The 
Nazi command became aware that the Einsatzgruppen troops (soldiers responsible for 
face to face killing of Jews in Eastern Europe) suffered from psychological problems due 
to the nature of the killing. For example, the troops suffered anxiety, nightmares, and 
tremors. Thus, the Nazis needed to find a "surgical" means of mass killing. This 
"surgical" distinction allowed the soldiers in the trenches to distance themselves 
psychologically from the horror of murder. 
The main justification, however, for mass murder came from the idea that killing was 
a therapeutic imperative for the German (Aryan) people. The Nazis dichotomized 
humans into either the racially pure Aryan Volk or the impure others. Then, by means of 
metaphor, they re-conceptualized the Aryan race into a biological organism. Then they 
metaphorised other groups into other biological identities, for example as a potential 
disease to the Aryan organism. Thus, when a doctor is confronted with the apparent 
contradiction between healing and killing, he can say, "Of course I am a doctor and I 
want to preserve life. And out of respect for human life, I would remove a gangrenous 
appendix from a diseased body. The Jew is the gangrenous appendix in the body of 
mankind. 2047, Thus the physicians' transformation from serving a patient, to serving 
society-a transformation from a healer to a killer. 
203 Lifton, Robert Jay. The Nazi Doctors. 15 
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The Nazis were masters in using metaphors to describe the groups that they wanted to 
eliminate. For example, there were many metaphors that the Nazi used to describe the 
Jewish people. One group of metaphors focused on the organism metaphor and the 
medical notions we have about treating illness and disease: The Jews are agents of racial 
pollution and racial tuberculosis; the Jews are parasites and bacteria causing sickness, 
deterioration, and death; the Jews are eternal bloodsuckers, vampires; they are germ 
carriers; maggots in a rotting corpse. Thus, it is of biological importance to eliminate the 
Jews. Another group of metaphors focus on the Nazi perception that the Jewish People 
are less than human: The Jews are ants - thus we must exterminate them before they 
overrun the country; the Jews are wild dogs - thus (for anyone who has visited a 
European country without animal control) they are dangerous and should be put down. 
(Also, since it is medically justified to experiment on dogs, it is by extension permissible 
to experiment on the Jew.) Thus, for anyone believed the metaphors that the leadership 
imposed, there were reasons to allow what we now consider atrocities. In the case of 
Nazi Germany, many people became convinced that there was a need for a national cure. 
Thus, the Nazis really pushed the idea of the Regime as a Healing Movement, or as 
Rudolf Hess declared, "National Socialism is nothing but applied biology. 2059, 
Thus, the underlying ideology of the mass killing relied on pseudoscientific ideas of 
racial purity, genetics, and eugenics.206 The justification further built up a picture of the 
German Volk as a biological organism that is threatened by disease. This conception 
invites the idea of a medical solution, which justifies mass murder (killing off the cancer 
of humanity), and changes the role of a physician from a healer to a killer. Within the 
205 Lifton, Robert Jay. The Nazi Doctors. 129 
206 Genetics itself is a science; the Nazi application of it was not. The Nazi taught that the Aryan race was 
descended from Atlantis while non-Aryans were descended from monkeys and apes. 
medical community, there are many metaphors the doctors used to justify their 
participation in murder. 
The underlying metaphor justifying sterilization and medical killing is "Life 
unworthy of life." This phrase permeates the entire five-step-program to genocide: 
Sterilizationjchild euthanasiajadult euthanasia-3Direct Killing+Mass Murder. The 
changing classification of what qualifies as life unworthy of life is seen in the progress of 
the 5-step program. 
Sterilization started out with cases of the criminally insane and then included the 
hereditary sick: congenital feeblemindedness, schizophrenia, epilepsy, manic depressive 
insanity, Huntington's chorea, hereditary blindness, hereditary deafness, grave bodily 
malformation, hereditary alcoholism, etc. The sterilization was justified because these 
people represented a current threat to the organic body of the pure German Volk. They 
represented the threat of spreading more of their kind like a cancer, sucking nourishment 
from society, until they kill off the organism. Under this metaphor, the idea quickly 
spread that this group of people were using up limited public resources. For many 
Germans this seemed unfair. After all, "the best young men died in war, causing a loss to 
the Volk of the best available genes. The genes of those who did not fight then 
proliferated freely, accelerating biological and cultural degeneration. 2073, These 
hereditary sick were also made less human by the use of metaphors, e.g., this person is 
mentally dead, that person is merely human ballast, that group represents empty shells.208 
Thus, there are at least three levels of metaphor at work here. First, there is the ever- 
present biological assumption of an organism (the German Volk) protecting itself from a 
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biological harm, e.g., the spread of cancer. Thus giving rise to the idea that we must stop 
the cancer fiom spreading. Second, we have the idea of the organism (the German Volk) 
as being crowded in its environment and unable to continue its genetic heritage, i.e., there 
is a direct threat to its genetic hture; and Third (I imagine that this is rather important to 
those people who must work directly with the hereditary sick) the dehumanizing 
metaphors. The metaphorical beliefs contributed to feelings of resentment and the 
changng attitude towards non-Aryans. The metaphors M h e r  represent the cognitive 
transition to the next level of the Nazi eugenics program--euthanasia. 
There were actually two distinct programs of euthanasia--one for children and the 
other for adults. Once more playing to the influence of the organic metaphors and the 
biological threat to the body, to the Nazi mindset people with heredity sickness were 
already using valuable resources, and sterilization was not doing enough to combat the 
problem. Not only must we stop cancer fiom spreading, but we must try to remove the 
cancer from the body. Thus, the next step in the eugenics program involved killing 
children (newborns to about five-year olds) with these hereditary conditions. We hear 
doctors using the biological justification when they say, "These creatures [the children] 
naturally represent for me as a National Socialist only a burden for the healthy body of 
2099, our Volk. Although a person would think that the systematic killing of children would 
be a difficult and horrifying task for a doctor, many Nazi used the organic and health 
metaphors to lessen the difficulty. The psychological burden was further lessened as 
doctors used metaphors as euphemisms for killing-"putting-to-sleep," or "the slow 
withdrawal of rations." 
209 Lifton, Robert Jay. The Nazi Doctors. 62. The speaker is Dr. Hermann Pfannrnuller, one of the Nazi 
doctors who developed various "Special Diets" that starved patients to death. 
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The adult euthanasia program followed similar reasoning and justification-protect 
the race, and put sick people out of their misery. The adult program, named T4, extended 
the medical oversight of killing to include (1) patients suffering from specific disease, (2) 
patients institutionalized for more than 5 years, (3) the criminally insane, and (4) non- 
German c i t i z e n ~ . ~ ' ~  The doctors' role, changing from healer to killer, in this program 
participated in any or all of the following: (1) identifying people to be given "Special 
Treatment;" (2) performing the actual killing (injecting of medication, ordering a special 
diet, or experimenting with gasses to come up with a more humane way of killing); (3) 
calming the patients who were to be killed; (4) disguising the killing process, (5) 
falsifying the death-certificate, and (6) developing new technology to increase the killing 
process. 
The T4 program officially ended around 24 August 1941. The Nazi regime, however, 
made it clear to the doctors that medical killing was to continue. Since there was now no 
official policy of medical killing, selections were now based on the individual doctor's 
discretion. Doctors continued to use metaphors to justify their actions, e.g., calling 
mental patients "Useless eaters." The doctors also had more freedom to experiment with 
death; e.g., the useless eaters were given special diets to ensure the patients dead-a 
totally fat free diet! As new technology was developed to kill patients, the T4 idea 
extended to the concentration camps under the code 14fl3. In the camps, death selection 
(although still carrying on the medical myth and metaphors of health) was based more on 
crimes, political views, and race. The importance of the 14fl3 program is that it 
"provided two crucial bridges between existing concepts and policies and unrestrained 
2'0 Lifton, Robert Jay. The Nazi Doctors. 65-66 
genocide.211" The first bridge was "the ideological bridge fiom the killing of those 
considered physiologically unworthy of life to the elimination, under the direction of 
doctors, of virtually anyone the regime considered undesirable or useless: that is, fiom 
2127, direct medical to medicalized killing. The second bridge was "the institutional bridge 
2 1 3 9 9  fiom the T4 project to the concentration camps. The camps themselves provide more 
examples of metaphors in action. 
The camps represent the "final solution to the Jewish question." Very powerful 
metaphors operate here. I take it that the "Jewish question," fiom the Nazi point of view, 
is something like: Given that the German Volk is a body and the Jews are a disease that 
threatens the Volk, how do we protect our body? The answer, in typical medical fashion, 
gets rid of the disease. Thus, Genocide is now a medical procedure, "A image of curing a 
deadly disease, so that genocide may become an absolute form of killing in the name of 
2149, healing. Within the camp, selections for death were seen as connected to medical 
2169,. triage in war.215 Inhumane medical experiments were viewed as "hobbies , the gas 
2179,. 
chambers were sometimes referred to as "The Central Hospital , the prisoners were 
often seen as "The living dead. 2189, 
Lifton's book provides a good source to see how the Nazi utilized extensive medical 
metaphor. In fact, with a quick glance through the book I identified about 45 metaphors 
that are consistently used by the Nazi Doctors. One pattern I think I've found, but leave 
for another paper is that the Nazis tend to use Organic (Organism) metaphors to justify 
211 Lifton, Robert Jay. The Nazi Doctors. 138 
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what they did; yet they use mechanical metaphors to carry out the killing and as part of 
their defense as to why they did not try to stop the killing. For example, the procedure at 
the camps was very mechanical: selections and killing were constantly pushed to be 
faster; the Nazi Killing Machine was cold and lifeless; the camps were run like 
manufacturing plants-with assembly line precision. Even if a person thought that 
something was immoral about the process, they felt helpless to change the process. They 
were not just following orders, many describe the helplessness as being mere cogs in the 
machine; or they felt like tools, with no idea what the rest of the machine was doing. 
The Nazi use of metaphor shows one potential problem when metaphor is considered 
as true/false. "The people who get to impose their metaphors on the culture get to define 
2197, what we consider to be true-absolutely and objectively true. History is full of the 
(mis)deeds of those working under science or morality that is "absolutely and objectively 
true." We now turn to Garrett Hardin as an example of using metaphor in ethics under 
the cognitive view of metaphor, i.e., where metaphors are not taken as true 1 false. 
Lakoff & Johnson. Metaphors We Live By. 160 
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Lifeboat Ethics 
We have seen how the Nazis used metaphors as truly defining the nature of reality. 
Contrary to the belief that the Nazi Doctors were inherently evil, many of the atrocities 
committed by doctors can be attributed, in part, to the physicians' belief in the 
metaphorical reality in which they were a part. They believed that the metaphors 
accurately described the state of affairs of an objective world. However, not everyone 
involved in ethical discourse and activism use metaphors as being true or false with 
respect to reality. Some of them, like Garrett Hardin, use metaphors in science and ethics 
as tools of understanding. Furthermore, they do not take the metaphors as true or false, 
but as useful or not in trylng to reach some sort of ethical truth (whatever that is). I 
suggest that under the cognitive model of metaphor, Garrett Hardin's use of metaphor is a 
decent representation of the "proper" role of metaphor within ethical discourse. His uses 
of metaphors also show metaphor in bridging the gap between science and ethics. In this 
section, we review some of the dominant metaphors Garrett Hardin uses. 
Garrett Hardin is professor emeritus of biology at UC Santa ~arbara .~"  He received 
his training and education at the University of Chicago and Stanford University. As a 
scientist, Garrett Hardin practiced ecology, microbiology, and human ecology. As an 
ethicist, Hardin advocates consequentialism (non-utilitarian) and eugenics. For Hardin, 
science (in particular ecology and economy) and ethics are intimately bound because, 
"We are not the Man from Mars.. ..We are living here on this planet.. ..If we make a mess 
2219, of the Earth, we still have to live on it. Furthermore, bioethics is not the application 
of ethics to biological questions, but, "'toughlove ethics,' built on a biological 
220 Biographical information was attained at: httD:llwww.id.uscfNERITAS/SPEAKERS/Hardin.html 
221 Meile Frank. Interview in Skeptic. 
2229, foundation. Within his pursuit of toughlove ethics, Hardin is probably most famous 
(or infamous) for his metaphors derived-in his articles "The Tragedy of the Commons" 
and "Living on a Lifeboat." As an example of the use of metaphors, Hardin's Lifeboat 
ethics is the better of the two examples, however, since the lifeboat ethics metaphor uses 
the "commons" metaphor, we briefly look at the commons first. 
Garrett Hardin made popular the metaphor of the commons in his 1986 Science 
article, "The Tragedy of the commons." His thesis is that the "Population Problem" is a 
member of the class of problems that have no technical solutions, where "A technical 
solution may be defined as one that requires a change only in the techniques of the 
natural sciences, demanding little or nothing in the way of change in human values or 
ideas of morality. 2237, The population problem, as he understands it, is that many 
countries in the world face overpopulation problems and that this overpopulation causes 
evils, e.g., starvation, suffering, and painful death. Furthermore, he claims that many 
people "who anguish over the population problem are trying to find a way to avoid the 
evils of overpopulation without relinquishing any of the privileges they now enjoy. 2249, 
Because people do not, traditionally, want to give up their goodies, they tend to look for 
technical solutions to ease their conscience, e.g., fish farms, golden rice, or monetary aid. 
That there is a problem cannot be in doubt. We are finding that Malthus' 
prediction-that in a finite world, as populations increase geometrically, there is a danger 
that the population will eventually outgrow the resources-is coming true. Hardin's first 
metaphorical argument is for the conclusion that we must curtail the individual freedom 
for reproduction. In this argument, Hardin believes that Adam Smith's metaphor of the 
222 Meile Frank. Interview in Skeptic. 
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"Invisible Hand" must be shown to describe how inadequately the public benefits from 
individual selfishness. Recall that one aspect of the Invisible Hand is that as an 
individual works to his own gain, an "Invisible Hand" will lead people to actually 
promote the public interest; i.e., when individuals make rational decisions for their own 
well being, the public will benefit. The Tragedy of the Commons is an exercise in game 
theory (developed by mathematician William Forster Lloyd) that Hardin uses to refute 
Smith's Invisible Hand: 
Picture a pasture open to all. It is to be expected that each herdsman will try to 
keep as many cattle as possible on the commons. Such an arrangement may 
work reasonably satisfactorily for centuries because tribal wars, poaching, and 
disease keep the numbers of both man and beast well below the carrying 
capacity of the land. Finally, however, comes the day of reckoning, that is, the 
day when the long-desired goal of social stability becomes a reality. At this 
point, the inherent logic of the commons remorselessly generates tragedy. 
As a rational being, each herdsman seeks to maximize his gain. Explicitly or 
implicitly, more or less consciously, he asks, "What is the utility to me of 
adding one more animal to my herd?" This utility has one negative and one 
positive component. 
1. The positive component is a function of the increment of one animal. Since 
the herdsman receives all the proceeds from the sale of the additional animal, 
the positive utility is nearly + 1. 
2. The negative component is a function of the additional overgrazing created 
by one more animal. Since, however, the effects of overgrazing are shared by 
all the herdsmen, the negative utility for any particular decision making 
herdsman is only a fraction of - 1. 
Adding together the component partial utilities, the rational herdsman 
concludes that the only sensible course for him to pursue is to add another 
animal to his herd. And another .... But this is the conclusion reached by each 
and every rational herdsman sharing a commons. Therein is the tragedy. Each 
man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd without 
limit -- in a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination toward which all men 
rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the 
freedom of the commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all.225 
- 
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The problem is relatively easy to see: whenever people share property, they feel less 
inclined to take care of that property; e.g., public parks and rivers are often messy 
because "My little amount of trash doesn't really hurt the area." This story becomes a 
metaphor for many areas of our world: the air we breath, the water we use, and the land 
we occupy. It becomes a tragedy of the commons because of the careless manner in 
which we care for these resources, e.g., the disposal of waste (sewage, chemical, 
radioactive, pollution, etc.) Moreover, the commons apply, according to Hardin, with the 
"Freedom to Breed." In the rest of the article, Hardin argues that public interests should 
be regulated by the notion of the commons. This is because if we do not take care of the 
commons, then it will be destroyed. Hardin's arguments are reminiscent of Galton (the 
poor outbreed the rich and destroy the world). However, for the purposes of this thesis, 
we are done with Hardin's first essay. One reason is that it does not seem like Hardin 
ever really defends his position that there are no technical solutions to the breeding 
problem; he seems to only establish the nature of the commons. The other reason we 
move on is that this essay represents Hardin's first major example of using one metaphor 
(the commons) to replace another (the invisible hand). Garrett Hardin's next metaphor 
"Living on a Lifeboat" is a more explicit use of metaphoric argument. 
"Lifeboat Ethics" is a metaphor developed in Garrett Hardin's 1974 essay "Living on 
a Lifeboat." This is another attempt to displace one metaphor (spaceship earth) with 
another metaphor (lifeboat ethics) to argue for population control. According to this 
article the spaceship metaphor was developed by Kenneth Boulding to replace the 
"cowboy economy" with a metaphor acknowledging that we live on a world with limited 
resources. 
The spaceship metaphor, as developed by Boulding, has many focusing elements. 
Earth is now understood as a tiny sphere, closed, limited, crowded, and hurtling through 
space to unknown destinations. Because of the limited resources of this closed system, 
we cannot pollute or otherwise waste the limited resources. Like in a spaceship, it is no 
longer possible to use up resources in one location and move to another for more 
resources. Furthermore, resources are limited, and in many cases currently 
nonrenewable, thus to survive we have to move to renewable resources. Because of 
larger populations and less living room, social interactions will have to change to avoid 
conflict. We will have to change our relationships with animals; e.g., animals will have 
to be domesticated. Also, there will be a need for central leadership.226 Hardin sees that 
there are a few problems with this metaphor. Primarily, the spaceship metaphor 
encourages technical solutions, which results in what Hardin considers a suicidal policy 
of sharing resources without regard for how individuals care for the resources. Thus, we 
have a tragedy of the commons. Another problem with the spaceship metaphor is that the 
spaceship earth has no captain or executive committee to run the show. Hardin suggest 
that we consider a new metaphor, that of a lifeboat, to more closely matches how we 
understand the world. 
To understand the lifeboat metaphor, we start by defining nations as either being rich 
or poor. According to Hardin, 113 of the nations in the world are "rich" while the 
remaining nations are "poor." Metaphorically speaking, each rich nation of the world 
amounts to a "lifeboat," while each poor country is a "swimmer." The question is, what 
do we do about the swimmers? Do we save the swimmers or let them fend for 
themselves? If we opt to save them, then how? We have to look at the situation. Each 
- - 
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lifeboat is limited in space and resources. If we look at one lifeboat, we may find the 
following situation. There are 50 people in the lifeboat, the lifeboat has a safety factor 
built in which, if ignored, can allow an additional 10 people on the lifeboat. The 50 
people in the boat see 100 people swimming around and wonder what they should do. 
Option 1: Complete Justice requires that everyone deserves to live, so the 50 people let 
the 100 on the lifeboat. The boat is swamped, everyone dies. Option 2: Admit 10 
people. There is no longer any safety factor, and there is an additional problem of how to 
decide which ten people should be saved. Option 3: Admit no one and watch for 
boarding parties. Hardin concludes that this is the operational metaphor we must 
consider to survive in the real world. He uses this metaphor, along with additional 
metaphors to argue that we should not provide "technological" aid to poor counties, e.g., 
food or money, i.e., he argues for the third option. 
First, in another move reminiscent to Galton's work, Hardin calculates the rates of 
reproduction within the lifeboat and with the swimmers. The doubling time of the U.S. 
lifeboat is every 87 years, while the doubling time of the swimmers is 35 years. If it is 
required that the people in the lifeboats take care of the people swimming, then within a 
few generations, the swimmers would quickly outstrip the lifeboats. Thus, Hardin argues 
that a sharing ethics results in the tragedy of the commons. If the gain of each individual 
is not proportional to his responsibility, then the system collapses. To show this, Hardin 
discusses another metaphor, "The World Food Bank." 
The New Commons, in international affairs, is the proposal for a World Food Bank. 
In the World Food Bank, the rich nations contribute their surplus goods, while the poor 
countries are allowed to withdraw and use the goods. Hardin gives two problems with 
this idea. First, an analogy with businesses: Organizations that do not budget for 
emergencies fall by the wayside. By struggling, people leam lessons. Organizations with 
forsight will survive and maybe even thrive. If a business (or a family) is always bailed 
out of financial ruin, money is wasted. Hardin claims that this applies to countries also, 
"If it is open to every country every time a need develops, slovenly rulers will not be 
motivated to take Joseph's advice.. .others will bail them out whenever they are in 
trouble." A dependency cycle will result where the rulers never learn proper 
management. The second problem with the world food bank is that "Some countries will 
make deposits in the world food bank and others will withdraw from it; there will be 
almost no overlap. Calling such a depository transfer unit a 'bank' is stretching the 
2277, metaphor of bank beyond its elastic limits. The disaster of mismanagement and no 
overlap is argued for in another metaphor, the "The Ratchet Effect." 
According to Hardin, a country that has responsible populations would become stable 
through the following process. The population will live within the carrying capacity of 
the land with safety factors. As the safety factors are used up and the carrying capacity is 
transgressed, overpopulation occurs. In the natural course of affairs the lack of resources 
causes part of the population to die off. Eventually the population will re-stabalize with 
the natural resources. Without outside interference, this cycle repeats until either the 
population dies out because they didn't leam the lessons, or the population stabilizes 
because of population control. Hardin admits that this seems cruel. After all, it does 
entail periods of suffering and death. It also seems like the "Right" thing to do, if we 
want to save the swimmers, is to set up a food bank so that the people do not starve and 
die. However, these intuitions are false, according to Hardin (and Galton and Spencer). 
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In reality, a country that has access to a food bank will experience more suffering and 
death in the long run. A food bank acts as the pawl of a ratchet. Whenever a country 
reaches overpopulation, it has used up its resources. The country turns to a food bank, 
and people start eating and reproducing more. Yet the natural resources never have a 
chance to regenerate. In other words, the food bank allows a country to systematically 
overrun the carrying capacity of the area. Population sizes continue to increase without 
hope of stabilizing. The process only stops when the system collapses. Since people 
used the food bank, there are more people then normally allowed. Consequently, there is 
now even more suffering and death than if there was no aid. Hardin concludes, "Under 
the guidance of this ratchet, wealth can be steadily moved in one direction only, from the 
slowly breeding rich to the rapidly breeding poor, the process finally coming to a halt 
only when all countries are equally and miserably poor. 22897 
The rest of the article uses these metaphors as a foundation to try to show how the 
population problem will not be solved by giving out money or food or allowing 
immigration. For example, by increasing the population, or giving aid that increases the 
population in 3rd world countries (the swimmers) we transgress on the commons: food, 
air, water, unspoiled scenery, solitude, beaches, fishing, hunting, etc. Immigration 
creates a commons by speeding up the destruction of the rich countries. Interestingly, 
Hardin identifies the metaphor that usually justifies allowing immigration, the Statue of 
Liberty. The Statue presents an image of "an infinitively generous earth-mother, 
passively opening her arms to hordes of immigrants who come here on their own 
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2297, initiative. Hardin ultimately concludes that no aid should be given to the 3rd world 
countries unless we want lots of suffering in the future. 
I am not arguing for or against Garrett Hardin's conclusion. (Although, I think that 
Peter Singer has a much better argument for famine relief that can respond to many of the 
criticisms Hardin makes about the consequences of giving aid.) My interest is in seeing 
how Hardin conceives of using metaphors in argument. Hardin is as an example of a 
person who is using metaphor and acknowledging that he is using it. In fact, Hardin has 
the following to say about metaphor 
It is probably impossible to approach an unsolved problem save through the 
door of metaphor.. .since metaphorical thinking is inescapable it is pointless 
merely to weep about our human limitations.. .to avoid conscious suicide we 
are well advised to pit one metaphor against another.. .we may come closer to 
metaphor-free solutions to our problems.230 
Hardin actually uses an ethical analysis consistent with the cognitive view of metaphor. 
Lifeboat ethics are irreducible, experiential, focusing, and creative. Hardin does a good 
job of laying out the metaphors and using them in arguments. However, contrary to his 
last claim, Hardin never drops the lifeboat metaphor, "For the foreseeable future survival 
demands that we govern our actions by the ethics of a lifeboat. Posterity will be ill 
served if we do not.23"' Although he never does abandon metaphor for a "metaphor-free 
solution", he shows just how entangled understanding is with metaphor. 
A natural question would be in what way is Hardin's use of metaphor any better than 
the Nazi doctors? After all, they each result in practices that some people find intuitively 
repulsive. In one case we have active genocide; in the other case we are letting people 
starve to death because they are poor. First, Hardin's use of metaphor follows the 
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cognitive view of metaphor developed in the first part of this thesis, the metaphors not 
being true or false, but useful or not in gaining understanding about what we think about 
the world. Second, by acknowledging the fact that he is using metaphor, he allows 
(whether or not he wants to) for the possibility of not having a claim to "Truth." In this 
respect, I think he is trying to model ethics more on experience and understanding (and 
maybe even on the scientific method). I think that the distinction between the uses of 
metaphor as the Nazi used them and as Hardin used them display an important move 
within ethical discourse, where ethicists need to evaluate the role metaphors are playing 
within their arguments. Now, we turn away from ethics to the realm of mathematics. 
Mathematics 
This thesis originally started out as an exploration of metaphors used in science and 
an exploration of metaphors used in ethics. The original goal was to explore metaphor 
and the possibility of a connection between science and ethics. During the research for 
this project, I have discovered a virtual web of connections between science, math, ethics, 
and metaphor. In this final section, I would like to use some connections between math 
and metaphor to suggest an implication regarding ethical arguments. 
If we look within the history of science, we can see two movements. One movement 
tries to put math into science, the other tries to get metaphor out of science. The math 
movement was successful. Mathematics and science are now intimately connected. In 
fact, math is now seen as a logically necessary (although not necessarily sufficient) 
condition of science. We see this as people argue that their field of interest is a science 
because it uses math, e.g., psychology, sociology, astrology, and acupuncture. Ridding 
science of metaphor, however, did not happen. As we have seen, metaphor permeates 
science. In this case metaphor is necessary (not in a logically sense) as a component of 
understanding. Part of the resistance to the idea of metaphors in science is based on the 
interpretation of metaphors as lying in the realm of the subjective imagination. Part of 
the acceptance of mathematics within science is based on the interpretation of 
mathematics as lying in the realm of objective rationality. I suggest that it is impossible 
to both (1) put math into science and (2) rid science of metaphor. I base this on the 
finding of George Lakoff and Rafael E. N ~ e z ' s  book Where Mathematics Comes From: 
How the Embodied Mind Brings Mathematics into Being. 
There is something seen as special about mathematics. Love it or hate it, 
mathematics has a special status within peoples' beliefs. Lakoff and Nufiez identifL this 
belief as "The Romance of Mathematics." Some beliefs associated with this romance are 
Mathematics is an objective feature of the universe; mathematical objects 
are real; mathematical truth is universal, absolute, and certain. 
Mathematics would be the same even if there were no human beings, or 
beings of any sort. Though mathematics is abstract and disembodied, it is 
real. 
Since logic itself can be formalized as mathematical logic, mathematics 
characterizes the very nature of rationality. 
The mathematics of physics resides in physical phenomena 
themselves.. .'the book of nature is written in mathematics7.. .the language 
of mathematics is the language of nature and that only those who know 
mathematics can truly understand nature. 
Mathematics is the queen of sciences. It defines what precision is. The 
ability to make mathematical models and do mathematical calculations is 
what makes science what it is.232 
What Lakoff and Nufiez discover is that many of the above claims are either false or 
misleading. They do this by showing that a large portion of mathematics is based on 
metaphorical concepts. If they are correct about the metaphorical nature of mathematics, 
then it follows that it is impossible to both (1) put math into science and (2) rid science of 
metaphor. Rather than completely summarize their arguments (about 450 pages worth of 
argumentation) I will highlight the metaphorical structures they discovered in math and 
logic. 
Modem mathematics (as taught to us in school) arises from a combination of innate 
number discrimination, subitizing, the use of symbols, calculation, the memorization of 
short tables, and 4 grounding metaphors + one convention. Various forms of innate 
number discrimination within babies have been found in recent studies: Babies can 
distinguish between collections of two and three objects (3 or 4 days old); babies can 
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recognize "that one plus one is two and that two minus one is one" (by 4 % months); 
babies can recognize "that two plus one is three and that three minus one is two" (a little 
later); babies can "recognize the numerical equivalence between arrays of objects and 
drumbeats of the same number."233 Thus, we have a limited innate ability to group 
objects. All humans can also subitize, or at a glance identify up to about four objects.234 
The four metaphors come into play because metaphors provide a cognitive understanding 
of one area in terms of another. Thus, mathematics (in this case arithmetic) is understood 
by use of ordinary, nonrnathematical domains. 
The most basic operational metaphor within arithmetic is that "Arithmetic As Object 
Collection." Numbers are understood as the size of the collection. Operations are 
changes in the size of the collections. We learn this at an early age, "If John has 3 apples 
and Susie has 2 apples, then how many apples do they have?" This metaphor is limited 
as seen in the following example, "If John has 3 apples and Susie takes away 5 apples, 
how many apples does John have?" There are several problems. How do we deal with a 
"Negative Collection," what are fractions, and what does it mean to have a collection of 
"No Items?" We may get kactions, but we must define "0" and "Negatives." 
Another metaphor used in arithmetic is "Arithmetic As Object Construction." In this 
case, numbers are whole objects made up of parts; the parts are also (in some cases) 
whole objects made up of other parts. Thus, five is made up of three and two. Since 
numbers are objects, there is no number zero under this conceptual scheme. We now 
have a more intuitive notion of kactions. We also have the "Measuring Stick Metaphor" 
where a length is representing a unit. Thus, length = number. Without this metaphor, 
233 Lakoff and Niu5ez. Where Mathematics Comes From 1 5- 19 
234 Lakoff and N ~ e z .  Where Mathematics Comes From. 19-21 
irrational numbers, like 42, cannot exist. This is because 42 represents the non-rational 
length of the hypotenuse of a right triangle with legs of length one. If you assume that 
only rational numbers exist (which you have to with the first two metaphors) then, 42 
cannot exist. (This shows directly how mathematical objects, like pi, i, and e, cannot 
exist apart fiom mental construction, i.e., they are only 'out there' in the sense that we 
developed our understanding that way.) The final grounding metaphor is "Arithmetic As 
Motion Along a Path." This is very similar to the measuring stick metaphor, yet zero is 
automatically defined as a point-location. This metaphor also provides for a natural way 
to conceive of negative numbers and of numbers lying between other numbers. 
Lakoff and Niifiez show how the above four metaphors take us from the innate 
mathematical ability to complex mathematics. The book has many metaphors that show 
how logic, mathematics (and by extension science) relies on metaphorical thinking: Many 
people who teach Venn Diagrams are using the metaphor that "Classes Are 
23577 Containers. College Algebra and Trigonometry students daily make use of Descartes' 
metaphor "Numbers are Points on a Line" to combine geometry and algebra. Calculus 
students use the Cartesian Coordinate System to combine Euclidean Space with 
Changing Motion. "Space" has two different metaphorical interpretations depending on 
whether sets of points define space or space contains sets of points. "Point" is either a 
disc of zero diameter or an infinitely shrinking disc. Numbers can be real, granular, 
imaginary, hyperreal, etc. 
Math is full of metaphor. I suggest that because of the metaphorical nature of 
mathematics it is impossible to both (1) put math into science and (2) rid science of 
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metaphor. Ethical implications? I have heard some people disparage ethical study 
because it makes use of metaphor and that this is not modeled on "science." Well, they 
cannot have it both ways. Most ethical arguments are grounded in logical reasoning. 
Logical reasoning is grounded in mathematical reasoning. Mathematical reasoning is 
grounded on metaphorical reasoning. Thus, even the structure of ethical arguments 
cannot avoid some type of metaphorical reasoning, which is one more way that metaphor 
provides a link between science and ethics. 
This chapter thus shows us the consequences of taking metaphors as true when they 
are imposed upon us by our leaders, how to argue with metaphors in a manner more 
consistent with the cognitive view of metaphor, and how we can't get metaphor out of 
math, science, or ethics. 
Chapter VII: Metaphor: A Bridge Between Science and Ethics 
Summary 
Chapter One: Introduction 
Science and ethics are often considered disjoint areas where science is a description 
of the way things are, while ethics concerns itself with the evaluation of human action 
and how we ought to be. However, it is common to accept the injection of ethics into 
science, e.g., genetic engineering or artificial womb technology (although ethics and the 
law are usually playing catch-up). It is also usually considered not acceptable to use 
science to justify ethics, e.g., deriving morality from evolutionary theory (sometimes this 
relates to the naturalistic fallacy). Rather than tackle either one of these issues, this thesis 
starts with the observation that people do combine science with ethics. Then, we step 
back from these issues and ask some questions: What, if anything, is the underlying 
connection between science and ethics? Alternatively, how do people so naturally make 
the connections? One possible answer is with metaphor. I arrived at this idea after 
seeing Dr. Doren Recker's work concerning metaphor in science. His work shows how 
we can conceive metaphor as a cognitive tool that unintentionally links the gap between 
science and pseudoscience, e.g., evolution and creationism. 
This paper explores the rout to a cognitive theory of metaphor and examines 
metaphors used in science and ethics. This exploration shows that: (1) Metaphorical 
structures provide a mechanism of understanding one domain in terms of another. (2) 
When people use metaphors to understand the world we live in, the same metaphors can 
be used within science and ethics. (3) Therefore, it is plausible that metaphors provide a 
cognitive connection between science and ethics; i.e., metaphors bridge the gap between 
science and ethics. 
Chapter Two: Traditional Theories: The Big Three 
Comparison Theory 
The comparison theory, one of the oldest theories of metaphor tracing its roots to 
Aristotle, states that metaphorical objects involve a comparison of similarity between two 
or more objects. The CTM is most often interpreted as a metaphysical theory, meaning 
metaphors describe an underlying objective reality in which common similarity exists 
between the metaphorical elements. CTM is also often associated with the idea that 
metaphors are similes, with the "like" or "as" taken out. Using examples like-Sally is a 
block of ice and Richard is a Gorilla-Searle shows how Metaphors may fail to be 
metaphysically based. In the first example, the common elements do not exist between 
the objects; in the second example, the characteristics exist, yet are based on a 
misunderstanding of the nature of gorillas. 
With respect to the simile theory, Searle argues that the theory does not give us an 
account for computing the meaning of metaphors and that metaphors and similes have 
differing truth-values, thus they cannot be the same. I argue that the first complaint 
merely establishes that more work is needed within the theory and that metaphors and 
similes do not necessarily have differing truth-values. By using math examples (12+1=1, 
.999. ..=I) I show how truth is context dependent. Thus, similes and metaphors may 
really be evaluated similarly because similes are really metaphors; however, it is not 
The speech act theory completes this chapter and our exploration of the three most 
common metaphor theories that get us to a cognitive view of metaphor. In this theory, 
Searle was concerned with how people can say one thing and mean another. He claims 
that a statement may be interpreted in one of two ways. The Speakers Meaning is what 
the person is hylng to communicate. The Sentence Meaning is what the sentence means 
by itself. Searle further draws out that context counts. For example, "she is tall," "the cat 
is on the mat," or "it's getting hot in here." Searle further gives a method for identifying 
and partially understanding a metaphor. 
Chapter two brings out the following issues: Theory may be metaphysically based 
(describing underlying reality independent of human interaction) or the theory may be 
epistemological based (describing the way humans understand and experience the world); 
These theories provide a basis for identifying metaphors and partially deciphering them; 
hrthennore, metaphors may be creative and focusing; finally context matters. 
Chapter Three: Colorful Linguistic Expression vs. Cognitive Role 
Donald Davidson argues that metaphors mean what the words, in their most literal 
interpretation, mean-nothing more. He arrives at this conclusion from at least three 
related claims: (1) Metaphor conveys truth about the world much as plainer prose. (2) 
Literal meaning and truth conditions can be assigned to words and sentences apart from 
contextual usage. (3) Metaphor does not have cognitive content. I respond with: (1) 
Maybe, (2) I do not think so, and (3) no. 
I do not specifically respond to the notion of how we arrive at truth with respect to 
plainer prose because that could be a thesis in itself! However, it seems that Davidson 
arrives at the truth of plainer prose by a logical positive method. Thus, truth (and 
meaning) is built up fi-om verifiable empirical claims, much like Cartesian 
Foundationalism. I do not think that meaningful understanding arises this way. For 
example, if a person asks me "What is love?" Under Davidson's understanding, I would 
give a definition-intense affection, sexual desire, or a zero score in tennis. However, I 
am not sure that would give understanding. Taking the cognitive approach of Lakoff and 
Johnson, I would say that to understand the meaning of love, you would use a 
combination of metaphors, "Love is a journey," "Love is a collaborative work of art," 
"Love is war," etc. I am guessing that for Davidson, truth leads to meaning and 
understanding, while for Lakoff and Johnson, understanding leads to meaning and truth. 
I am not sure what to think about literal meaning and truth conditions independent 
from contextual usage. Context certainly counts in math, "12+1=1," "12+1=13," 
".999.. .=I," "2+3=5 is equivalent to 5=3+2." I am not sure where to find context free 
truth statements that when combined give meaning and understanding of the world and 
my relationship with it. Even if we can find a collection of true statements, there does 
not seem to be a way to combine them together to get meaning and understanding. For 
example, I can put together a collection of true math statements, yet if I gave the 
collection to someone, I am not convinced that the person could derive an understanding 
of mathematics. Truth seems to be a component to survivability, meaning, and 
understanding, but it does not seem to be independent of them. 
Finally, Davidson does not establish, in the essay I reviewed, that metaphor has no 
cognitive content. He claims that a literal interpretation implies that there is no creative 
component to metaphor, to which I reply that metaphors are often created-the similarity 
is not there until the author or audience of the metaphor, e.g. forges the relationship, 
gravity is super-percolated coffee grounds. Davidson further argues that metaphor must 
not have a cognitive content because people have a difficult time laying out the cognitive 
content. I respond that there are many areas where it is difficult to describe something, 
yet we do not deny the existence, e.g., explaining color to the blind, working on 
understanding a math concept, or seeing a picture. I argue for an "Ah Ha" account of 
understanding that does not require the ability to express the concepts. Furthermore, the 
special cognitive content of metaphor arises because metaphors structure our belief 
systems by allowing us to understand one area in terms of another. 
Lakofand Johnson argue that metaphor is the primary way in which we structure and 
understand the world. Under this idea there are four aspects of metaphor. Metaphor is 
irreducible because it has no truth-value with respect to an objective realm independent 
of human understanding; metaphor is better understood as good or bad. Metaphor is 
focusing because it highlights some areas while downplaying others. Metaphor is 
creative because it connects previously disjoint areas. Finally, metaphor is experiential 
because it changes the way we experience life and our relationship / understanding or the 
world. We can see these aspects if we take the time to evaluate the following: time is 
money vs. time is a frisbee, man is a wolf vs. man is a rabbit, love is a collaborative work 
of art vs. love is hell, the world is a machine vs. the world is an organism, a thesis 
defense vs. a thesis construction. 
Lakoff and Johnson also bring up the fact that their theory gives neither an objective 
theory of truth or a subjective theory of truth. A traditional view of metaphor is that if it 
is not objective, it must be subjective. Moreover, subjectivity is dangerous because truth 
is important to survivability. This cognitive theory of metaphor (as developed by Lakoff 
and Johnson) denies objectivism's claims to absolute and unconditional truth. They hold 
that truth is relative to understanding; understanding is based in part by our culture and 
metaphorical system. However, they also deny subjectivist's claims to individual truth 
and intuition because understanding is based on successful fhctioning in our physical 
and cultural environment. Lakoff and Johnson propose an experiential synthesis that 
combines two systems, e.g., rationality and emotion, reason and imagination, the known 
and unknown. 
From this chapter, I conclude the following: Context matters, It is not necessarily 
desirable to structure metaphors as T/F, there are four aspects of metaphorical 
understanding; Objective and subjective truth systems are not the only game in town. 
Because of this understanding of metaphor, I conclude that: For some people, metaphors 
provide a method of understanding and experiencing the world. Thus, it is possible that 
metaphor provides a cognitive link between science and ethics. 
Chapter 4: The World Is? 
This chapter highlights that throughout history there is an interconnection between 
science and ethics. The nature of the interconnection depends, in a large part, on the 
metaphors chosen to describe the world. In this chapter we looked at "The world is a 
machine" and "The world is an organism" 
The World is a Machine was largely developed in the 16" century. From an 
intellectual religious view, it was pushed with the belief of a rational / perfect God as 
Engineer. From a secular view, we have many people working with new machines and 
mathematics. As the machines and math became more complex, the model began to be 
pushed to describe the world. The four aspects of metaphor helped us see how this 
metaphor shaped understanding: Irreducibility-the metaphor was not taken (originally) 
as true or false, but as a pragmatic view of understanding. Focusing-the metaphor 
stressed analysis, taking things apart, passive matter, change based on matter in motion, 
and engineering models. Creative-the metaphor was created and gave a new way to 
understand the world. Experiential-the metaphor provided a new way to treat the world 
and offered new questions to ask. The competing metaphor is the world is an organism. 
The World is an Organism has two different views, a primitive (mother earth) and 
modem (Gaia) view. This metaphor is evident in environmental ethics and our behavior 
or treatment towards the Earth, e.g., Smohalla of the Columbia Basin Tribes talking about 
cutting the mother. The four aspects of metaphor also helped us understand this view. 
Irreducible-the metaphor provides a model of understanding that is so powerful, people 
often fight as if it were true. Focus-the metaphor provides a holistic view; it stresses the 
interconnections between things in proper context; matter is active; different centers of 
activity have interconnections between them; it stresses biological models. Creative- 
both primitive and modem views were created based on observations of the world. We 
also saw new entailments, e.g., Superorganisms. Experiential-the metaphor certainly 
changes the way people act: radical environmentalists, humanity as a cancer, and some 
experience this as a "Natural" reaction to the inhumanity of the mechanical view. 
We saw the different ways these metaphors guide science by looking at ape studies: 
kill, dissect, poke, prod, inject, etc. verses passively watching, learning, etc. Finally, we 
looked at how the machine metaphor shaped the debate between Descartes and Hume 
regarding the reasoning ability in animals. Hume relied on a strict analogy between 
humans and animals through their anatomy and behavior. We saw his claims that 
humans and animals learn from experience in the same manner, induction. Induction is 
not based on reason but custom and habit, both of which are used to train humans and 
animals. Descartes holds that animals are machines that react to the environment; 
humans have a mechanical body but a mental thinking substance. He further claims that 
humans have a mental substance that distinguishes our difference from animals because 
(1) Humans have complex language and (2) Reason is a universal instrument, not like 
specific organs of the animals (that can only provide one function) 
From this chapter we see the pervasive nature of metaphor in science and ethics. 
When we allow multiple metaphors to understand one subject, we allow for greater 
understanding of the world. Furthermore, metaphor is pervasive in philosophical 
argument. 
Chapter 5: Evolutionary Metaphors 
Evolutionary Metaphor: Science 
Darwin's use of metaphor is a case study in the applicability (and acceptability) of 
metaphors used in science. Induction and Newton's Four Rules largely defined Science, 
at his time. However, these gave various methodologies: NaYve (strict) empiricist, 
Positivist Vera Causa, Empiricist Vera Causa, Rationalist Vera Causa. We saw how 
metaphor fit into both the 3" and 4h position, as does Darwin's methodology. Darwin 
was concerned with the new forms debate. His response, evolutionary theory, involved 
the extensive use of metaphors. 
Natural Selection is a metaphor that relies on the concept of artificial selection. For 
artificial selection to work, we need variability of individuals, a large population, and 
selection of characteristics. By the use of the metaphor the struggle for existence, and 
Malthus' studies on population growth and subsistence growth, Darwin is able to 
establish that natural selection meets the same three criteria as artificial selection. He 
describes selection as a struggle for existence. This struggle is further described by two 
metaphors, The Wedge Analogy-the competitive nature of evolution; The Entangled 
Bank-the cooperative nature of evolution. Although there was some question as to what 
exactly the metaphors implied-a creator, and some question about using other 
metaphors, e.g., the Sunday stroll for existence-Darwin never gave up the metaphors. 
Furthermore, they appear necessary to understanding his theory. 
Evolutionary Metaphor: Ethics 
Next, we turned to Galton and Spencer's use of metaphors. This is a case study in the 
metaphorical transfer of understanding from science into ethics. Galton was the founder 
of the modem eugenics movement. His main concern was with how hurnan societies are 
shaped by evolution. He builds his case by trylng to show the harm of not following 
eugenics: the ignorant poor will swamp the educated rich; population growth studies 
show how the educated may be pushed out of existence; civilized culture will be 
destroyed. He uses example fiom the dark ages in Europe, prohibitions of marriage with 
university instructors, and how the church eliminated people to show that the civilized 
human race is in danger of being destroyed. 
We saw how Galton's claims were faulty. His selection of metaphors is poor and 
thus ignores the full theory of evolution. Spencer faired little better. Spencer was the 
founder of social Darwinism and argued against poor laws. He claimed that laws and 
institutions should be implemented that W h e r  human progress by eliminating the weak 
or inferior members of society. He believed that evolution applies to society and species, 
e.g., they both move fiom simple to complex, general to particular, and homogeneous to 
heterogeneous structures. He argued that forced charity (poor laws) harms society: 
forced charity subverts the natural inclinations for charity, adds ineffective middleman, 
gives to random charity, is against nature because struggle is natural; short term suffering 
is better than long term suffering; poor laws halt learning through struggle and self- 
sacrifice and do not result in a net increase of social stability or utility. 
Spencer suffered from similar problems as Galton. He exclusively used one focusing 
metaphor while ignoring others, inserted ideas of "Progress" and "Good" into 
evolutionary theory, and his own metaphor "Survival of the fittest" is rather poor. 
From chapter five we learn that metaphor can be successfblly used in science, that 
metaphor is necessary in some sciences, and that Darwin's metaphors are necessary for 
his theory. We see metaphors going from one area to the other, and Darwin's metaphors 
helped bridge the gap between science and ethics. 
Chapter 6: Miscellaneous Metaphors: Nazi, Lifeboat, Math 
me Nazi Doctors 
The people who get to impose their metaphors on the culture get to define what we 
consider true-absolutely and objectively true-L&J. The Nazis used both organic and 
mechanical metaphors in their project. One thing they did was to change the role of a 
physician. Traditionally, a physician would have one of the following relationships with 
his or her patients: Parental, Partnership, Rational Contract, Friendship, or Technician. 
The Nazis changed the role of a physician to a Social Healer / Killer. We saw this in 
such statements as, "I would remove a gangrenous appendix.. . 99 
The Nazis made use of many metaphors. For example, based on superorganic 
metaphors, the Volk is an organism, and must be protected (not killed, allowed to pass on 
genetic material). Moreover, The Jew is a disease, which must be cut out. Many 
metaphors were adopted to describe the Jews as either a biological danger or as sub- 
human: Racial pollution and tuberculosis; Parasites and bacteria; Vampires; Maggots; 
Ants; Dogs. 
The Nazi made an entire medical killing machine based on the simple idea of "Life 
Unworthy of Life." They justified sterilization of the criminally insane & hereditary sick 
based on the metaphors that they were a cancer on society, taking up resources, 
threatening racial purity, mentally dead, human ballast, and empty shells. Child 
euthanasia was justified to stop the cancer from growing in society, saving the body of 
the Volk. They were not murdered or killed, but "Put to sleep" or given a "Special diet." 
Adult euthanasia was similarly justified as cutting out the cancer. It was merely special 
treatment of useless eaters. They also got special diets-totally fat free meals. Direct 
Killing (14fl3) and mass murder then began in the camps. It to was justified under 
metaphorical grounds. It was merely the final solution to the Jewish question. It 
involved medical tiage, the central hospital, and getting rid of the living dead. 
Lifeboat Ethics 
Garret Hardin understands metaphor as not true or false, but as providing 
understanding that may get to truth. His first metaphor "The Tragedy of the Commons" 
attempts to answer the population problem. His conclusion is that there are no technical 
solutions. He bases the population problem on an understanding that Malthus' 
predictions are coming true and Adam Smith's Invisible Hand is not working. He uses 
Conclusion: 
(1) Metaphor structures thought by providing a mechanism of understanding one 
domain in terms of another. 
(2) When people use metaphors to understand the world we live in, the same 
metaphors can be used within science and ethics. 
(3) Therefore, it is plausible that metaphors provide a cognitive connection 
between science and ethics, i.e., metaphors bridge the gap between science 
and ethics. 
Future-Projects 
There are several assumptions, implications and questions left unanswered. Can we 
answer "We Should" before we know "We are"? Agreement in ethics is based on 
agreement on our metaphors. We get many of our metaphors based on their success in 
science. The success of science is based, in large part, on its success of mathematics. 
Nevertheless, metaphors in science are not true or false, they relate to understanding. 
Therefore, what is the statues of ethics using metaphor? How does science reach 
agreement on the metaphors it uses? Success. What is success? What is success in 
ethics? How can ethics ever reach success with their metaphorical argument without 
resorting to who has the biggest sword? 
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Appendix 
Appendix 1 : Fragments 
This is simply a list of metaphors and thoughts regarding metaphors I have chanced 
upon during the research phase of this paper. 
Fragments: 
Some fun metaphors 
o A sea of troubles 
o The solution of my problem 
o Argument is war. 
o Biology.. .Struggle for survival, survival of the fittest, natural selection 
o The allegory of the cave 
o In mathematical linguistics and formal language theory.. .node, branch, 
root node, leaf nodes, path.. .all using aspects of metaphor. 
o Statistics.. .stem and leaf diagrams 
o Physics.. .force of a field, flow of heat 
o Toricelli.. .Air as a "sea of air." 
o Harvey.. ."Heart is a pump." 
o Wave Theory of Light 
o Continental Drift 
o Ben Franklin.. . "electricity is a fluid." 
He also stressed, "Time is Money." 
o Metaphor is a filter. 
o Chomsky.. .colorless green ideas sleep fbriously. 
o Metaphor is the picture of our reality. 
o The world is a 56 Ford Truck. 
o The world is a balding rubber tire. 
o The World is a Vampire. 
o Bentham.. . "Rights are non-sense on stilts." 
o Kafka.. . "A good book is an axe in the frozen sea." 
o Liebnitz.. . "We are infinite machines all the way down." 
o We are software rewriting itself. 
o Some of us are still running DOS. 
o Some of us are running Windows. 
o Sodium Chloride is 6, Cesium is 8, there is no 7. 
o DNA: Blueprint, Archive, Instructions, Library, Cipher, Code 
Biologist fight over which term to use, so how can it only be 
colorful language? 
o The bloody food chain. 
o The deadly feast of life. 
o Buckminster Fuller.. .man is "A self-balancing, 28-jointed adapter-base 
biped; an electrochemical reduction plant, integral with segregated 
stowages of special energy extracts in storage batteries for subsequent 
actuation of thousands of hydraulic and pneumatic pumps with motors 
attached.. ..The whole, extraordinary complex mechanism guided with 
exquisite precision fi-om a turret in which are located telescopic and 
microscopic self-registering and recording range finders, a spectroscope, 
etc.; the turret control being closely allied with an air-conditioning intake- 
and-exhaust, and a main fuel intake. . . ." 
o Plato.. ."Man is a biped without feathers." 
o Not eugenics but biological solidarity 
o The Mad Scientist. 
o Bio-prospecting 
o Brute-force testing 
o Genetic material as products. 
o Industry Actors 
o Research opportunities appear as lottery tickets.. .price, probability, and 
jackpots. 
o The Blind Watchmaker 
o Earth as a nurse. 
o Earth as the wicked step-mother. 
o The mind is a calculating machine. 
o A calculator is a living bank clerk. 
o The bootstrap model of nuclear physics. 
o The mind is a computer. 
o You see the problem? 
o DNA, the stupid molecule. 
o War is Peace 
o Freedom is Slavery 
o Ignorance is Strength 
o Real vs. Abstract metaphors in computer interfacing. 
o Order of discovery is rock-climbing; order of presentation is swimming. 
o Metaphors of light.. . 
o Third world countries as children. 
o Computers are toys, calculators, or ??? 
o Ethics is Superman. 
Metaphors only have an illusion of truth-value. 
Metaphor + intuition of knowledge (rationalist or empiricist) = influencing 
condition in belief of a theorykypothesis. 
More problems with the literal.. .e.g., What is the difference between (1) He was 
caught red handed, (2)  he was literally caught red handed (a) caught murdering, 
(b) with paint on hands, (3) this book is black, (4) this book is literally black.. .I 
think that I know what we mean by 2+3=5 in a literal meaning, but what about the 
literal meaning of her mood is blue? 
Non-literal = emotive force? 
Look at all the projects for understanding and manipulating nature (pre- 
Descartes). . .Look at science after Descartes method. What works? Science. 
What makes it work? Mathematics. So, lets make language more like 
mathematics (with definite truth values). . .they forgot that math is a model, so too 
is language.. .much like computer programs (machine language, translator, 
programming language, natural language.. .much like the line?) 
Test for AI: Can it use and understad metaphor? 
How do we shape our own world? By the metaphors we choose to live by. 
Bridge terms? 
Science uses models and models are a type of metaphor.. .or metaphor is a type of 
model? 
Implications of mechanical and organic models? 
o As mechanical view gains complexity.. .can it push out organic view? 
o Time line - organic, mechanic, organic, mechanic. . . 
The mechanical metaphor will seem most intuitive (in science) to people with 
knowledge of math. 
Similes are metaphors; we just use a simile when we are afraid that our metaphor 
will be rejected. 
Metaphors gone wrong, see the Flat Earth Society 
The Journey is now complete, now I am a Master! 
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